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DI SSERTATION ABSTRACT 
Esse/Essence and Grace: 
A Theological Inquiry into Thomist Methodology 
Traditional Thomism, both philosophical and theologi-
cal, has assumed that the esse/essence distinction drawn by 
St Thomas Aquinas lies within the domain of philosophy 
(nature) rather than of theology (grace). The source of 
this assumption is Thomas himself, who supposed the substan-
tial correlation of esse and essence to be natural, thereby 
relegating grace to the role of accident. This dissertation 
challenges that fundamental assumption. 
The dissertation consists of two parts. In Part I, the 
esse/essence distinction itself is analyzed. The approach 
is methodological, not historical. Arguing that the basic 
methodological principle of Thornism is the act/potency com-
plementarity which Thomas derived from Aristotle, Part I 
concludes that the correct application of that principle 
requires us to regard esse as gratuitous rather than as 
natural. That is to say, grace, within Thomist methodology, 
is substantial, not accidental. 
The second part of the dissertation applies the prin-
ciples of Thomist methodology worked out in Part I to con-
temporary Roman Catholic theology, first, with regard to the 
nature/grace problematic and the question of method which 
it has raised within this century, and, secondly, with regard 
Little - 4 
to the problem of contemporary historical con sciou s ne s s and 
the need for a new per spective which it has raised i n the 
wake of Vatican II. Arguing that Transcendental Thomism 
has failed to resolve the methodological problem with regard 
to the relationship between nature and grace and that liber-
ation theology has failed to find the new per spective which 
contemporary historical con scious ne ss indicate s we require, 
Part II concludes that the act/potency methodology of Aris-
totle, a s transformed by the Thomist esse/essence distinction, 
opens the way to a new theological approach to creation as 
Christocentric and covenantal, and that such an approach not 
only overcomes the methodological problems with regard to 
the nature/grace relationship, but also provides the new 
' perspective which historical cons~iousness today requires. 
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PREFACE 
This dissertation is an inquiry into Thomist method. It proceeds 
on the basis of two fundamental assumptions with regard to theological 
method. First, theological method deals with the formal structural 
principles employed in systematic theology. Secondly, theology itself 
is not concerned solely with God or with man, but with the union between 
the two. That union as given in Christ, the God-man, grounds the theolo-
gical enterprise. 
Theological method is therefore a correlation of the revelation 
given in Christ with methodological principles drawn from one or another 
of the humanistic disciplines. This dissertation deals explicitly with 
the correlation of the revelation and principles drawn from philosophy. 
In Plato and Aristotle, we are confronted with a fundamental choice 
between understanding reality as either extrinsic to or immanent within 
the material world. Plato proceeds on the basis of a notion of reality 
which treats the world as fallen from the essential integrity of pure 
form. Matter is, for him, that which fragments or disrupts the essential 
integrity of pure form. Such a notion of reality as dematerialized is 
expressed primarily in the principle of a form/matter contradiction or 
tension, whereby the fundamental ambiguity or angst of fragmented human 
existence is given a methodological account. 
Aristotle, rejecting the purely formal realm of Plato, identifies 
reality with the material world. Reality for Aristotle is therefore 
found in the material world and not apart from it. Such a notion of the 
v 
vi 
"really real" as the material world is expressed in Aristotle's prin-
ciple of the complementarity between act and potency, operative at the 
two levels of form/matter and substance/accident. 
When either the Aristotelian or the Platonic approach is employed 
in order to understand the structures of being or reality, we have 
philosopRy. When either of these approaches is correlated with the 
Christian revelation, we have moved from philosophy to theology. While 
both methods or approaches are capable of a theological transformation, 
this dissertation deals primarily with Aristotelian method and its 
transformation by St . Thomas Aquinas. 
This dissertation attempts to establish five points. First, the 
basic principle operative in Thomas' works is the act/potency complemen-
tarity which Thomas derived from Aristotle. Thomist method is therefore 
Aristotelian and not, as is often argued, either Platonic or a synthesis 
of Aristotle and Plato. Secondly, the esse/essence correlation intro-
duced by Thomas produces a radical transformation of Aristotelian 
method, a transformation which Thomas himself did not fully grasp or 
work out. Thirdly, that transformation is explicitly theological, and 
not, as is generally supposed, philosophical, inasmuch as it is the 
means by which the Aristotelian notion of material reality as necessary 
and eternal is transformed into the Christian notion of material reality 
as contingent and created. Fourthly, an analysis of the principle of 
esse within Thomist methodology requires us to recognize that the 
created order, within such a methodological framework, cannot be under-
stood as substantially natural, but must be recognized as substantially 
graced. Grace, therefore, is not solely accidental in Thomism, but 
operates at the level of substance as well. Fifthly, Thomas' trans-
vii 
formation of Aristotle is, methodologically speaking, necessarily 
Christocentric, inasmuch as an Aristotelian and, therefore, a Thomist 
method proceeds on the basis of an intrinsic, not an extrinsic, analysis 
of the world as real. Hence, the union of God and man cannot be reduced 
to notions of human participation in divinity which invoke an extrinsic 
source, whether this be Ipsum Esse, the divine essence, the Divine Ideas 
or the dis incarnate Logos. Rather, Christ must be recognized as the im-
manent sou~ce of unity and value in the created order, and the partici-
pation of humanity in divinity must be recognized as a mediated partici-
pation in Christ, the God-man. The substantial grace of creation is 
therefore, within Thomism, inseparable from the Incarnation and gratia 
Christi. 
The most important of these five points, the one most central to 
the overall purpose of the dissertation, is the final one, namely, 
the argument that Thomist method proceeds on the basis of an intrinsic, 
not an extrinsic, analysis of the material world. The first part of 
the dissertation focuses on the failures of Thomas and subsequent 
Thomist philosophers, as well as Aristotle himself, to locate within 
this world a unified source for the composite intrinsic principles or 
causes of this world. The failure to locate such an immanent source 
has produced successive appeals to extrinsic or dematerialized sources, 
• 
whether they be the separate substances or Prime Movers of Aristotle, 
the Divine Ideas of Thomas or the notion of Ipsum Esse employed by 
participationist Thomists. 
The second part of the dissertation examines contemporary Catholic 
theology and contemporary quantum physics, finding there the same 
failure, whether it be Rahner's appeal to an infinite horizon of being, 
viii 
Lonergan's appeal to infinite intelligence and the unrestricted desire 
to know, Metz' God of the absolute future or Einstein's God who does 
not play dice. In all of these cases, the reality and value of the 
world is reduced, in Platonic fashion, to a source extrinsic to it. 
However, the problems and questions which contemporary theology 
must face require that we locate reality and value within the· world. 
This is most acute with regard, first, to the nature/grace problem as 
it presents itself in this century, for the question is not one of 
locating an extrinsic source of grace nor even of asserting an immanent 
nexus between nature and grace, but of giving some methodological account 
of that immanent nexus. The need to locate reality and value within 
the world is also acute with regard to contemporary anthropocentrism and 
concern for the importance of the created order itself, where once again 
the question is not one of referring the value of this world to an ex-
trinsic' agent, but one of discovering within this world that source 
which unifies it and makes it good. 
Heretofore Catholic theology has failed to link Christ to creation. 
Yet just such a link is what we require in order to resolve both the 
methodological problem raised by nature and grace and the problem which 
contemporary historical consciousness raises when it seeks a value and 
unity in this material order and not apart from it. 
Both of these problems are explicitly Aristotelian ones, for they 
address the question of an immanent source of unity and intelligibility 
within the world. Their resolution is found in Christ, the God-man, 
in whom is given the union of the human and the divine. Therefore, a 
Thomist theological method, which proceeds by an analysis of immanent 
causality within the light of the revelation of Christ as the first-
born of creation (Col 1.16), the One for whom and by whom all things 
ix 
exist (1 Cor 8.5f, Heb 2.10), the One in whom all things hold together 
(Col 1.17), the Alpha and the Omega (Apoc 22.13), provides the basis 
for a theology of creation in Christ which responds directly to those 
theological needs which are most pressing today. 
English translations of the primary sources have been used exten-
sively in this dissertation. They include, with regard to Aristotle, 
R. McKeon (ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 
1941), and, with regard to St. Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, 
translated by Armand Maurer, 2nd rev. ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Insti-
tute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968), On the Power of God, translated by 
the English Dominican Fathers (Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 1952), 
On the Truth of the Catholic Faith (Summa Contra Gentiles), 4 volumes, 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., Image Books, 1955-1957), 
Summa Theologiae, 60 volumes, Blackfriars edition (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1964-1976), and Truth, 3 volumes, translated by 
Robert W. Mulligan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952-1954). 
This dissertation was done with the help of a large number of 
people. I would like to thank, first, my fellow students, especially 
Kevin McMahon, Cindy Guthrie, Sr. Susan Wood, Dan Hauser, Fr. Bill Kelly 
and Rev. Terry Scherf, for their enormous support and encouragement. 
Secondly, I would like to thank the members of my board, particularly 
Fr. Harry R. Klocker, S.J., for their advice and suggestions. And last, 
but certainly not least, I would especially like to thank Fr. Donald J. 
Keefe, S.J., the Director of this dissertation, without whom, in all 
manner of way, this work could never have been done. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Twentieth century Thomist philosophy cannot be faulted for igrior-
ing the real distinction between esse and essence. As one writer re-
cently noted, liThe year 1910 marks a watershed in the history of the 
real distinction debate; in that year the Jesuit Marcel Chossat re-
kindled the ever-smoldering embers of the real distinction controversy 
by doubting that St. Thomas ever held the doctrine traditionally as-
cribed to him."l Since few Thomists can be found who agree with Chos-
sat,2 the actual debate over this distinction has, in recent years, 
moved to higher ground. Assuming that St. Thomas did in fact draw such 
a distinction, most Thomists today ask whether or not that distinction 
and, indeed, Thomism itself, are best understood as fundamentally Aris-
totelian or fundamentally Neoplatonic. 3 The discussion has therefore 
tended to focus on the centrality of esse, on the one hand, and the 
notion of participation, on the other. 
Although disagreements among Thomists range far and run deep, 
these philosophers are as one in assuming the real distinction itself 
lGermain Kopaczynski, Linguistic Ramifications of the Essence-
Existence Debate (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 
1979), p. 62 (hereafter cited as Kopaczynski, Linguistic Ramifications). 
20ther recent Thomists who have denied the esse-essence distinction 
include Francis Cunningham, Pedro Descoqs and J. P. Kenney. 
3Earlier studies supported the view of an Aristotelian Thomism. 
More recent works, especially those of C. Fabro, L.-B. Geiger, J. de 
Finance, L. de Raeymaeker, A. Little and W. N. Clarke, argue for a 
strong Neoplatonic influence at work in Thomas' thought. 
2 
3 
to lie within the domain of philosophy rather than of theology. It is 
that assumption which Part I of this dissertation will challenge. The 
approach will be methodological, not historical. That is to say, no 
attempt will be made to claim that, in assuming the real distinction to 
be philosophical, contemporary Thomists are departing from what St. 
Thomas himself said. The textual evidence clearly indicates that Thomas 
did in fact understand the real distinction- to lie within the domain of 
philosophy. Instead, Part I will proceed on a different course, one 
which nevertheless closely parallels in some respects the recent Thomist 
discussions on the real distinction. 
First, the real distinction will be examined with regard to both 
act/potency and participation, in order to establish that the act/ • 
potency correlation is the basic methodological principle in Thomism. 
Such an examination parallels the current philosophical discussion on 
whether Thomas is Aristotelian or Neoplatonic, and that discussion will 
therefore be considered. Secondly, the place of esse will be appraised 
within Thomist methodology, with a view to establishing that, given the 
correct application of the act/potency principle, esse cannot properly 
be considered as a 'natural' element in existing things. Such an 
appraisal parallels the current philosophical discussion on the cen-
trality of esse in ThomFs' thinking, and that discussion will also be 
considered. The appraisal itself will show that, unless esse be under-
stood as gratuitous and its gratuity to be theological, no coherent 
systematic account of the nature/grace relationship can be given within 
Thomist methodology. 
CHAPTER 1 
ESSE/ESSENCE: THE THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT 
\ 
"Si on considere l'ensemble de la philosophie de St. Thomas on est 
frapp~ du role organique que joue cette doctrine capitale."l With those 
words, Roland-Gosselin has pinpointed both the importance of the esse/ 
essence distinction within Thomist philosophy and the source of the dif-
ficulties which arise when one attempts a methodological analysis of it. 
To paraphrase La Fontaine, all roads lead to the real distinction and, 
conversely, all roads lead from it. In this chapter, I will examine 
the real distinction both with regard to its definition and with re-
gard to its philosophical and theological uses by St. Thomas. No at-
tempt will be made to trace the chronological development of Thomas' 
thought; rather, what will be shown are the· interrelationships between 
this distinction and the methodological principles of act/potency and 
participation, on the one hand, and the theological doctrines of God as 
Ipsum Esse and the world as created, on the other. Only after the 
major elements in the structure have been set out can any attempt be 
• 2 made to determine the fundamental nature of that structure. 
~. D. Roland-Gosselin, Le 'De Ente et Essentia' de S. Thomas 
d'Aqin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1926), p. 185. 
2 See chapter 2. 
4 
" 
Definition of the Esse/Essence Distinction 
Without debate the Scholastics accepted the fact that the 
essence, considered as a mere possible, was really distinct 
from its act of being, from esse. The precise point of 
contention was the following:--in an actually existing con-
crete being, are the two elements which go to make up the 
being's metaphysical constitution, essence and esse, really 
distinct?3 ----
To this question, Thomas' answer was consistently affirmative. 
5 
'~aturity brought about a shift in St. Thomas's position on some matters, 
but in the matter of the real distinction the thought of St. Thomas re-
mained unchanged throughout his scholarly career.,,4 However, a second 
question remains. What sort of distinction are we talking about? 
Avicenna had held a real distinction between esse and essence in his 
account of esse as an accidental characteristic of existing essences. 
Giles of Rome was later to maintain a real distinction between esse and 
essence as two distinct things which, although they are found composed 
in beings, can nevertheless be separated by the power of God. There-
fore, as Kopaczynski points out, it would be less confusing and more 
accurate were we to speak not of the real distinction, but of the 
Thomist real distinction. 5 
There are three basic components to the Thomist real distinction. 
/ 
First, in contradistinction to Giles of Rome, Thomas maintains a dis-
• tinction of principles, not of things. For this reason, Thomists 
generally refer to it as a 'real minor' or a 'real metaphysical' 
3Kopaczynski, Linguistic Ramifications, pp. 8-9. 
4J . C. Taylor, s.v. "Essence and Existence," New Catholic Encyclo-
pedia, 5:550. 
5Kopaczynski, Linguistic Ramifications, pp. 9-10. 
distinction. 
A real distinction is found wherever there are really several 
things, parts, elements, and the like, independently of any 
act of the mind. • . • When the distinction is between complete 
things or beings, we speak of a major real distinction. When 
the distinction is between the parts (elements, principles) of 
one thing, we call it a minor real distinction (for example, 
the distinction between a man's hand and his foot; or the dis-
tinction between his color and his shape).6 
6 
Secondly, in contradistinction to Avicenna, Thomas maintains a real ir-
reducibility of either of these principles to the other. 7 There is 
nothing in the essence of a thing which permits us to conclude to its 
existence. 
Finally, the real distinction is perhaps more properly thought of 
as a real composition. " .. we commonly attribute to Thomas a 'dis-
tinction' of essence and existence, whereas he usually spoke of their 
8 
'composition'." In point of fact, Thomas uses the verb 'distinguere' 
9 
only once with reference to the relationship between esse and essence. 
The importance of this point cannot be stressed too much. There could 
be no composition between these principles unless they were distinct, 
6George P. Klubertanz, Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, 
2nd ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963), pp. 80-81. 
7 
"Everything that does not belong to the concept of an essence or 
quiddity comes to it from outside and enters into composition with the 
essence" (On Being and Essence, c. 4). Later, Thomas explicitly denies 
the Avicennian view of ~sse as an accident: "For the being of a thing, 
although other than its essence, nevertheless is not to be understood 
as something superadded in the fashion of an accident, but is as it 
were constituted by the principles of the essence" (In IV Metaph., 2, 
n. 558, English translation from Joseph Owens, An Elementary Christian 
Metaphysics [tfilwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1963], p. 43). 
8Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle 
Ages (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 421 (hereafter cited as Gilson, 
History). 
9"Cum dicitur: Diversum est esse et quod est, distinguitur actus 
essendi ab eo cui actus ille convenit" (De Veritate 1, 1 ad 3). 
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and so it is not incorrect to speak here of a real distinction. Never-
theless, apart from their composition with one another, these principles 
have no reality. 
The principles of which there is question are not beings which 
we could in any way consider in themselves, absolutely. They 
are transcendental relations and nothing else; all that we can 
say of them formally concerns their correlation. 10 
We are speaking, therefore, of "a distinction between two principles by 
h . 1·· db· . ,,11 w ose un10n 1m1te e1ng 1S. 
St. -Thomas' works abound in texts regarding the real distinction, 
so much so, in fact, that no two Thomists employ the same selection of 
h di . . 12 texts w en scuss1ng 1t. The fact that Thomas always treats this 
distinction within the context of other matters contributes enormously 
to the diffusion of references. He does, however, deal with this dis-
tinction quite explicitly and at greatest length in Book II, chapters 
52-54, of the Summa Contra Gentiles. There he discusses, first, the 
reality of such a distinction in intellectual creatures (chapter 52), 
secondly, the view that this distinction reflects an act/potency 
structure in those creatures (chapter 53), and, thirdly, the fact that 
the esse/essence composition is not identical with the form/matter com-
position (chapter 54). Indeed, in these three chapters we find almost 
10Louis de Raeymae~er, The Philosophy of Being (St. Louis: B. Herd-
er Book Co., 1954), p. 112. 
llHenri Renard, The Philosophy of Being (Milwaukee: The Bruce 
Publishing Company, 1946), p. 40. 
l2For a thorough survey of references to the real distinction in 
Thomas' early writings, see Leo Sweeney, "Existence/Essence in Thomas 
Aquinas' Early Writings," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philo-
sophical Association 37 (1963):97-131 (hereafter cited as Sweeney, 
"Early Writings"). For a selection and discussion of twenty-one texts 
drawn from a wide range of Thomas' writings, see Kopaczynski, Linguistic 
Ramifications, pp. 34-43. 
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all of the major theological and philosophical elements which playa 
part in Thomas' use of the real distinction. These chapters, therefore, 
afford us an excellent text upon which to focus in examini'ng the various 
strands which enter into Thomas' treatment of the esse/essence composi-
. 13 t10n. 
The theological elements will be considered first. The philosophi-
cal elements will then be examined in light of Thomas' theological con-
cerns. This procedure assumes that the philosophical principles serve 
a theological program and are therefore controlled by that program. In 
proceeding thus, this chapter reflects a methodological principle which 
is central to the Thomist enterprise. As Thomas himself says at the 
beginning of his most ambitious work, the Summa Theologiae: 
Holy teaching can borrow from the other sciences, not from any 
need to beg from them, but for the greater clarification of the 
things it conveys. For it takes its principles directly from 
God through revelation, not from the other sciences. On that 
account it does not rely on them as though they were in con-
trol, for their role is subsidiary and ancillary; so an archi-
tect makes use of tradesmen as a statesman employs soldiers. 14 
13Gilson sees Summa Contra Gentiles as an important stage in Thomas' 
writings: "The doctrine of creation is bound to modify the notion of 
metaphysics itself, in that it introduces into the realm of being a 
first cause to whose causality everything is strictly subjected. This 
is why, in his Contra Gentiles, in which he does not speak as a com-
mentator of Aristotle, but in his own name, Thomas Aquinas can take 
over the very formulas of Aristotle, yet give them a distinctly new 
turn" (Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. [Toronto: Pontifical In-
stitute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952], p. 156). He later adds that 
chapter 54 in Book II is where Thomas proves that the distinction be-
tween substance and existence differs from the distinction between form 
and matter (Ibid., p. 163). W. N. Clarke notes that Contra Gentiles 
is the first work in which Thomas fuses act/potency and participation 
(limitation principle), and cites CG I, 43, and II, 52-54, as the first 
two places, chronologically speaking, in which these two principles 
appear together ("The Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism 
or Neoplatonism?", The New Scholasticism 26 [1952]:192, 190n [hereafter 
cited as Clarke, "The Limitation of Act by Potency"]). 
14 ST I, 1, 5 ad 2. 
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The Theological Concerns 
--
God as Ipsum Esse 
Chapter 52 ("Quod in substantiis intellectualibus differt esse et 
quod est") begins with a consideration of the fact that intellectual 
substances, although not corporeal or composed of a mixture of form and 
matter, nevertheless fail to enjoy the same simplicity as does God. 
The reasons given for this follow from the nature of subsistent being, 
which is incapable of division per se, inasmuch as, in subsistent being, 
substance and being identify. After employing a series of arguments de-
signed to demonstrate this truth, Thomas ends the chapter with a refer-
ence to Exodus 3.14, where God reveals Himself as He Who Is. Although 
the text comes at the end of the chapter, everything in the chapter 
hinges on it. Indeed, in maintaining that God's proper nature requires 
that His substance be His being, Thomas refers the reader back to Book 
I, chapter 22, where we are told that this "sublime truth" was revealed 
by God to !10ses ("Hanc autem sublimen veritatem Moyses a Domino est 
edoctus") • 
To say that essence and exi.:;ter:.ce i dentify in God was not, in 
itself, an extraordinary thing for a Chrtst~an theclogian to say. To 
maintain, l.owever , as Thomas does, that God's substance is His being, 
• to give, in other words, the final ,say to existence over essence, was 
a radical departure from his predecessors and his contemporaries, both 
theological and philosophical. Invoking a literal interpretation of 
the Qui est of Exodus, Aquinas rejected both the Greek philosophical 
understanding of being as limited form and the Christian theological 
understanding of God as infinite essence. ,The fact that, for Thomas, 
GOd is pure act, Ipsum Esse, was to reverberate throughout his entire 
15 
system. 
10 
God as Creator. Since chapters 52-54 appear in Book II, that part 
of Contra Gentiles explicitly devoted to the question of creation, much 
of the discussion of God as Creator has preceded these chapters and is 
therefore taken for granted within them. Because all creatures derive 
their source of being from God (chapter 6) and are brought into being 
by Him (chapter 15) from nothing (chapter 16) by a free act (chapter 
23), creation is discussed in chapters 52-54 in terms of causality and 
God is designated as primum agens (chapter 52). Again, the arguments 
proceed from God's nature as subsistent being. Since God alone has 
His being through Himself or through His own substance, all other sub-
stances must receive their being from Him. God is being; all other 
substances have being ("Relinquitur igitur quod, quum Deus sit esse sub-
sistens, nihil aliud praeter ipsum est suum esse"). Because only God 
is uncaused being, all other beings are caused. Since God is most per-
fectly in act, becau~e he is act itself (Ipse actus), all beings which 
have act are dependent upon him. For that reason, God alone is the 
first agent, just as He alone is His own being. 
In fact, Thomas concludes that Ipsum Esse belongs to the first 
agent as His proper nature, since being is His substance ("Ipsum esse 
competit primo agenti secundum propriam naturam; esse enim Dei est ejus 
• 
substantia"). In other words, the Ipse actus which lies behind creation 
is identical to the Ipsum Esse which is God. And it is precisely 
15 The metaphysical implications of God as Ipsum Esse are well de-
tailed in Thomist scholarship. The theological implications have yet 
to be fully worked out. For an important study on the methodological 
principles of Thomas as they apply to theology, see Donald J. Keefe, 
Thomism and the Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich: A Comparison of 
Systems (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971) ; cited hereafter as Keefe, Thomism. 
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because God is Ipsum Esse that He is able to effect causally a certain 
likeness to Himself in all created substances by imparting esse to them 
(chapter 53). 
God as Infinite Perfection. Thomas' view of Ipsum Esse as infinite, 
not only in the negative sense of an absence of all limitation but in 
the positive sense of the plenitude of all perfection, follows from his 
view of God as subsistent being. Self-subsistent being is infinite be-
cause it is not terminated in anything. Therefore, subsistent being can 
~ 
be one only, since an infinite being must necessarily contain every per-
fection; if two such beings existed, they would be indistinguishable 
from one another (chapter 52). For Thomas, therefore, God is the source 
not only of being but also of every perfection, since infinite being is 
identical with infinite perfection. 16 
God as Ipsum Esse, Creator and infinite perfection come together 
in chapter 54, where we are told that in all created beings there is a 
capacity to perfect and to be perfected. What Thomas clearly has in 
mind here is a twofold capacity which corresponds to the composite 
nature of all created being which he has spent these three ,chapters 
establishing. As substances considered apart from the being which they 
16This link between esse and perfection finds expression in Thomas' 
early writings. In a well-known passage in On Being and Essence, c. 5, 
Thomas writes: "Furthehnore, although God is pure being, it is not 
necessary that he lack other perfections or excellences. On the contrary, 
he possesses all the perfections of every kind of thing, so that he is 
called absolutely perfect, as the Philosopher and Commentator say. In 
fact, he possesses these perfections in a more excellent way than other 
things, because in him they are one, whereas in other things they are 
diversified. This is because all these perfections belong to him in 
view of his simple being. In the same way if someone could produce the 
operations of all the qualities through one quality alone, in that one 
. quality he would possess every quality. Similarly, God possesses all 
perfections in his being itself." 
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receive from God, they have the capacity to be perfected. As substances 
which enjoy a certain likeness to God by virtue of the esse which He 
imparts to them as Ipsum Esse, they have within themselves the capacity 
to perfect, a capacity which derives its efficacy from God as infinite 
perfection. As composite beings, their existence and perfections are a 
product not of their essential principles, but of their existential re-
lation with their Creator. The distinction between essence and exis-
tence is therefore a real distinction which can be found in all created 
beings, material and immaterial (chapter 54). 
All of the above arguments ultimately depend upon a literal read-
ing of Exodus 3.14. Gilson has written, "we do not maintain that the 
text of Exodus is a revealed metaphysical definition of God; but if 
there is no metaphysic in Exodus there is nevertheless a metaphysic of 
17 Exodus." E. L. Mascall thinks that to speak of a metaphysic of Exodus 
is to take too narrow a view of the matter, but goes on to add that: 
it is, I believe, profoundly true to say that there is a 
metaphysic of the Old Testament and that it is substantially ex-
pressed by the Exodus text as St. Thomas interprets it. For 
although the Old Testament is written almost entirely in ethical 
and hardly at all in metaphysical terms, the declarations which 
it makes about the activity of God have very far-reaching meta-
physical consequences, and however imperfect may have been the 
attempts of pre-Thomist writers to express in the Exodus Test 
as they understood it the Biblical truth about God, I believe 
that St. Thomas did succeed in this task through his radically 
existentialist out~ook.18 
The remainder of this chapter will examine the very far-reaching meta-
physical consequences of Thomas' view that He vllio Is is Ipsum Esse. 
l7Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, trans. A. H. 
C. Downes (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 433, n. 9. 
18 Eric Lionel Mascall, Existence and Analogy: A Sequel to He Who 
Is (New York: Longmans Green, 1949), pp. 13-14 (hereafter cited as 
Mascall, Existence and Analogy). 
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The Philosophical Framework 
When Thomas sets out in chapter 52 to establish the fact that in-
tellectual substances are composed, he provides several arguments, all 
of which are based on the notion that only God is utterly simple. This 
notion is itself based on the above-mentioned understanding of God as 
He whose proper nature is "to be". Since being and substance identify 
in God, there is no basis in Him for any kind of composition. From 
this, Thomas derives the fundamental principle on which all of his argu-
ments in this chapter depend: "Now being, as being, cannot be diverse; 
but it can be diversified by something beside itself [praeter esse]." 
Thus, when he argues in this chapter for a composition in intellectual 
creatures on the basis of 1) God's being as beyond every genus, 2) 
God's infinity and 3) God's uncaused nature, he is maintaining that 
generic/specific differences, finitude and the caused nature of in-
tellectual creatures cannot be explained solely in terms of esse or 
being, because esse considered in itself is utterly simple and contains 
within itself no grounds for its own diversification. Hence, wherever 
we find creatures, we can recognize that being has entered into composi-
tion with or terminated in something other than itself. 
At this point, every argument he has employed underscores the dif-
• ferences which obtain between God and creatures. The final two argu-
ments of the chapter move in the opposite direction, revealing not only 
the uniqueness of God (perfect act and Ipsum Esse) but also the type of 
relationship which Thomas understands to exist between God and His 
creatures. In the fourth argument, Thomas maintains that, since God 
is "Ipse actus perfectissimus," it thereby follows that "this act is 
14 
being [esse], wherein generation and all movement terminate, since every 
form and act is in potentiality before it acquires being [esse]." This 
statement sets the stage for Thomas' discussion ' in chapter 53 of the 
act/potency composition in all intellectual creatures. In the fifth 
argument, Thomas insists that since God is Ipsum Esse, inasmuch as 
being belongs to Him according to His proper nature, it thereby follows 
that "that which belongs to a thing according to its proper nature does 
not belong to other things except by way of participation, as heat is 
in other bodies from fire." 
Act/potency and participation are the two philosophical principles 
to which Thomas returns again and again in applying his doctrine of the 
real distinction to creatures and their relationship to God. Both are 
important. If either one is left out, the full significance of the 
real distinction cannot be understood. Their fusion in Thomas' thought 
constitutes, as tv. N. Clarke notes, "a peculiarly original stroke of 
genius on his part.,,19 Before considering their fusion, however, each 
must be examined separately for the particular manner in which it 
enables Thomas to develop the fundamental features of the esse/essence 
distinction. 
Act/Potency and the Real Distinction 
As Gilson points O\1t, "The composition of matter and form dominates 
the natural philosophy of Aristotle, but the composition of essence and 
, , Ar' I' ,,20 eX1stence 1S not 1stote 1an. Thomas was forced to make a 
19tv . N. Clarke, "The Meaning of Participation in St. Thomas," 
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 26 
(1952):154 (hereafter cited as Clarke, "Meaning") . 
20G' l 1 son, History, p. 422. 
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distinction not found in Aristotle, and he was forced to do so for two 
reasons: 1) the Christian doctrine of a free creation ex nihilo and 2) 
his oWn rejection of the form/matter composition as coterminous with 
all of created reality. His reasons for rejecting form/matter as the 
ultimate composition in created beings are set out in chapter 54 and 
will be considered in more detail later in this section when that 
chapter is examined. 
Aristotle's identification of essence and existence was unaccept-
able theologically, because it presupposed that the existence of a thing 
belongs to it by virtue of its essence. Aristotle's necessary and 
eternal world is the inescapable corollary of that identification. 
Avicenna's view of existence as an accident of essences was also un-
acceptable, inasmuch as, while it provided for a created world, it led 
to the inescapable corollary that the world is necessarily created. 
For if esse is accidental to essence, it pertains to the nature of 
essences to exist and God is thereby placed under a necessity to create 
them. What Thomas required was a clear distinction between esse and 
essence, such that existence could in no way be understood as identical 
with or pertaining to essences per se. "Into Aristotle's eternal world, 
existing outside God and without God, the Christian philosopher intro-
duces the distinction of essence and existence.,,2l 
The real distinction is clearly a Thomist, not an Aristotelian, 
principle. Nevertheless, Thomas uses Aristotle's act/potency framework 
to move beyond Aristotle. More precisely, he uses two of Aristotle's 
principles, act/potency as a unified composition and the priority of 
2lIdem., The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 68. 
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act, as the means by which he gets to an 'act/potency account of the 
esse/essence distinction and an Act/act account of God's action as effi-
cient cause. 
1) Act/Potency as a Unified Composition. Having considered in 
chapter 52 that there is a composition in intellectual creatures, Thomas 
turns in chapter 53 ("Quod in substantiis intellectualibus creatis est 
actus et potentia") to a discussion of the act/potency nature of this 
composition. His first argument for such a composition rests on the 
complementarity or proportionality which defines the relationship be-
tween act and potency. 
For in whatever thing we find two, one of which is the comple-
ment of the other, the proportion of one of them to the other 
is as the proportion of potentiality to act; for nothing is 
completed except by its proper act. 
Behind this view of the act/potency correlation lies the Aristo-
telian use of act/potency to account for the problem of being and be-
coming. Steering between the Scylla of Parmenidean being and the Charyb-
dis of Heraclitean becoming, Aristotle drew upon potency to explain how 
that which changes is neither being nor non-being. Becoming is the 
passage from being in potency to being in act. In the famous Aristo-
telian formula, motion is the act of a being in potency in so far as 
. i . 22 1t s 1n potency. Act/potency was the means by which Aristotle ac-
• 
counted for the intrinsic unity of a thing without denying the reality 
of change. Although Thomas' application of this methodological prin-
ciple to the real distinction is not relevant to the problem of change, 
it is enormously important with regard to the question of unity in a 
composed thing. Hence, Thomas insists upon the 'complementarity' of 
22Aristotle deals most fully with potency and becoming in Meta-
physics, Book IX. 
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act and potency and on act itself as that which 'completes' a thing. 
Act and potency are not two things, but two principles .which are propor-
tionate to one another in the unity of a single thing. 23 
The proportion which Thomas has in mind here is that between the 
'isness' and the 'whatness' of a thing, a proportion which applies even 
to intellectual substances. As he states in chapter 52, 
Although intellectual substances are not corporeal, nor composed 
of matter and form, nor existing in matter as material forms, 
it is not to be supposed that they therefore equal the divine 
simplicity. For a certain composition is found in them by the 
fact that in them being [esse] is not the same as what is [quod 
est]. 
He had worked out this distinction in a much earlier work of his, an 
Being and Essence. In a famous passage there, he points out that it is 
possible to know what a man or a phoenix is, without knowing that it is. 
From this, he concludes that esse is other than essence or quiddity.24 
In intellectual substances, therefore, essence is the 'whatness' or the 
intelligibility of the substance. As Owens puts it, "essence may be 
called 'nature' in the Boethian sense of what is intel~igible through 
the definition of the thing.,,25 Act is the actualizing principle which 
makes that intelligibility an existent intelligibility.26 
2) Priority of Act. The second argument Thomas presents in 
23Thi~ principle hqs already been stated clearly in CG, I, 18: 
"In every composite there must be act and potency. For several things 
cannot become absolutely one unless among them something is act and 
something potency." 
24an Being and Essence, c. 4. 
25Joseph Owens, "The Accidental and Essential Character of Being 
in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas," Mediaeval Studies 20 (1958):26 
(hereafter cited as Owens, "Accidental and Essential Character"). 
26 an esse as act, see CG I, 22 ("Esse actum quamdam nominat") and 
ST I, 54 1 ("Esse est actualitas substantiae vel essentiae"). 
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chapter 53 on behalf of the act/potency correlation in things is based 
on the priority of act: "What ever is present in a thing from an agent 
must be act, for it belongs to an agent to make something in act." 
This statement hearkens back to the discussion in chapter 52 on the 
priority of act. There he had written, "Since every agent acts in so 
far as it is in act, it belongs to the first agent, which is most per-
fect, to be most perfectly in act." The fundamental principle at work 
here is an Aristotelian one, the priority of act. 27 For Aristotle, 
potentially existing things are always produced by actually existing 
things. Something can produce an act only to the extent that it is in 
28 
act itself. 
Employing this principle within the context of creation, Thomas 
goes well beyond Aristotle in maintaining not only an act/potency re-
lationship of esse to essence in created things, but an Act/act relation-
ship between God and His creation. The basis for the second is the 
priority of Ipsum Esse over created esse, the basis for the first is 
the priority of created esse over created potency. ~fuat this means, 
in both instances, is that esse is the first effect of God's creative 
power . As Thomas writes elsewhere: "being [Ipsum esse] is the most 
common first effect and more intimate than all other effects . ,,29 That 
is why he argues, here in chapter 53, that whatever is from an agent is 
• 
act . God as first agent produces, prior to all other effects, that being 
(esse) by which all substances are placed in existence. Hence, there is 
27MetaphYSiCS, IX, esp. l049b-105la. 
28Ibid ., l049b20-28 . 
29 De Pot., q. 3, a. 7 resp. 
a. 5, obj. 2 and ad 2, as well as 
CG III, 66. 
Cf. Ibid., q. 3, a . 4 resp, and q. 3, 
In 1~e Causis, lect. 4, init., and 
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an Act/act relationship between God and creation. At the same time, 
this esse produced by God correlates with substance as act with potency, 
"since act, as such, is referred to potentiality." Thus, Thomas returns 
full circle to the point which it is the purpose of chapter 53 to estab-
lish: "Therefore, in every created substance there is potentiality and 
act." 
At the same time, he implicitly rules out the possibility of sub-
stance as a kind of pre-existing potency which is simply standing there 
waiting to be actualized: first, because potency is a principle and not 
a thing, and therefore cannot exist on its own, and, secondly, because 
act is prior to potency and therefore in no way dependent upon it except 
as a principle of correlation. The created esse and the created potency 
come into existence simultaneously, or they do not come into existence 
at all. For only the thing exists, not its principles of correlation. 
As Owens notes: 
The proper effect of subsistent being is being, but that effect 
can be realized only in something else. In producing finite 
being, the first cause thereby produces the potency finite being 
inevitably involves. Its being maintains the priority, even 
though, strictly, the thing itself is what is produced. In 
creation, therefore, the production of the finite existential 
act is the production of the subject that is made to exist. It 
does not at all presuppose that any such subject already exists. 
Rather, viewed from a metaphysical standpoint, it produces the 
potency in sequence to, and not in priority to, the existential 
act that is receiv~d.30 
3) Agens Enim Agit Sibi Simile (Act/act). The fourth31 and final 
argument which Thomas employs in chapter 53 to establish the act/potency 
composition in intellectual substances proceeds on the principle that 
3 ° Owens , An Elementary Christian Metapnysics, p. 102. 
31The third argument involves participation and will be discussed 
in the next section. 
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"The agent produces its like so far as it is in act." Referring back 
to chapter 6 in the same volume of Contra Gentiles, Thomas notes that 
it is through being itself (Ipsum esse) that every created thing bears 
a likeness to God. Therefore, esse is to every substance as act is to 
potency. 
Creative causality is a key element in the esse/essence doctrine. 
If the reason for the existence of this being is not found to 
be of the very essence, then I must look outside that essence 
for a principle of being. I conclude, therefore, that an 
existing limitea and finite being is not sufficiently explained 
by its intrinsic structure, by the composition of act and 
potency. There must be other principles--extrinsic principles, 
to be sure, indicating not why these limited beings are such 
and why they are different from one another (for that is suf-
ficiently explained by essence and "to be," matter and form, 
substance and accident), but simply why they~. Thus we 
are brought to the question of cause and of causality.32 
Efficient causality is the production of being. It cannot be otherwise. 
If esse is a composing principle in all substances which comes to them 
from outside themselves, that esse must be the proper effect of God, 
whose proper nature is Ipsum Esse. Furthermore, the relationship must 
be that of Act to act, since created esse is the first effect of Ipsum 
Esse. 33 
Three important points must be understood. First, God is not the 
essential being of all things, but rather the causal being. 34 This is 
simply another way of s~ating the real distinction. Only God's proper 
32Renard, The Philosophy of Being, p. 117. 
33Act/act is not, of course, the same thing as first act/second 
act, but the two of them are related as principles. That relationship 
will be explored in chapter 4. 
34In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2 sol. Cf. ST I, 3, 8 ad 1: "Godhead 
is archetypally and causatively the being of all things, but not sub-
stantially their being." 
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nature is being itself. In all other beings, esse must enter into com-
position with a nature that is distinct from God's. 
It [being] is a real nature itself, and is in fact given to 
other natures through efficient causality. But it cannot be 
given to them as a nature, and cannot enter into their natures. 
It is really given to them through efficient causality, it is 
really in them as a real act in a real potency. It is really 
not any of their natures nor part of their natures. 35 
Secondly, efficient causality, for Thomas, is much more than the 
placing of creatures outside their cause. It is the investiture of a 
likeness to their cause within the very heart of each creature's exis-
tence. It is, in fact, that existence itself. 
Existence may mean either a state or an act. In the first sense, 
it means the state in which a thing is posited by the efficacy 
of an efficient or a creative cause, and this is the meaning the 
word receives in practically all the Christian theologies outside 
Thomism, particularly those of Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, Scotus, 
and Suarez. In a second sense, existence (esse, to be) points out 
the interior act, included in the composition of substance, in 
virtue of which the essence is a "being," and this is the proper-
ly Thomistic meaning of the word. 36 
Thus Aquinas can say that, while creatures are not being per se, they 
do have being. 37 Indeed, esse in creatures is the sign of their 
createdness: "Now having an efficient cause is due to having real 
existence. ,,38 Not only is esse an intrinsic component in every created 
being, it is that component which is most intimate to every being. 
"Esse autem e~t illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet et quod profundius 
• omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt, ut ex 
35 Owens , An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, p. 103. 
36Etienne Gilson, Elements of Christian Philosophy (Garden City, 
NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960), pp. 130-131. 
37 In De Hebdomadibus, c. 2. 
38 ST I, 44, 1 ad 3. 
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supra dictis patet.,,39 Existence is not simply a fact about created 
things, it is the source of their innermost reality. 
Actuality is, then, an intrinsic condition of each existent and 
amounts to a good deal more than setting an essence into a con-
text of efficiency. It is the existent himself viewed in the light 
of what internally perfects, ennobles, constitutes, and realifies 
him. 40 
Thirdly, the real distinction of esse and essence is also the dis-
tinction between that which is contingent and that which is necessary in 
the created order. Since the real distinction means that existence is 
not a property of essence, esse must come to substances from outside 
themselves. The first created effect is, therefore, as Thomas notes, 
created esse, which enters into the constitution of created things not 
by virtue of their right to command it, but by virtue of God's free de-
cision to confer it. As Gilson points out, "The Thomist distinction 
between essence and existence expresses the radical contingence of 
existence in all that is not God.,,4l 
Essences, on the other hand, constitute the necessary component 
in creation. Since being cannot diversify itself and remains infinite 
unless it terminates in that which is other than itself (chapter 52), 
God's free decision to create beings within whom created esse is a 
constitutive component places Him under a necessity to provide an es-
sential component by which created esse may be terminated and diversi-
fied. Please note that this necessity is methodological, not absolute. 
That is, it derives from the exigencies of the esse/essence distinction, 
39 ST I, 8 1. Cf. In II Sent., I, 1, 4 sol. 
40Leo Sweeney, A Metaphysics of Authentic Existentialism (Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 82. 
41G"1 ~ son, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p" 435, n. 1. 
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not from the exigencies of divinity. 
The contingency of esse is inextricably related to God as efficient 
caose. Since esse cannot be produced by essences, its presence in sub-
stances requires an extrinsic source. 
Whatever is contingent (whatever exists contingeotly) must have 
a sufficient reason why it exists rather than not. But this 
sufficient reason is not an intrinsic one, since the essence·is 
not the "to be." Therefore, it must be an extrinsic principle; 
and this is what we mean by an efficient cause. 42 
It is here that Thomas makes a decisive break with Aristotle's notion 
of causality. Efficient causality as the production of being is quite 
alien to Aristotle's eternal and uncreated world in which the primary 
causes are movers, not creators. 
It is at this point that the limitations of an act/potency method-
ology become most clear. For Aristotle, act/potency is the means by 
which he accounts for change, and the primary cause he considers is 
therefore the moving cause. Thomas, however, by introducing the dis-
tinction of esse and essence, turns act/potency and efficient causality 
into the means by which he accounts for the static or created nature of 
things. As a result, a strict Aristotelian act/potency methodology 
places severe limitations on what he can say at this level, particularly 
with regard to the question of a more-than-causal account of the re-
lationship between Ipsum Esse and creatures as constituted in part by 
• 
esse and the question of what, if any, reciprocity exists between esse 
and essence, matters which never confronted Aristotle. That is why, as 
Sweeney notes in his study of early Thomist texts on the real distinc-
tion, esse and essence are set "entirely within the frame-work of effi-
cient causality, of the effect-cause relation between the creature and 
42Renard, The Philosophy of Being, pp. 125-126. 
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God, of creaturehood.,,43 Within this framework, esse is the principle . 
of act and the source of contingency, with essence as the principle of 
'whatness' or intelligibility and the source of necessity. But how 
these two principles compose and what sort of causal reciprocity and 
proportion exists between them are matters which remain largely un-
answered. To deal with the relationship between Ipsum Esse and crea-
tures composed of esse and essence in a manner that goes beyond causali-
ty and to account for the reciprocj ty between esse and essence, Thomas 
has recourse to the notion of participation. 
The application of participation language to the real distinction 
is rare in Thomas' early writings. Act/potency and participation are 
developed there on separate tracks. Only with Contra Gentiles does 
Thomas fuse these two streams of his thought. We will therefore return 
to Book II, chapters 52-54, when examining his notion of participation. 
Before doing that, however, it is important to pause here for a moment 
in order to examine more closely the radical transformation which 
TIlomas effects in the Aristotelian understanding of act/potency by his 
introduction of the esse/essence distinction. 
Esse/Essence: The Separation of Act From Form 
Chapter 54 ("Quod non est idem compositio ex materia et forma, et 
ex substantia et esse") deals entirely with demonstrating that the 
I 
composition of substance and being is different from the form/matter 
i . 44 compos t10n. After stating that matter is only a part of the substance 
43Sweeney, "Early Writings," p. 127 . 
44Thomas sometimes uses substance, as he does here in chapters 
52-54, in an Aristotelian fashion to refer to the form/matter composi-
tion or essence. At other times, he uses it to refer to the existing 
thing, i.e., the esse/essence composition. This ambiguity with regard 
to substance will be taken up in chapters 4 and 5, where it will be 
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and that form is complementary to and not identical with being, Thomas 
concludes that "being [esse] is compared even to the form itself as 
act . " 
Supreme in their own order, substantial forms remain the prime 
acts of their substances, but, though there be no form of the 
form, there is an act of the form . In other words, the form 
is such an act as still remains in potency to another act, 
namely, existence. 45 
Thomas goes on to distinguish between the form as the quo est, the 
substance (form/matter) as the ipsum quod est, and esse as quo substan-
tia denominatur ens. He notes that material beings enjoy a twofold 
composition, first, a substantial composition of form/matter and, 
secondly, an existential composition of the composed substance with 
esse itself. Even in beings not composed of form and matter (angels), 
however, he insists that there remains a composition of form and esse. 46 
Thomas therefore concludes that act/potency, not form/matter, is co-
terminous with all of created reality. 
It is therefore clear that composition of act and potentiality 
has greater extension than that of form and matter. Thus, 
matter and form divide natural substance, while potentiality 
and act divide common being. Accordingly, whatever follows 
upon potentiality and act, as such, is common to both material 
and immaterial created substances, as to receive and to be re-
ceived, to perfect and to be perfected. 
The importance of his separation of form from act cannot be over-
stated. 
. Thomas Aquinas could not posit existence (~) as the 
act of a substance itself actualized by its form, without making 
argued that Thomas' failure to carry completely through on his trans-
formation of Aristotelianism was caused in great part by his failure to 
free himself completely from the Aristotelian notion of substance. 
45G"1 1 son, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 174 . 
46The non-material nature of angels is one of Thomas' favorite argu-
ments for the esse/essence composition, e.g., In II Sent., d. 3, q. 11 , 
a.l; In Boet. de Trin., q . 5, a. 4 ad 4; ST I, 50, 2 ad 3. 
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a decision which, with respect to the metaphysics of Aristotle, 
was nothing less than a revolution. He had precisely to achieve 
the dissociation of the two notions of form and act. This is 
precisely what he has done and what probably remains, even today, 
the greatest contribution ever made by any single man to the 
science of being. 47 
This dissociation marks a break not only with Greek philosophical think-
ing about being, but also with traditional Christian thinking about God. 
First, the dissociation of act from form means the separation of being 
from form. Greek philosophy had always understood being to be formal, 
just as previous Christian theologians had understood (within the basic-
ally Neoplatonic framework they took over) God's being to be essential 
or formal. Secondly, the dissociation of act and form also means a 
separation of being from limit. For Aristotle and all of his predeces-
sors, apeiron (the unlimited) was employed as a negative concept not 
only in the denotative sense of that which has no bounds, but also in 
the connotative sense of that which is without form and therefore unin-
telligible. It was a privation, the absence of wholeness and completion. 
As Aristotle put it, "Nothing is complete (teleion) ~vhich has no end 
(telos); and the end is a limit.,,48 
With Plotinus and the Neoplatonists, an important shift in the use 
of apeiron took place. Here the unlimited was associated with form, so 
that being came to be designated as "infinite form.,,49 This usage was 
47G Ol ~ son, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 174. 
48phYSics, III, 207a14 . 
49This riotion of infinite form appeared in the Liber de Causis. 
"The essence of the doctrine was summed up and transmitted under the 
handy formula, 'Omnis forma pura est infinita' (every pure or unparti-
cipated form is infinite), and appears to have been accepted in some 
form or other as a fundamental category of thought by most of St . 
Thomas's predecessors and contemporaries" (W. N. Clarke, "Meaning," 
pp. 149-150). 
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picked up by the early scholastics via Pseudo-Dionysius and John Damas-
cene, the latter having actually referred to God as "an infinite sea. ,,50 
By Thomas' time, the linking of infinity and God had come into its own, 
although there yet remained pockets of resistance among those who 
either still related infinity to unintelligibility or feared that if 
God's essence were infinite, beatitude itself was jeopardized~ since, 
as it seemed to them, the only sort of essence to which finite minds 
could have access must itself be finite. 5l Thus, Christian theologians 
were not unprepared for the notion of Ipsum Esse as infinite. What 
they were unprepared for was the notion of Ipsum Esse as infinite act. 
Aristotle would have found both the infinity and the act unintel-
ligible. Act for him always meant formal act. Therefore, act was in-
separable from limitation and that intelligibility or 'whatness' which 
Thomas associates with essence, not act. Where Aristotle was concerned, 
"the role of form or act is to impose a limit on the formless infinity 
of matter in itself and thus confer upon it determination and intelli-
gibility.,,52 Formal act in Aristotle is the highest act possible. In 
Thomas, it can only be understood as a potency to esse, the act which 
has no form and therefore is capable of actuating all forms. 53 This 
SOc. R. S. Harris, Duns Scotus, 2 vols. (New York: The Humanities 
Press, 1959), 2:170-171. Leo Sweeney has done a great deal of work on 
• the notion of infinity in the Middle Ages. See especially his "Divine 
Infinity: 1150-1250," The Modern Schoolman 35 (Nov 1957): 38-51, and 
"Some Mediaeval Opponents of Divine Infinity," Nediaeval Studies 19 
(1957): 233-245 (hereafter cited as Sweeney, "Mediaeval Opponents"). 
5lFor discussion of this, see Sweeney, "Nediaeval Opponents," pp. 
236-243. 
52Clarke, "The Limitation of Act by Potency," p. 179. 
53"Ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium: comparatur enim ad omnia 
ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem nisi inquantum est; unde ipsum 
dissociation of act from form is what enables Thomas to fuse partici-
pat ion and act/potency into a single framework. 
Ipsum Esse and Participation 
The first requisite for unravelling the complex threads which 
interweave to make up the Thomistic act and potency doctrine is 
to recognize that it contains two distinct elements. The first 
is a composition of two correlative metaphysical principles 
called act and potency, first introduced by Aristotle to "explain 
the process of change. The second is the relating of these two 
principles to each other in terms of a theory of infinity and 
limitation, which, it must be admitted by all, cannot be found 
explicitly in Aristotle. 54 
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In his early writings, Thomas describes participation almost always 
in terms of reception. Thus, for example, he writes, "participare nihil 
aliud est quam ab alio partialiter accipere.,,55 Perhaps his most de-
scriptive text on participation appears in In Boethius de Hebdomadibus: 
To participate is to receive as it were a part; and therefore 
when anything receives in a particular manner that which belongs 
to another in a universal manner, it is said to participate it; 
as man is said to participate animal, because he does not possess 
the intelligible notes (ratio) of animals according to the 
latter's total "community" [Le., universality]; and for the same 
reason Socrates participates man; in like manner also a subject 
participates an accident, and matter form, because the substantial 
or accidental form, which of itself as such is common [or unpar-
ticularized], is determined to this or that subject; and similar-
ly an effect is said to participate its cause, and especially 
when it does not equal the power of its cause, as, for example, 
if we say that air participates the light of the sun because it 
does not receive it with the same brightness that it has in the 
sun. 56 
• esse est actualitas omnium rerum et etiam ipsarum formarum" (ST I, 4, 1 
ad 3. -
54clarke, "The Limitation of Act by Potency," p. 172. 
55 In II de Caelo et Mundo, c. 12, 1ect. 18, n. 6. Cf. In Lib de 
Causis, 1ect. 4: "Secundum hoc quod participat est finitum, quia 
quod participatur non recipitur in participantem secundum totam suam 
infinitatem, sed particulariter." 
56 In Boeth. de Hebd., lect. 2. 
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The text doesn't include esse and essence, because t -hey are the obj ect 
of his illustrations. Nor does the text include any direct application 
of the act/potency principle. It is not until Contra Gentiles that 
Thomas explicitly fuses act/potency and participation. In Book II, 
chapter 52, he tells us that, because only God's proper nature is being 
itself, other things can possess being only by way of participation. 
He then adds, "Therefore, being itself belongs to all other things 
from the first agent by a certain participation." He concludes that 
substance and being are identical only in God and must therefore form 
a composite in all other beings. 
It is only with chapter 53, however, that he expiicitly incorpor-
ates participation into an act/potency framework. 
Likewise, whatever participates in a thing is compared to the 
thing participated in as act to potentiality, since by that 
which is participated the participator is actualized in such and 
such a way. But it was shown above (c. 15 and 52) that God alone 
is essentially a being, whereas all other things participate in 
being. Therefore, every created substance is compared to its own 
being as potentiality to act. 
Here the use of act/potency to explain participation results not only 
in a fusion of these two aspects of his thought, but also in a modifica-
tion of the act/potency framework itself. As a result, the two basic 
principles related to act/potency and applied to the real distinction 
(act/potency as a unified composition and the priority of act) remain, 
but in altered forms that are able to accomodate the notion of partici-
pation. They are 1) the limitation of act by potency and 2) the per-
fection of act. And just as Thomas uses the original two principles to 
arrive at an Act/act notion of efficient causality, so he uses their 
modification to develop a notion of efficient causality mediated by 
formal causality. 
30 
1) The Limitation of Act by Potency. Clarke regards the principle 
"Actus non limitatur nisi per potentiam" to be the "keystone of the 
Thomistic metaphysical system.,,57 Gilson regards it as the necessary 
corollary to the Thomist understanding of God as Ipsum Esse. 
Outside the pure act of existing, if it exists, nothing can 
exist save as a limited act-of-being. It is therefore the 
hierarchy of the essences which establishes and governs that 
of beings, each of which expresses only the proper area of a 
certain act-of-being. 58 
Owens reasons in a similar fashion, observing that if esse is, properly 
speaking, God's nature, then it cannot be the nature of anything else. 
It must therefore compose with natures different from itself. 
It has to be produced as act, for it is always found as act, 
the act of every other act. It has to be produced, consequently, 
as the act of something other than itself. Every produced act 
of being, accordingly, involves its corresponding potency. It 
cannot be produced except as the act of that potency ..•. Pro-
duced being, therefore , is finite being. It is finite, not be-
cause it is being, but because it is the act of a limiting po-
tency.59 
Thomas first states the principle that esse tvhich is unterminated 
is infinite in Book I, chapter 43, of Contra Gentiles, ' when discus$ing 
God's infinity. There he says that "an act that exists in nothing is 
terminated by nothing." Noting that God is that act which in no way 
exists in another, he concludes that God is "ipsum esse infinitum." 
In Book II, chapter 52, he returns to this theme: "Now subsisting be-
• ing must be infinite, because it is not terminated in some recipient." 
Here, however, the infinity of God is linked to His perfection and used 
57clarke, "The Limitation of Act by Potency," p. 169. 
53Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 
trans. L. K. Shook (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 36 (hereafter 
cited as Gilson, Thomas Aquinas). 
59Owens , An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, pp. 101-102. 
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to demonstrate that there can be only one God. Thus, Thomas is able to 
identify esse with absolute perfection. The application of an infinity/ 
limitation interpretation to the principle of act/potency as a unified 
composition enables Thomas to say a good deal more about esse and es-
sence than that they are the 'isness' and 'whatness' of an existing 
thing. Esse can now be seen as both an extrinsic nature (God) and an 
intrinsic principle of perfection, with essence functioning as an in-
trinsic principle limiting that perfection to the mode of a particular 
quiddity or intelligibility. 
Act is the principle of perfection; potency is the principle 
of the measure in which one participates in this perfection, of 
the particular mode according to which it possesses this perfec-
tion, of the limits within which it receives this perfection. 60 
In fact, essence as intrinsic limitation is a principle which cuts 
two ways simultaneously. In De Potentia, Thomas notes that esse is not 
limited in the same way that potency is limited by act, but rather in 
the fashion of act limited by potency.61 Matter, for example, is a po-
tency limited by essence or formal act. Following this pattern, one 
would expect that essence, as potency, would be limited by esse. Yet 
essence performs the limiting function. Essence limits both that which 
lies below and that which lies above. In other words, form limits 
qualitatively as well as quantitatively. 
2) Perfection of Act. As we have seen, Thomas' argument for the 
absolute perfection of God is based on God's nature as infinite being. 
Esse is pure act or, as Thomas describes it elsewhere, "actus ultimus, 
qui participabilis est ab omnibus, ipsum autem nihil participat.,,62 
60de Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being, p. 256. 
61De Pot., q. 7, a. 2, obj. 9. 
62 Quaest. Disp. de An., q.u., a. 6 ad 2. 
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He also describes esse as that which complements every form,63 or actual-
64 izes every form. He even speaks of esse as that which best realizes 
the notion of unlimited perfect form. 65 This capacity to actualize 
things is inseparable from the notion of esse as good. In fact, the 
perfection of esse is in some sense posterior to its actualizing capa-
city. 
. • . the act of existing lies at the very heart, or if one 
prefers, at the very root of the real. It is therefore the 
principle of the principles of reality. First absolutely, 
it even precedes the Good, for a being is only good in so far 
as it is a being, and it is a being only in virtue of the ipsum 
esse which permits us to say of it: this is "being."66 
Thus, Thomas tells us that the perfection of a thing depends upon the 
degree of actuality which it achieves. 67 He even maintains that, while 
living things are more important than those things which simply exist, 
nevertheless 'to be' is more important than 'to live', because 'to 
live' means not merely to possess life but to possess actual being as 
well. 68 Esse is "actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio 
69 
omnium perfectionum." 
If God's essence is His esse, this must necessarily lead to the 
corollary that created beings, by their participation in created esse, 
are capable of sharing in a nature which exceeds their own. And this, 
63 Quodl. XII, q. 5, a. 5. 
64 ST I, 4, 1 ad 3. 
65 
_ST I, 7, 1. 
66G· l ~ son, Thomas Aquinas, p. 34. · 
67 ST I, 5, l. 
68 De Pot., q. 7, a. 2 ad 9. 
69Ibid . Cf. ST I, 4, 1 ad 3; I, 4, 2. 
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in fact, is what Thomas means by participation. "That belongs to another 
participative, which exceeds its nature, yet participates in some way in 
it.,,70 The actualizing of a substance is, by definition, its participa-
. . h· h 71 t10n 1n a 19 er act. The principle underlying this is: 
72 
ways more perfect than potency. 
act is al-
It is important to note here the absence of a formal identity be-
tween act and potency. Esse and essence are not two different grades 
of a single nature. As principles they represent two different natures, 
and their composition produces the participation of the lower nature in 
the higher one. Their proportion to one another, therefore, rests upon 
the capacity of essence to 'receive' and limit pure act without destroy-
ing that act's fundamental perfection and capacity to perfect. For 
that reason, Thomas can speak in chapter 54 of those features which all 
created beings share in common: 
Accordingly, whatever follows upon potentiality and act, as 
such, is common to both material and immaterial created sub-
stances, as to receive and to be received, to perfect and to 
be perfected. 
The priority of act to potency indicates a primary dependence of 
essence on esse. The greater perfection of act reinforces this primary 
dependence. That is why Thomas can speak of esse as that which per-
fects, essence as that which is perfected. It is also why he is able 
• to speak of esse as that by which all creatures are likened to their 
Creator (chapter 53). Esse is that by which every created thing parti-
cipates in Ipsum Esse. For that reason, esse is the source of goodness 
70Comment. in ad Coloss., c. 1, lect. 4 (translation from de Raey-
maeker, The Philosophy of Being, p. 31). 
71 Quodl. XII, q. 5, a. 5. 
72 De Pot., q. 7, a. 2 ad 9. 
and perfection in all created things,73 and thereby that principle by 
which they are referred to God. 
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3) Efficient/Formal Causality. We have already seen that, within 
an act/potency framework, esse is the first created effect of God as 
efficient cause. This places all existing things in a direct causal 
dependence upon God. It also makes esse the innermost reality of all 
beings. 1Vhat is not clear within such a framework is the nature of 
the relationship between Ipsum Esse and created esse. Nor is the 
causal relationship between God and essence, on the one hand, and esse 
and essence, on the other, very apparent. The notion of participation 
allows Thomas to deal more effectively with these questions. 
Esse and Existential Participation. Although chapters 52-54 do 
not deal at length with existential participation, all of the ingre-
dients for it are there. In chapter 53, we are told that esse is that 
component through which we are likened to God. "It is through being 
itself [ipsum esse] that every created substance is likened to God." 
This follows directly upon a discussion of participation, in which all 
created beings are said to participate in Ipsum Esse. This participa-
tion is the third argument Thomas advances in the chapter to demonstrate 
the real distinction. The substance of created beings is as potency to 
the esse which they par~icipate. 
That esse is also the inner source of actuality for a substance be-
comes apparent in this chapter as well. To exist is not mereiy to be 
placed in a state of existence. It is to receive as a principle of 
one's own reality the very act which realifies or actualizes. The 
significance of existence deepens, however, in light of the previous 
73 See ST I, 5, I and I, 20, 2; also CG I, 28. 
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chapter (52). There we are told that Ipsum Esse is infinite perfection. 
To exist is therefore to receive esse as an inner principle of perfec-
tion. 
In one sense, this is a partial return to Aristotle. Esse as an 
intrinsic principle of existence is not unlike act as an intrinsic prin-
ciple of motion. An enormously important difference remains, ' however. 
Aristotle's principle of motion is a necessary component within sub-
stances, because it belongs to them by reason of their very natures. 
In Thomas, esse is a contingent component composing with substance 
(form/matter). It is necessary only in the sense that without it a 
thing cannot exist. But it comes from a source outside the substance 
(from God through efficient causality) and constitutes the participa-
tion of that substance in a nature other and higher than its own. 
This difference between existing substances in Thomas and in Aristotle 
cannot be stressed too much. It is a difference to which we will 
return in chapter 4. 
Esse in created things is a participation in Ipsum Esse. 74 Parti-
cipation is therefore existential, not formal. This is the single most 
important element in the Thomist doctrine of participation. 
The fundamental principle of ontology is brought to light: 
existence is the first act, the unique source of all parti-
cipation; existenc~ does not participate in anything, but 
everything participates in existence. "75 
Here we have the reason why participation is necessarily linked with 
efficient causality, for God is the efficient, not the formal, cause of 
74"Esse cuiuslibet rei est esse participatum, cum non sit res ali-
qua praeter Deum, suum esse" (CG 111,65). Cf. Quaest. Disp. de An., 
a. 6 ad 2; In Boeth. de Hebd., lect. 2; ST I, 3, 4 and I, 75, 5 ad 4. 
75de Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being, p. 137. 
esse i h ' 76 n t l.ngs. 
In its application to being, the doctrine of participation 
has to be purged of any aspect of formal causality. In no sense 
can you say that part of being goes to each of its recipients. 
There is here no form to be divided among different subjects. 
If being as a nature may be called a form, it is a form that is 
entirely indivisible and unable to be shared as a nature with 
anything else. As the first efficient cause it can just make 
other natures be. In this communication of being, on the side 
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of the first cause, there is no trace of strictly formal ' causality 
whatsoever. Being is imparted from that viewpoint, to creatures 
only through efficient causality. The finite nature is made to 
exist, without any addition at all in the order of nature. 77 
Nothing of formal nature is shared when being is participated. 
Here, therefore, we also have that Act/act relationship between God and 
creation to which reference has already been made. 
If the application of participation to efficient causality as 
creative causality marks a break with Aristotle, the interpretation of 
participation as existential, not formal, marks an equally sharp break 
with Plato. It is the necessary corollary to the earlier noted de-
parture from the Greek view of being. If God is esse, not essence or 
form, participation in Him must be existential. There is no form to be 
shared. 
A second point, which will be mentioned here and discussed at 
greater length later in this work,78 should be noted. Through esse, the 
groundwork for a Thomist doctrine of existential dynamism is laid. It 
is a dynamism which cut~ in two directions at once. On the one hand, 
76Thomas maintains that, while being caused doesn't enter into the 
definition of a thing, it is nevertheless a necessary corollary to the 
notion of participation: "While a relationship to a cause does not 
enter into the definition of a being that is caused, nevertheless it 
follows from what is bound up in a being by participation, for from the 
fact that a thing is such it follows that it is caused by another" (ST 
I, 44, 1 ad 1). --
77 Owens , An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, pp. 106-107. 
78 See chapter 4. 
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Ipsum Esse and created esse form an extrinsic Act/act dynamism. Crea-
tures are likened to God in the first instance because they exist. 
" . creatures are made to the image and likeness of God. Therefore 
each creature too involves existence and actuality but, unlike God, as 
shared, participated, limited by what each is, by its essence.,,79 Esse 
is that by which all creatures are referred to their Creator. ' As effi-
cient cause, He is the extrinsic source of their participation. Their 
creation is, by its very definition, a sharin~ in His nature. That is 
the meaning of participation. On the other hand, and by the same token, 
created esse is that principle of perfection by which essence is able to 
compose with a nature higher than its own. Hence, essence is that ele-
ment which is said to be perfected, esse that element which is said to 
perfect (chapter 54). Esse and essence therefore provide the foundation 
for an intrinsic act/potency dynamism. 
Essence and Formal Causality. Gilson notes that Thomas' reforma-
tion of Aristotelian metaphysics had two consequences with regard to 
causality. First, it gave a much more precise understanding of effi-
cient causality than Aristotle had provided. 
The second consequence of the Thomist reform of metaphysics 
has been to introduce a clear-cut distinction between the two 
orders of formal causality and of efficient causality. Formal 
causality is that which makes things to be what they are, and, 
in a way, it also ~akes them to be, since, in order to be, each 
and every being has to be a what. But formal causality dominates 
the whole realm of substances, and its proper effect is sub-
stantiality, whereas efficient causality is something quite dif-
ferent. It does not make beings to be what they are, it makes 
them "to be. "80 
Or, as Owens puts it, "being for St. Thomas is the terminus of efficient 
79sweeney, "Early Writings," p. 98. 
80Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, pp. 168-169. 
causality, but always by means of a formal cause."Sl Esse is an ex-
trinsic efficient cause 1 essence an intrinsic formal cause. 
These two distinct forms of causality correspond to the two dis-
tinct principles which compose all existing things. They are another 
way of expressing the esse/essence composition. 
Since they represent irreducibly distinct modes of causality, 
esse and existence are irreducibly distinct, but the reality 
of their distinction presupposes their composition, that is, 
it presupposes the actual reality of the thing."S2 
Efficient/formal causality is also another way of expressing the con-
tingency/necessity relationship between these two principles. 
3S 
If the form is the cause of being in its own special way, that is, 
as formal cause, it will in its own order necessarily determine 
the essence to being. Formal causality is a necessary type of 
causality. All formal results follow necessarily from their 
formal causes, as may be seen in the procedures of mathematics. 
If its form determines every nature to be a being, then every 
nature is essentially a being. There is nothing in the form 
itself, however, that requires its submission to any efficient 
causality. That it is acted upon by another efficient cause does 
not follow with necessity from its own formal nature. If its 
act of being has to be given in this way by an external efficient 
cause, that act can only be accidental to it in this order of 
causality.S3 
SlOwens, "Accidental and Essential Character," p. 22. As Thomas 
puts it, "esse naturale per creationem Deus facit in nobis, nulla causa 
agente mediante, sed tamen mediante alique causa formali; forma enim 
natural is principium est esse naturalis" (De Veri tate 27, 1 ad 3). 
82Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 172. 
83Owens , "Accident~l and Essential Character," p. 22. Owens' identi-
fication of the contingency of esse with its accidental character in the 
order of formal causality is important, for it helps to explain Thomas' 
apparent ambivalence regarding the nature of esse. Sometimes he calls 
it an accident, other times he denies its accidental character. When 
he calls it an accident, he specifies an accident as that which does 
not belong to an essence, as that which lies outside the essential 
realm (See Compo Theo!., C. LXVI, and Quod!, XII, 5). Esse comes to 
essences from outside them (On Being and Essence, C. 4). Esse or effi-
cient causality is accidental to formal causality, in that the placing 
of a thing in existence and the constituting of it by a composing prin-
ciple of esse remain distinct from and therefore outside the order of 
essence or formal causality. 
Because esse and essence operate on the same level and yet within two 
different orders of causality, their reciprocity is causal. 
. . . Thomas Aquinas maintains the Aristotelian principle that 
causes which belong in distinct orders of causality can exert 
reciprocal causality. In this case, efficient causality can 
give existential being to substance, just as conversely, formal 
causality can import substantial being to actual existence. 
Where there is no existence, there is no substance, but where 
there is no substance, there is no existence. It is then 
literally true to say that existence is a consequence which 
follows from the form of essence, but not as an effect foll~ws 
from the efficient cause. 84 
At this point, however, a serious problem begins to make itself 
felt. If created esse is the first created effect, the actuality and 
the source of all of a thing's perfections, what role is essence left 
to play? That essence does have a function is apparent to everyone. 
The precise question is whether or not that function is positive or 
negative. In other words, does essence function causally only as a 
limiting principle or does it exercise formal causality in the full 
sense of producing a distinct formal element in created things? 
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In Clarke's words, what we are confronted with here is the question 
of the 'thick' versus the 'thin' essence. The thick essence 
• . is still looked on as possessing a certain positivity of 
its own, received indeed from existence as ultimate act, but 
giving it a distinct positive role of its own, precisely as 
distinct from the act of existence, so that the essence becomes 
the positive subject which exists, distinct as positive subject 
from the act of existence which it exercises. 8S 
The thin essence, on the other hand, is 
nothing but the interior limiting principle, the inner 
limit or partial negation . of the perfection which re-
sides properly within the act of existence itself. The act 
84Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 169. 
8Sw. N. Clarice, "What Cannot Be Said in St. Thomas' Essence-
Existence Doctrine," The New Scholastiicism 48 (1974):36 (hereafter 
cited as Clarke, "What Cannot Be Said"). 
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of existence, accordingly, as thus limited, becomes the very sub-
ject which exists. 86 
What is at stake here is nothing less than the real distinction 
itself. If essence is not viewed as a positive principle of correla-
tion, esse begins to assume almost the entire burden of explanation for 
existing things. Clarke, who is of the 'thin essence' school, says, 
for example, that "on this view [thin essence] one must indeed tone down 
rather drastically the 'reality' and solidity of the so-called 'real 
distinction,,,.87 He then adds: 
To my mind, the essential point truly worth holding onto in the 
doctrine of St. Thomas is the notion of limited participation in 
the central perfection of existence, not the technical solution 
of how to express this, whether by 'real distinction,' or some 
other way.88 
If, however, the real distinction is not an appropriate way to express 
the Thomist doctrine of participation, this can only mean that the doc-
trine of participation has moved outside an act/potency framework and 
toward a much more Platonic view of reality. 
This is the point at which the two major themes of modern Thomist 
scholarship converge: first, an increasing appreciation of the impor-
tance and priority of esse in Thomas' writings and, secondly, a renewed 
interest in the possibly Platonic elements in Thomas' thought. The 
first of these themes will be taken up in chapter 4, where the role of 
esse will be examined more closely within the framework of Thomist 
methodology. The second theme is the question of that methodology 
itself, whether it be Aristotelian or Platonic. Since answering that 
86 Ibid . 
87 Ibid., p. 37. 
88Ibid . 
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question depends largely on an analysis of the formal elements in 
Thomas' system, chapters 2 and 3 will center on a more thorough exami-
nation of the Aristotelian/Thomist notion of essence, particularly as 
it relates to the question of whether Thomas employed an Aristotelian 
or a Platonic methodology. 
CHAPTER 2 
THICK OR THIN ESSENCE: THE HETHODOLOGICAL PROBLEH 
Thomist philosophy has gone through several stages in this century. 
These stages can be distinguished by their divergent views on the role 
of esse in Thomas' thinking. As the importance of esse became more 
apparent, questions began to arise regarding the notion of essence. 
These questions, in turn, fueled a growing rift between those Thomists 
who understand Thomas to have been fundamentally Aristotelian and those 
who understand him to have been fundamentally Neoplatonic. The more 
recent view, that of the so-called 'thin essence,' suggests that Thomas 
developed, in his later writings, a Neoplatonic notion of participation. 
One Thomist who takes this view describes Thomism as "a system which in 
its basic outlines reproduces certain of the structural features of a 
certain kind of emanationist Neo-Platonism."l Before examining in 
some detail the position of those who belong ' to the 'thin essence' 
school, we shall briefly survey the stages through which recent Thomism 
has passed, in order to see more clearly why this Neoplatonic inter-
pretation of his work finds an audience among today's Thomists. 
20th c. Thomism: The Shift from Aristotle to Plato 
What has become known as 'Strict Observance' Thomism was the first 
lGeorge Lindbeck, "Participation and Existence in the Interpreta-
tion of St. Thomas Aquinas," Franciscan Studies 17 (June 1957):115 
(hereafter cited as Lindbeck, "Participation"). 
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clear view of Thomas' work to carry the day in this century. Associated 
with Thomists such as Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange and expressed in the 
Twenty-Four Theses, this position stressed the centrality of Aristotle's 
act/potency schema and interpreted the real distinction as little more 
than a corollary to it. As the First Thesis states: "Potency and Act 
so divide being that whatsoever exists either is a Pure Act, or is 
necessarily composed of Potency and Act, as to its primordial and in-
trinsic principles. ,,2 Lumbreras, in his comments, notes that this state-
ment is "true both in the existential and in the essential order. ,,3 
The Second Thesis defines act as "perfection" and potency as "limiting 
principle and capacity for perfection." It is only with the Third 
Thesis that the real distinction itself is asserted: 
~Vherefore, in the exclusive domain of existence itself God alone 
subsists, He alone is the most simple. Everything else, which 
participates in existence, has a nature whereby existence is 
restricted, and is composed of essence and existence as of two 
really distinct principles. 4 
As one recent Thomist has noted, the 'Strict Observance' position 
"tends to emphasize the continuity between Aristotle and St. Thomas, 
going so far as to find in Aristotle an anticipation of the Thomistic 
treatment of essence and existence.,,5 
However attractive this position might have seemed at a time when 
Thomism was fighting f~ an objective reality over against the relativity 
2peter Lumbreras, The Twenty-Four Fundamental Theses of Official 
Catholic Philosophy (Notre Dame: University Press, 1923), p. 13. 
3Ibid• 
4Ibid., p. 14. 
5Lindbeck, "Participation," (~tarch, 1957):10. 
c> 
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of modernism and the elan vital of Bergson, it failed on two very im-
portant counts. First, it never appreciated the 'existential' signi-
ficance of the real distinction, because it was never able to credit 
esse with anything beyond the 'facticity' of things. Hence it always 
tended, in practice, toward an 'essentialist' reading of Thomas. Second-
ly, in its failure to appreciate the genuine transformation Thomas had 
introduced into Aristotle's work, it hitched the Thomist wagon far too 
closely to the Aristotelian star. As Pegis has pointed out, 
To identify St. Thomas with an Aristotle who is, in many important 
respects, his own creation, is a compliment to St. Thomas himself. 
To do so without realizing that St. Thomas' Aristotle is a Thomist 
who, on some basic fundamentals, was never an Aristotelian is a 
historical illusion that is both dangerous and without justifica-
tion in our day.6 
'Strict Observance' Thomism was superseded by, as Kopaczynski calls 
it, the 'Primacy of Esse' approach. This view is similar to 'Strict 
Observance' Thomism, in that it regards both esse and essence as positive 
principles, but, unlike the latter, it lays much greater stress on esse 
as the source of perfection and value in existing things. 'Primacy of 
Esse' Thomists are not as easily classified as 'Strict Observance' 
Thomists, although, broadly speaking, they divide into two groups--
those who understand Thomas to have transformed Aristotle in light of 
Christian doctrine and those who understand him to have transformed 
Aristotle in light of Plato and the Neoplatonists. 
The first group, spearheaded by Etienne Gilson, tends to under-
score the theological elements in Thomas' thinking--particularly the 
Qui est of Exodus and the doctrine of creation. 
6Anton C. Pegis, Introduction to Saint Thomas Aquinas (New York: 
Random House, The Modern Library, 1948), pp. xxviii-xxix. 
... St. Thomas Aquinas, referring expressly to this text of 
Exodus, will declare that among all divine names there is one 
that is eminently proper to God, namely Qui est, precisely be-
cause this Qui est signifies nothing other than being itself: 
non significat forman aliquam sed ipsum esse. In this principle 
lies an inexhaustible metaphysical fecundity; all the studies 
that here follow will be merely studies of its results. There 
is but one God and this God is Being, that is the corner-stone 
of all Christian philosophy, and it was not Plato, it was not 
even Aristotle, it was Moses who put it in position. 7 
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Gilson later adds that "the five Thomist proofs are hung expressly from 
8 the text of Exodus." 
For Gilson, the act of existing (esse) is Thomas' central insight 
and the key to his transformation of the eternal world of Aristotle into 
the created world of Scripture. It is also the only path by which we 
can get to a knowledge of the real distinction. 
so far as we are able to see, all the arguments one can 
use to establish the distinction between being and essence in 
Thomas Aquinas' doctrine presuppose the prior recognition of 
the notion of the "act of being" (esse).9 
The priority which Gilson assigns to esse and the real distinction 
reflects his view that Thomas' Christianity introduced a genuine trans-
formation into Aristotle's metaphysics. 
Although willing to grant considerable Christian influence at work 
in Thomas' thought, Gilson is unwilling to concede much to Plato. His 
major reason for refusing to do so lies in the Thomist notion of God as 
Pure Act, a notion whicoh places God "beyond essence, at the very core 
of being."lO For Gilson, this means that "His perfection is not a per-
fection received, but a perfection, so to speak, existed, and it is 
7Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 51. 
8Ibid., p. 74. 
9Gilson, Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 130. 
10Ibid., p. 34. 
just that which will always keep Christian philosophy distinct from 
Platonism, in spite of all the efforts that may be made to identify 
them."ll Even the elements of participation in Thomas can be traced 
directly back, in Gilson's judgment, not to Plato but to Ipsum Esse: 
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" . . it is one and the same thing to conceive God as pure Esse and 
to conceive things, so far as they ~, as including in their metaphy-
sical structure a participated image of the pure Act of Being.,,12 
Although Gilson insists on the priori~y of esse over essence and, 
therefore, of efficient causality over formal causality, and of the 
"radical and total" difference13 which such a shift in priorities forges 
between the worlds of Aristotle and Thomas, the fact remains that Aris-
totle's substance, now transformed into Thomas' essence, seems, from 
Gilson's point of view, not to have undergone any very radical changes 
in Thomas' hands. Although Gilson insists that the Aristotelian sub-
stance "will have to undergo many inner transformations in order to be-
come a created substance,,,14 he nevertheless also maintains that "the 
Aristotelian substance remains intact in the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas,,,15 
and that the world of Thomas "is a world of Aristotelian substances which 
are in their own right. ,,16 
This position finds support in Joseph Owens, whose views on Thomas 
are quite similar to those of Gilson. Granting the same priority to 
llIdem., The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 54. 
l2 Idem., Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 133. 
l3 Idem., Being and Some Philosophers, p. 160. 
l4 Ibid . 
l5 Ibid . 
16 Ibid., p. 162. 
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esse over essence, Owens insists on a theory of participation in Thomas 
which avoids being Platonic through the expedient of being existential. 
"Existential act . . . can be a thing or a reality or a nature only in 
its primary instance, God. Outside God it cannot be a thing or reality 
or nature, but only the actualizing of some other nature.,,17 Therefore, 
Owens is drawn to the same conclusion as Gilson, namely, that while 
Thomism proceeds from the viewpoint of existence, it nevertheless leaves 
"intact all starting points in the realm of essence, both substantial 
and accidental. ,,18 Unlike the new man in St. Paul, whose conversion 
requires him to cast off all the old trappings, this 'new' Thomist 
essence of Gilsonian Thomism continues to bear an uncanny resemblance 
to the old Aristotelian substance. 
As long as Thomists could keep the motif of participation both at 
the periphery of their interpretation of Thomas and in isolation from 
any Platonic influences, as Gilson and Owens do, the positive character 
of the principle of essence went unchallenged. The closer, however, 
that participation was moved to center stage, the more difficult it 
became to justify the essence as fundamentally positive. This problem 
became increasingly severe among the second group of 'Primacy of Esse' 
Thomists, who approached the matter from a point of view which empha-
sized the participation1st elements in Thomas' work as the primary 
force leading him to insist on the priority of the act of being. 
17Joseph Owens, "Quiddity and Real Distinction in St. Thomas 
Aquinas," Mediaeval Studies 27 (1965):20 (hereafter cited as Owens, 
"Quiddity"). 
IBIdem., St. Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 1957), p. 57. 
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For these Thomists,19 the notion of participation lies at the core 
of any philosophy of being. As de Raeymaekerputs it, "La participation 
A , I 
sur le plan de l'etre constitue le probleme metaphysique par excellence, 
car il concerne pr~cisement l'object formel de la m~taphysique.,,20 An 
immediate problem arises, however, as soon as one combines the primacy 
of esse with the notion of participation. If esse is the source of all 
perfection, value and intelligibility, and if created things share in 
perfection, value and intelligibility by virtue of their existential 
participation in Ipsum Esse, in what sense is it possible to regard 
essence as a distinct principle of anything positive? Aren't the in-
telligibilities which we abstract from created things simply 'contrac-
tions' or limitations of esse itself? And, if this is the case, isn't 
essence, ontologically speaking, no more than a limiting principle 
which 'finitizes' what would otherwise be that infinite perfection 
which is esse by definitionZ 
L.-B. Geiger made the most serious attempt, among this group of 
Thomists, to salvage the positive function of essence. In order to do 
so, he had recourse to the view that in Thomas two separate types of 
participation are at work--participation by composition and participa-
tion by formal hierarchy.21 Participation by composition is the type 
which Gilson and Owens ~ccept. Namely, participation in esse is the 
19Most prominent in this group of Thomists are L.-B. Geiger, Andre 
Marc, Aime Forest, Cornelio Fabro and Louis de Raeymaeker. 
, 20Louis de Raeymaeker, La Philo sophie de l'~tre, 2nd ed. (Louvain: 
Editions de L'Institut Sup~rieur de Philosophie, 1947), p. 39. 
21L._B• Geiger, La Participation dans la Philosophie de S. Thomas 
d'Aquin (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1953), consists of 
a discussion of each type of participation (Book One) and of their 
synthesis in Thomas (Book Two). 
, 
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necessary consequence of the esse/essence composite in all created 
things. Participation by formal hierarchy, on the other hand, subordi-
/ 
nates the esse/essence composition to the notion that created things 
participate in esse. Participation produces composition, not vice versa. 
This latter notion of participation necessarily stresses essence as a 
limiting principle rather than as a positive component within existing 
things. 
For Geiger, this latter form of participation is pre-eminent in 
Thomas. Nevertheless, Geiger continued to insist that participation by 
composition also plays a role in Thomas' thought, and that essence 
therefore could never be reduced simply to a negative limiting principle 
I 
without doing violence to what Thomas himself intended. "A son gre 
; I \ .. 
l'essence n'est pas cette pure limite negative etrangere a l'ordre de 
l'~tre.,,22 Geiger's view here is based on the fact that Thomas under-
stands God to be the source of essence as well as existence. 
Pour S. Thomas l'essence ausi bien que l'existence proc~dent 
de Dieu. Dieu est certes subsistance absolue et existence 
n~cessaire. Mais il est aussi pl~nitude absolue et simple d~ 
toute perfection repr~sent~e par les essences des cr~atures. 3 
Paradoxically, Geiger's reason for refusing to reduce essence to 
a negative limiting principle turned out to be the very reason why a 
participationist reading of Thomas was ultimately unable to accept such 
a dual structure of participation. How could one talk about two dis-
tinct principles of participation emanating from one single, utterly 
simple source? To trace created essences to Divine Ideas didn't avail, 
because the Divine Ideas were in no way distinct from the Divine Es-
sence. And to trace created essences to the Divine Essence as though 
22Ibid., p. 203. 
23Ibid• 
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it were distinct from Ipsum Esse was to introduce a composition into 
Being which found no support in Thomas. In fact, this whole way of 
speaking about essences suggested that the diversity found in created 
beings could have its source in Being Itself, a view which, as we have 
already seen, Thomas himself denied. 
As those Thomists committed to a participationist interpretation 
of the 'primacy of esse' struggled with these problems, another stage 
of Thomism was emerging, in which both the centrality of esse and the 
problematic character of essence were becoming apparent, though from 
quite a different perspective. Transcendental Thomism, proceeding by 
a method designed to meet the demands of the Kantian critique, sought 
in the human affirmation of being a means of demonstrating an intrinsic 
existential dynamism toward Ipsum Esse. Within such a framework, 
~ 
Marechal, the first to apply transcendental method to Thomism, charac-
terized the relationship between our abstractive knowledge of existing 
I 
things and absolute being to be such that "La donee subjective (ou 
"species") ne peut devenir objet dans la pens~e qu'en se soumettant au 
\... /' premier principe, c'est-a-dire en revetant une relation necessaire a 
la forme absolue d'~tre.,,24 To associate the intelligibilities of 
existing things (the positive content of essences) with "la forme 
absolue d' ~tre" is to b,e already well on the path to identifying all 
perfections with esse and esse itself with intelligibility. As Helen 
James John describes it, "The finite essence, caught up in the drive 
of the intellect toward the affirmation of being, as such, reveals 
24 I I i Joseph Marechal, Le Point de Depart de la Metaphysique, Cahier 
V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique (Louvain: Mus:um Les-
sianum; Paris: Alcan, 1926), pp. 49-50. 
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itself as relative to and subordinated to that goal.,,25 Although t'rans-
cendental Thomists did not set out to establish the Platonic nature of 
Thomas' thinking, they nevertheless reinforced such a view by insisting 
on an intrinsic intellectual drive toward Ipsum Esse which clearly 
parallels the notion of existential participation as developed by so 
i · i . Th ' 26 many part c1pat on1st om1sts. The notion of essence as "thin' 
began, in the minds of many Thomists, to seem inescapable. 
The 'Thin Essence' Position 
'Thin essence' Thomism was born out of the 'primacy of esse' 
reading of Thomas. As soon as the full significance of Ipsum Esse as 
not only Pure Act, but source of all value and perfection, surfaced, it 
at once became apparent that such a notion of Being necessarily entailed 
a doctrine of existential participation. Such a doctrine could not 
but emphasize the role of essence as a limiting principle. This, how-
ever, seemed to contradict the earlier notion of essence as a positive 
principle of intelligibility. As. D. J. B. Hawkins asked, 
Is there not a contradiction in making a mere principle of 
limitation into a positive factor in the constitution of 
finite being? A limitation is a negation and nothing more. 
To assert a positive principle of limitation is like assert-
ing that the surface of a sphere is distinct from the sphere 
25 Helen James John, The Thomist Spectrum (New York: Fordham Uni-
versity Press, 1966), p. 145 . 
26Transcendental method itself introduces into Thomism a Platonic 
starting point not accepted by Thomas himself. As Little notes, "the 
Platonic method was to argue from intellectual data as such. And be-
cause intellectual data form the core of Marechal's philosophy he is 
probably the most Platonic of modern Thomists, even somewhat at the 
expense of the main element in Thomism, which is Aristotelianism" 
(Arthur Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism [Dublin: Golden 
Eagle Books Limited, 1949], p. 96) . 
, 
itself. That is clearly nonsense and so, therefore, it will 27 
be said, is the Thomistic conception of essentia or quiddity. 
The root of the problem lay in the earlier noted separation that 
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Thomas' notion of Being introduces between act (esse) and form (essence), 
a separation unheard of in the Greek sources (both Platonic and Aristo-
telian) from which he draws . For Greek philosophy, act and intelligi-
bility are indistinguishable; for Thomas they are not. Or, rather, for 
Thomas, act and intelligibility are indistinguishable in God, but dis-
tinguishable in created things. Or so they would appear to be, if one 
accepts the principle of essence as positive intelligibility and the 
principle of esse as little more than the facticity (actualizing) of 
that intelligibility ('Strict Observance' Thomism). Once, however, the 
principle of esse is defined as the source of perfection, such a dicho-
tomy no longer seems possible. Esse itself is the fullness of intelli-
gibility. Hence, essence as limited intelligibility can hardly be 
understood as 'other than' esse. At best, it must simply be a 'mode' 
of esse, but not a positive principle in its own right. This is the 
path which many Thomists saw open up before them. One is tempted to 
call it the narrow path, for it is the path of the 'thin essence.' 
Kopaczynski characterizes Thomists on this path as "reformers," 
"Esseists" or "Exclusivity of Esse" Thomists. Their immediate fore-
runner is Arthur Little, who attempted to answer Hawkins' question 
about essence in 1949, five years before Hawkins asked it, in a book 
entitled The Platonic Heritage of Thomism. Their most vocal leaders 
have been 1~illiam Carlo and W. N. Clarke. The most complete statement 
of their position is Carlo's The Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to 
27n. J. B. Hawkins, Being and Becoming (New York: Sheed & Ward, 
1954), p. 55. 
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Existence, published in 1966. The views of each of these three men 
deserve some attention. 
Arthur Little: Essence as the No-Moreness of Being 
Proceeding on the assumption that much of what can be found in 
Thomas actually stems from Platonic rather than Aristotelian sources, 
. . 
Little sets out to identify those areas in Thomas' thought which actual-
ly reflect Plato much more than Aristotle. As Little notes at the be-
ginning of the second chapter: 
The purpose of this chapter is to discover whether St. Thomas 
did in fact give to Aristotle's doctrine a more orthodox sense 
than that doctrine deserved. If he did it will be open to us 
to assign to Platonic influences many Thomistic ideas that St. 
Thomas himself believed to be inherited from Aristotle. 28 
Little locates two such lacunae in Aristotle. The first of these 
is Aristotle's denial of God as efficient cause of the formal perfec-
tions of the world. This, in Little's judgment, prevented him from 
developing any doctrine of participation worthy of the name. 
What Plato asserted and Aristotle denied was that this material 
world of ours was derived at least in its formal nature from 
the spiritual world. And only on this basis can any important 
doctrine of participation be erected. 29 
Little then examines, in the first half of the book, the implications 
of efficient and formal causality in Thomas, particularly with regard 
to the fourth way. 
Defining efficient causality as that causality by which God is 
able to produce a perfection which is formal in its effects because 
virtual within God Himself, Little concludes that the formal perfection 
produced by God "is, in a different order, identical with part of the 
28Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, p. 20. 
29Ibid ., p. 28. 
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perfection of the cause.,,30 Little describes the perfections which 
issue from the efficient causality of God as "not miniature replicas of 
God, but rather constituted of limiting essences that smother every 
divine property in them while yet leaving in their existences indica-
tions that what has been smothered is divine.,,3l 
What Little has in mind here is participation by formal 'hierarchy 
as defined by Geiger, which produces a universe not unlike Porphyry's 
tree, a universe in which each essence represents not so much a divine 
idea as a different grade of being. As Little puts it, "Clearly what 
each of these grades imitates in contraction is the whole of the base, 
32 
not any part of it." 
To the extent that essence connotes the total perfection of esse 
contracted to a formal, and therefore finite, mode by means of God's 
efficient causality, it can be said to be positive. In fact, since 
efficient and formal causality identify in God, the essence must connote 
that perfection which exists formally in the effect precisely because 
of its virtual and prior existence in God. The fourth way indicates 
clearly that Thomas recognized God to be exemplar cause of all created 
formalities and perfections. 
The second failure which Little finds in Aristotle has to do with 
Aristotle's notion of passive potency. 
Aristotle has hitherto been universally accepted as the 
vanquisher of Parmenides by his doctrine of passive potency. 
The contention of this chapter, mildly revolutionary to the 
history of philosophy and the only revolutionary contention 
30Ibid., p. 38. 
3lIbid., p. 116. 
32Ibid . 
in the book, is that Aristotle only ~artly understood Parmenides 
and definitely failed to answer him. 3 
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The problem, as Little sees it, is that Aristotle tried to resolve the 
Parmenidean dilemma by recourse to a notion of potency which left po-
tency hanging somewhere midway between being and non-being. But, for 
Little, this only produces a contradiction which is unable to, come to 
grips with the original dilemma. 
How are we to conceive this compromise between being and non-
being, to say nothing of exonerating the concept from contra-
diction? It is a reality that must be positive or not positive, 
that is (by the principle of the excluded middle) ne~ative. And 
Aristotle seems to say that it is not quite either. 3 
Therefore, while Plato took a view of potency as meontic non-being or 
the exclusion of being, Aristotle understood it to mean that which is 
not yet ~ being, that is, "being which is only part of what is required 
35 for a being." 
The second half of Little's book consists of an examination of 
Thomas' notion of passive potency, in which Little analyzes those 
passages in Thomas which indicate that Thomas understood potency as 
non-being or the exclusion of further being. 
Passive potency . . . is identified with the limit or no-more-
being of a being. Therefore it is not a pure negation because 
it implicitly affirms as a possibility the measure of being that 
it is capable of determining by explicitly excluding this from 
its negation. 36 
Although Little draws explicitly on seven texts from Thomas,37 his 
33Ibid., p. 184. 
34 Ibid ., p. 186. 
35 Ibid., p. 185. 
36Ibid ., pp. 201-202. 
37 These texts are: Compo Theol., c. 17; CG II, 52; De Ver., 2, 3 
ad 16; De Ver., 2, 2; CG I, 54; De Ver., 1, 5 ad 2; In Boeth. de Trin., 
4, 1. 
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position rests primarily upon two · arguments, both substantiated by 
citations from Thomas. The first of these arguments appeals to the 
principle that being cannot divide itself. Little relies heavily, 
as do other 'thin essence' Thomists, on Thomas' statement in In Boeth. 
de Trin. that 
It cannot be that being is divided from being, in as much as it 
is being. Nothing is divided from being except non-being. Simi-
larly, another being is not divided from this being, but by this 
that in this being there is included a negation of that being. 38 
The second argument is a corollary to the first, namely, that the formal 
hierarchy of being is constituted by descending degrees of being. 
Thomas is most explicit about this in De Veritate: 
Hence the more closely a creature approaches God, the more it 
possesses of the act of existence; the further it is from Him, 
the more it possesses of non-existence. But, since a creature 
approaches God only in so far as it participates in a finite act 
of existence, yet its distance from God is always infinite, it 
is said to have more non-existence than existence. 39 
Little concludes that, while essence implicitly refers to the 
positive perfection which defines the quiddity or 'whatness' of a being, 
it explicitly refers to the negative limiting principle which denies 
further esse or perfection to that being. Little concedes that this 
does not appear to have been Thomas' view of essence in On Being and 
Essence, but argues that in the later, mature Thomas, "the essence in 
the definition would be really identified with the act of being or 
existence co~sidered as affected by the limit; but the limit itself 
would be the essence that is really distinct from the act of being.,,40 
38In Boeth. de Trin., 4, 1. 
39De Veritate, 2, 3 ad 16. 
40Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, p. 193. 
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Hence, existing things are composites of being and non-being, in which 
the act of being (esse) is "shot through and through, as it were, by 
non-being . ,,41 
W. N. Clarke: Essence as Limiting Principle Within Esse 
The discussion about essence, in this country at least, only got 
off the ground after the 1957 publication of G. B. Phelan's article, 
"The Being of Creatures.,,42 Warning against the reifying tendencies 
inherent in the Greek essentialist vocabulary taken over by Thomas, 
Phelan re-examines essence within Thomas' existentialist reformation of 
that Greek essentialism. Referring to the passage in Contra Gentiles 
II, 54, in which Thomas asserts that being cannot diversify itself 
and therefore must be diversified "per aliquid quod est praeter esse" 
(already discussed in chapter 1), Phelan suggests that the "praeter 
esse" to which Thomas refers there is not "non-ens" but "non-esse.,,43 
Phelan concludes that essence is therefore best understood as a "mode" 
of being which restricts esse. 
To cal'l it "essence" is all very well, provided essence is 
not regarded as some positive thing, but simply the "by 
which" (quo) or the mode, measure or manner in which the 
act, ~, is exercised. To say, for example, "Crystals 
4lIbid., p. 222. 
42G. B. Phelan, "'I;he Being of Creatures According to St. Thomas," 
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 31 (1957): 
118-125 (hereafter cited as Phelan, "Being of Creatures"). 
43Ibid ., p. 122. Phelan's reason for arriving at this conclusion 
is quite tenuous. He notes that, in In I Phys., 6b, Thomas writes, 
"Quidquid est praeter ens est non-ens." Phelan therefore applies the 
principle he finds there to the text from CG. However, as Clarke notes 
in his commentary on Phelan's article, nowhere does Thomas himself say 
that "praeter esse" means "non-esse" (W. N. Clarke, "Commentary (b)," 
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 31 [1957]: 
131) . 
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are solids" means for the existential metaphysician "Crystals 
exercise the act of existence in a solid manner. ,,44 
The article was accompanied by two commentaries, one by W. N. 
Clarke, the other by William Carlo. Clarke's commentary is an early 
indication of the direction in which his own thought was moving. Re-
jecting the traditional view of essence as possessing "a certain den-
sity or perfection of its own,,,45 Clarke locates the positive perfec-
tion found in a finite being within esse itself, "with the essence 
playing the role not so much of subject as of intrinsic limit or, more 
accurately, of measure, or mode, or determination, molding the basic 
perfection of esse from within and not from without.,,46 Later, Clarke 
would characterize this essence as 'thin.' 
Clarke's primary concern is to recover the explicitly Neoplatonic 
elements at work in Thomas' thought. For him, the primary structure 
of Thomas' work is that of participation/limitation, which enables 
Thomas to transplant the Porphyrian tree of universal concepts from the 
rarified atmosphere of Plato's Forms into the Aristotelian world of 
47 
concrete experience. Because Thomas used the act/potency framework 
of Aristotle to accomplish this transplantation, we can rightly charac-
terize his work as a synthesis of Plato and Aristotle, though rather 
more Platonic than Aristotelian. 
Such, then, . . . are the essential characteristics of the 
Thomistic doctrine of participation: a formal relational frame-
work, clearly recognizable as taken over from the Neop1atonic 
44phelan, "Being of Creatures," p. 124. 
45 Clarke, "Commentary (b)," p. 129. 
46Ibid • 
47 Clarke, "The Limitation of Act by Potency," p. 191. 
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tradition, transposed--at least in its realistic applications--
into the technical Aristotelian terms of act and potency, its onto-
logical content emptied of the original Platonic ultra-realism of 
forms and replaced with the one basic analqgical perfection of 
esse, and the whole applied with a consummate sense of analogy 
to the different orders both of reality and of ideas--such is 48 
the highly original synthesis that is Thomistic participation. 
William Carlo: Essence as the Place Where Esse Stops 
Carlo's major concern is one of freeing a genuine Christ'ian exis-
tentialism from the tyranny of Greek essentialism. If this sounds some-
thing like the nominalist project, it is in fact quite the opposite. 
Unlike Ockham, who sought to free the concrete singular from the abstract 
universal, thus atomizing the world, Carlo seeks to free the single, all-
embracing metaphysical principle of being (esse) from the atomizing ef-
fects of essentialist diversification. 
The unity and plurality of things are certainly fundamental 
metaphysical facts of the universe. But they are not the most 
basic and foundational aspects of reality. Things are one because 
of their esse. God is Simple because He is Ipsum Esse. Crea-
tures are compo~ite only because they are limited esses that 
unite with other limited esses in secondary causality, and can, 
consequently, be separated. Unity and plurality have to be 
based on and rooted in being and ultimately in~. In a meta-
physics of being as ~ we can explain all the facts of the 
universe including unity and plurality. Unity and plurality 
cannot of themselves found a metaphysics. They must be rooted 
in being, not unity but the one, not pluralit~ but the many; 
one what? one being; many what? many beings. 4 
After summarizing the various historical controversies regarding the 
true nature of the real.. distinction, Carlo concludes, "The history of 
the controversies on the relations of essence and esse has a signifi-
cant message to teach us. Namely, that the roof of the universe can be 
occupied by only one principle, Ipsum Esse Subsistens and that the roof 
48 d " i " 157 I em., Mean ng, p. . 
49William Carlo, The Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to Existence 
in Existential Metaphysics (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966), p. 107 (here-
after cited as Carlo, Ultimate Reducibility). 
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of metaphysics can be occupied by only one principle, esse. ,,50 
For Carlo, the Greek understanding of essence is incompatible with 
the Christian doctrine of creation. " . . the notion of essence was 
conceived to explain the Greek eternal universe and its ratio essendi 
was to function within such a universe.,,51 Addressing himself to those 
Thomists who suppose that such essences can enter the Thomist universe 
intact (he has Owens in particular in mind here), Carlo asks, "Can the 
eternal essence of Greek metaphysics become contingent by any sort of 
addition, no matter how complex? Is essence indifferent to being eternal 
or created?,,52 Arguing that if a created being is one, then essence 
and existence must identify, inasmuch as composite things are separable 
and distinct,53 carlo maintains that, "As all creatures flow from God, 
so all other principles flow from esse in the creative act. Creation 
is not a marriage, a joining of esse and essence, but a true birth.,,54 
Because a true Christian metaphysics is centered on the created-
ness of things, it is therefore much more concerned with the existence 
of things than with their diversification. Hence, the ultimate charac-
teristic of such a universe and of all things within it is their isness. 
"Thus the introduction of ~ is the distinguishing mark of a Christian 
metaphysics of being.,,55 Since the positing of a real distinction be-
tween essence and exis~nce is, in fact, the positing of an extrinsic 
50Ibid ., p. Ill . 
51 Ibid., p. 6. 
52Ibid ., p. 7. 
53 Ibid., p. 109. 
54Ibid ., p. Ill. 
55 Ibid ., p. 7. 
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limitation of esse, such a distinction introduces a fundamental and un-
acceptable dichotomy into a true metaphysics of being. 56 
The 'Primacy of Esse' view (for which Carlo gives Gilson the lion's 
share of the credit) is, in Carlo's judgment, "a halfway house to the 
doctrine of the Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to Existence. Exis-
tence cannot stand self-sufficiently alongside the Platonic essence 
but must encompass and include it in the theory of essence as a Mode 
of Ess~,,57 Essence, therefore, and in this he agrees with Clarke, 
must be understood as intrinsic to esse, operating from within esse to 
produce the limited finite beings of the created world. 
In order to illustrate what he means by this notion of essence, 
Carlo employs two metaphors. First, he asks us to envision existence 
as though it were a liquid in process of being poured from a pitcher. 
Add to that a sudden drop in temperature, and the liquid freezes be-
fore it hits the ground. Under these circumstances, 
The shape it assumes is the determination of its own substance. 
Essence is not something extrinsic to existence which limits 
and determines it in the way that a pitcher shapes its recipient 
liquid, but essence is rather the place where existence stops.58 
In the second illustration, we are asked to imagine existence as 
a stream of water flowing down a mountainside. Again there is a drop 
in temperature, freezing the stream. If we then imagine chopping the 
stream into pieces, the blocks of ice which this produces would bear 
some resemblance to what happens when esse is intrinsically limited 
by essence. 
56Ibid ., p. 23. 
57 Ibid ., p. 3. 
58 Ibid., p. 103. 
There is nothing in the blocks but frozen water or ice. But 
one is distinguishable from another by the place where they 
stop, the myriad grooves and raised surfaces left by th~ blade 
of the axe. This is what we mean when we say that essence is 
the intrinsic limitation of existence. 59 
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If this sounds as though Carlo were equating quality with quantity, 
he is. Creatures are, in his view, contractions of the infinite per-
fection of esse. The degree of contraction determines the level of 
perfection enjoyed by the creature. The greater the contraction, the 
lower the level of perfection. As Carlo puts it, a creature "is con-
stituted as a certain level of perfection, a particular magnitude of 
~, an existential quantum, a degree of being.,,60 
While there is much in what Carlo says to suggest that he has mis-
construed the Thomist real distinction as a distinction of things rather 
than of principles, in point of fact, his starting point forbids him to 
consider even the possibility of a distinction of principles. Since 
God is both the fullness of perfection, on the one hand, and absolute 
simplicity, on the other, Carlo rejects any distinction between esse 
and essence which would suggest that, at the created level, that per-
fection which is both absolutely infinite and totally simple in God can 
be distinguished into an existential principle (esse) and a specific 
principle (essence) • 
• • . what positive effect could the creature have which is not, 
somehow or other, a diminution or limitation of the Divine Per-
fection, some characteristic which exists in its superabundance 
in God? Obviously for Aquinas there is none!6l 
Many Thomists would, at this point, wish to fall back on the Divine 
59Ibid ., p. 104. 
60Ibid., p. 113. 
61Ibid ., p. 139. 
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Ideas. This, however, Carlo will not permit. 
The traditional method of explaining the or1g1n of plurality 
is through the doctrine of the Divine Ideas. But the doctrine of 
the Divine Ideas takes one just so far in explaining the origin 
of plurality and then it fails. How is a multiplicity of Divine 
Ideas rooted in the Divine Essence? To push the origin of plurali-
ty back to the rationes, the respectus, or intelligible aspects 
of the Divine Essence which the Divine Intellect perceives as 
imitable in a variety of modes by creatures is, it would seem, 
merely to relocate the point of confrontation between a 'unitary 
Divine Essence and the Divine Intellect which perceives it as 
imitable. The basic rationes which seem to underlie the plurality 
of the Divine Ideas and a Simple Divine Essence is still a tradi-
tional Greek formulation of the One and the Many! Using the model 
of the human intellect as a foundation for the doctrine of the 
Divine Ideas, as Thomas Aquinas explains the historical origin 
of the doctrine in the De Veritate, would seem to introduce 
plurality into being through a lesser being, an esse intentionale 
of sorts. Although this might be effective with a created intel-
lect, can it be muc~. more than a metaphor when applied to a Being 
for Whom to Know is to Be?62 
Since esse is the source of all intelligibility, it makes no sense, in 
Carlo's judgment, to posit a real distinction between essence as limited 
intelligibility and esse as limitless intelligibility. The only possible 
distinction here is that between the finite and the infinite. There-
fore, to understand essence as anything more than a negative limiting 
principle is to misconstrue Being Itself. 
Once essence has been reduced to esse, the way is clear to reduc-
ing formal causality to efficient causality. "In a metaphysics of ~, 
essence needs only a subordinate relation of efficient causality to de-
marcate God from creat~res.,,63 In the same fashion, second act is no 
longer required to explain the dynamism of subsistence. "life have here 
not a multiplication or addition of acts, of ~ plus subsistere, but 
one self-same act manifesting its dynamism in a specified, contracted 
62 Ibid., pp. 107-108. 
63 Ibid., p. 113. 
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way.,,64 These are the inevitable corollaries to a notion of being which 
identifies the positive perfection of essence with the total perfection 
of esse. 
Instead of waiting from all eternity like the recipient essence 
of Avicenna, or being produced alongside of esse in a dual crea-
tion, barring these alternatives, which I consider the only al-
ternative possibilities, then essence must rise out of ~he flood 
of esse like Thetis from the frothy wave. Essence flows from 
ess~Esse gives rise to essence. Essence is the intrinsic 
modification of the dynamism of actual exercise of the act of 
being. liby not describe essenceS then, as the place where esse 
stops, bordered by nothingness?6 
Carlo's interpretation of Thomas rests upon the answers he gives 
to three questions. These questions, indeed, reflect the greatest 
problems which a 'primacy of esse' approach to Thomas leaves unresolved. 
And they are all methodological problems. The first question, "Why not 
describe essence, then, as the place where ess_e stops, bordered by 
nothingness?", addresses the problem of whether Thomas' methodology is 
Aristotelian or Platonic. The second question, "How is a multiplicity 
of Divine Ideas rooted in the Divine Essence?", addresses the problem 
of whether or not Thomas correctly applied his own methodology. The 
third question, "Is essence indifferent to being eternal or created?", 
addresses the problem of how to apply properly the Thomist methodology 
to the esse/essence relationship. The remainder of this chapter will 
consider each of those questions in turn. 
64Ibid ., p. 90. 
65William Carlo, "Commentary (a)," Proceedings of the American 
Catholic Philosophical Association 31 (1957):128. 
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Thomist Methodology: Aristotelian or Platonic? 
The Textual Dilemma 
The most obvious reason for not describing essence as "the place 
where esse stops" is a textual one. It simply doesn't square with a 
great many things said by the mature Thomas. In order to illustrate 
the point, four areas of his thought are examined below. No attempt is 
made to provide a complete textual analysis regarding these areas; rather, 
well-known and accepted views of Thomas are isolated for the sake of 
highlighting the problem. 
Being. First, Thomas maintains repeatedly that being transcends 
the categories. For this reason, he is able to insist that a genuine 
distinction can be drawn between the quiddity of a thing and its act 
of existing, since only quiddities, not being, can be in a genus. 66 
Furthermore, he states that, with the exception of God, no being is 
its own act of existing. 67 It is difficult to see how either of these 
positions can be reconciled with a view of essence which maintains that, 
to the extent that essence is regarded as positive and as the subject 
receiving existence, it is reducible to esse. If that is the case, then 
being does enter into the quiddity or definition of a thing and is, in 
fact, identical with that thing to the extent that it is a positive 
being. 
Secondly, Thomas insists that a distinction must be made between 
divine being and universal being. 68 Divine or pure esse is the fullness 
66 De Pot., 7, 4; De Ver., 27,1 ad 8. 
67 CG III, 65. 
68 De pot., 7, 2 ad 6; ad 9; ST I-II, 2,5 ad 2; cf. On Being and 
Essence, c. 5. 
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of perfection, and to it nothing can be added. Universal or common be-
ing, on the other hand, is such that additions can be made to it. As 
Thomas says in the Summa Theologiae, universal or participated being 
is raised to a higher level by the addition of a perfection. For this 
reason, Thomas cites Dionysius' remark that living things are better 
than merely existing things, and intelligent beings better than living 
b . 69 el.ngs. Of particular interest is the text of De Pot., 7, 2 ad 9, in 
which Thomas differentiates between God's being and that being which 
can be added to and determined by essence. 
Being, as we understand it here. signifies the highest perfection 
of all: and the proof is that act is always more perfect than 
potentiality. Now no signate form is understood to be in act un-
less it be supposed to have being. Thus we may take human nature 
or fiery nature as existing potentially in matter, or as exist-
ing in the power of an agent, or even as in the mind: but when 
it has being it becomes actually existent. Wherefore it is clear 
that being as we understand it here is the actuality of all acts, 
and therefore the perfection of all perfections. Nor may we think 
that being, in this sense, can have anything added to it that is 
more formal and determines it as act determines potentiality: be-
cause being in this latter sense is essentially distinct from 
that to which it is added and whereby it is determined. But 
nothing that is outside the range of being can be added to being: 
for nothing is outside its range except non-being, which can be 
neither form nor matter. Hence being is not determined by some-
thing else as potentiality by act but rather as act by potentiality: 
since in defining a form we include its proper matter instead of 
the difference: thus we define a soul as the act of an organic 
physical body. Accordingly this being is distinct from that 
being inasmuch as it is the being of this or that nature. For 
this reason Dionysius says (Div. Nom. V) that though things 
having life excel . those that merely have being, yet being excels 
life, since living things have not only life but also being. 
This text is often cited as supporting the notion of essence as a 
limiting principle, for Thomas here insists that essence acts as a po-
tency to limit esse. Yet it is important to note, first, that this 
text asserts two different types of esse, secondly, that it supports 
69 ST I-II, 2, 5 ad 2. 
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the notion of essence as that to which esse is "added," and, thirdly, 
that, while Thomas specifically says that only non-being lies outside 
being, he also notes that non-being does not include form and matter. 
Non-being. In the above-cited text, Thomas seems to place form 
and matter on the side of being. This is consistent with his earlier 
statement in the same work that being is common to potentiality and 
act. 70 It is also consistent with his remarks in the Summa Theologiae 
where, in discussing creat~on, he speaks of form in terms of a work of 
art, a shaping to a meaning, and associates it with the Logos. 7l 
To complicate the situation further, there are those places where 
he speaks of a lack of p~oportion between non-being (non-ens) and 
72 being (~). If such is the case, then how is one to understand 
either potency or essence as non-being, when act and potency are said 
to be proportioned to one another? One possible way out of this dilemma 
is to argue that ens in the above texts refers to ~ being, not being 
per se. Yet that raises a further difficulty. If non-being and a being 
lack proportion, do not. also common being (esse) and a being lack the 
same proportion? This would seem to .be the sense of Thomas' remarks 
in the Summa Theologiae, where he describes esse as the "distinctive 
note creative action strikes," but carefully and explicitly denies that 
it is the subject created. 73 
Evil. A third area in his thought where such difficulties abound 
is that of evil. In the Summa Theologiae, he argues that evil cannot 
70 De Pot., 3, 1 ad 12. 
71 ST I, 45, 7. 
72 ST I, 45, 5; De sub. sep., c. 10. 
73 ST I, 45, 4. 
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signify any existing thing or a real "shaping" or "positive" kind of 
74 thing. Since he has previously associated shaping with form, he seems 
once again to be saying that form is positive. This is supported by 
his further statement in the same article that actions are grounded in 
forms. Two articles later, he describes form as a sort of "completion" 
75 . 
and hence a sort of "good." In fact, he declares that the deprivations 
or negations associated with evil attach directly to qualities and 
forms. 76 If qualities and forms are to be regarded as negations them-
selves, this would make no sense. All of this echoes what he had said 
earlier in De Potentia, that inferiority among created things does not 
imply imperfection on the part of those things which are inferior, for 
"imperfection denotes the lack of something which is natural or due to 
a thing.,,77 In fact, in his discussions of evil and of virtue, Thomas 
repeatedly insists on distinct positive definable perfections in things, 
for it is only by knowing what a thing ought to be that we are able 
to make judgments about what is due it. 
Participation. Although there is a great deal in his writings 
to suggest that participation consists primarily of a finitizing or 
quantifying of esse, Thomas also speaks of participation as involving two 
distinct elements. Hence he discusses participation as the possession 
of a nature which is h~gher than one's own78 or as a share in a higher 
74 ST I, 48, l. 
75 ST I, 48, 3. 
76 ST I, 48, 4. 
77 De Pot., 3, 1 ad 14. 
78 Comment. in ad Coloss., c. 1, lect. 4. 
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act than one's own. 79 In De Potentia, he quotes Boethius to the effect 
that whatever exists participates both in being and in something else, 
and agrees that this is true of all created beings. 80 Earlier in the 
same work, he had already referred to the fact that God's own act of 
existing is distinct from all other acts of existing because only His 
act of existing does not come to a nature other than itself . 81 Thomas 
returns to the same theme in the Summa Theologiae, where he applies a 
similar notion of participation to creaturely causality: "A complete 
substance of some specific nature can reproduce its like, not indeed 
by producing that nature as such, but by applying it to a subject.,,82 
These remarks are consist.:ont with his view that God's esse "sit sub-
stantia vel natura Dei,,,83 whereas in created things esse "est actuali-
tas substantiae vel essentiae.,,84 And these statements, in turn, sup-
port his assertion that formal causality is not reducible to efficient 
causality, but rather that efficient causality operates through a mediat-
. f 1 85 1ng orma cause. 
The Hermeneutical Dilemma 
Clearly we have conflicting textual evidence in Thomas with regard 
to all of the major questions regarding the relationship of esse and 
essence. This hermeneutical dilemma has not gone unobserved by either 
79 Quodl. XII, q. 5, a. 5. 
80 De Pot., 7, 2 ad 8. 
81 
, De Pot., 7, 2 ad 5. 
82 ST I, 45, 5 ad 1. 
83 DePot., 7, 2. 
84 ST I, 54, 1. 
85De Ver., 27, 1 ad 3; cf. Quaest. Disp. de Anima, a . 6 ad 9. 
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Carlo or Clarke. Clarke notes that both the 'thin' and the 'thick' 
essence can find textual support in Thomas. 86 Carlo acknowledges the 
same two streams of texts, and asks, "Is there any way of explaining or 
reconci ling these opposed positions?,,87 
Carlo has his own answer to this question. 
The starting point for this entire discussion seems to me to 
be the doctrine of the possibles. If possible being is no being 
and if essences considered in themselves are in potency and po-
tential being cannot exert causality, then essence must be con-
sidered in a new light. This means simply that essence is merely 
a mode of being or esse. 88 
Although Carlo here disagrees with 'Primacy of Esse' Thomists on the 
precise nature of the starting point, his answer shares in common with 
theirs two characteristics. First, it seeks a metaphysical, not a 
methodological, starting point. Secondly, and as a consequence, it 
imposes a methodology on the texts themselves. That is to say, the 
starting point presumes the point of view from which Thomas' writings 
are to be interpreted, and the interpretation which results then becomes 
the means by which the point of view itself is demonstrated as valid. 
Thus, Gilson presumes that an authentic Thomism is characterized by 
the priority of esse and the real distinction between esse and essence, 
and goes on from there to demonstrate the Aristotelian/Christian syn-
thesis which Thomas achieves and the secondary importance of a partici-
• 
pation doctrine which is not Platonic. Carlo, on the other hand, pre-
sumes the valid principle at work in Thomas to be the non-being of 
86W. N. Clarke, Preface to Carlo, Ultimate Reducibility, p. viii . 
87 Carlo, "Commentary (a)," pp. 126-127 . 
88Ibid., p. 127 . 
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potency, and is thereby able to demonstrate the Platonic character of 
Thomas from the 'thin' essence which his starting point presumes. 
Beyond the fact that such answers are quite unable to bring dis-
senting Thomists into dialogue with one another (their starting points 
being mutually exclusive), a more serious difficulty attends this meta-
physical approach to the problem, namely, the fact that neither side 
is able to provide a convincing explanation for the two streams of 
texts. Gilsonian Thomists tend to deny the presence of a Platonic or 
.. 
Neoplatonic notion of participation, while 'Esseist' Thomists tend to 
dismiss the Aristotelian texts as 1) the early Thomas (Little), 2) a 
product of the misleading and reifying nature of essentialist Greek 
vocabulary which Thomas was forced to use (Phelan) or 3) Thomas' de-
cision to use a vocabulary and a set of formulas familiar to 13th cen-
tury theologians (Carlo). The first answer is not borne out by the 
textual evidence, while the latter two either provide no answer at 
all or do so at the expense of suggesting that Thomas willingly employed 
a vocabulary for which he really had no use to say a good many things 
he had no desire to say or that he played to the crowd of his day. 
There is general agreement among Thomists that the early Thomas 
is fundamentally Aristotelian. As Clarke has noted, the fusion of 
Aristotelian and Platonic elements does not appear explicitly in his 
, , 'I C G 'I 89 wr1t1ngs unt1 ontra ent1 es. Thomists also generally agree that 
Thomas employs an act/potency methodology throughout his writings. 
~fuether this methodology is Aristotelian ('Strict Observance' Thomism), 
89Clarke, "The Limitation of Act by Potency," p. 192. Sweeney 
also notes that Thomas, in his early writings, seldom applied the 
notion of participation to the real distinction ("Early· Writings," 
p. 120). 
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a synthesis of Aristotelian and Christian elements (Gilson), a synthesis 
of Christian and Platonic elements within a framework which is fund a-
mentally Aristotelian (participationist Thomists) or a synthesis of 
Aristotelian and Christian elements within a framework which is funda-
mentally Platonic ('Esseist' Thomists) cannot be determined by defining 
a metaphysical starting point which presumes the very answer which it 
then proceeds to demonstrate, but rather by examining methodology it-
self. We must first establish the differences between the Aristotelian 
and Platonic uses of act and potency, and then determine which methodo-
logy Thomas actually and explicitly employs. 
Act/Potency in Plato and Aristotle 
In order to distinguish the act/potency framework of Plato from 
that of Aristotle, it is necessary to examine briefly how each under-
stands the relationship of form to matter. Because of his insistence 
that being is immaterial, Plato .attributes to matter only a negative 
relationship with form. However one interprets the Platonic doctrine 
of the Forms, one thing is certain--their perfection is identified with 
their immateriality. Materiality introduces an element of irrationality, 
of non-being, into the empirical world of sense experience. As Keefe 
notes, 
. • it is the f~st insight, the a priori, of Platonism, that 
the existential -situation is irrational: It is the product of 
a "Fall" which is not implicit in the essential or conceptual 
structures of reality.90 
As the same author goes on to observe, "being and meontic nonbeing do 
not compose, but war with each other.,,9l As a result, the Platonic 
90Keefe, Thomism, p. 34. 
91Ibid., p. 132. 
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a priori assigns to matter an extrinsic and disruptive effect on the 
essential integrity and intelligibility of being. 
The human situation, under these conditions" is an~, a search, 
for an essential unity and meaning which the existential, empirical 
world is unable to provide. Plato has often been either credited with 
or accused of (considering one's point of view) providing a p'urely 
mythical or mystical account of how the human mind is able to know be-
ing in a world in which materiality and sense knowledge are barriers 
rather than paths to the 'really real.' Copleston notes that the later 
Plato was more inclined to stress the role of dialectic in leading the 
human mind to such knowlecige. 92 Nevertheless, the Platonic view of 
existence as disrupted and estranged lends itself easily to non-rational 
accounts of the material world. 
Aristotle, on the other hand, refuses the Platonic a priori. How, 
he asks, can the Forms be separate from the things of which they are 
the forms?93 Because he refuses to accept the notion that being and 
existence can be separated in this fashion, he attributes to matter a 
positive or composing relationship with form. Agreeing with Plato that 
matter is unintelligible, he nevertheless refuses to understand it as 
that element which disrupts intelligibility. Rather, as the principle 
of individuation, matt~ makes possible the multiplication of a single 
formal principle in the community of a species, which is eternal by 
virtue of its capacity to multiply itself indefinitely through its 
individual members. The material species (in~anent form) is, therefore, 
92Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 1, part 1: 
Greece & Rome (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., Image Books, 
1962), pp. 225-226 (hereafter cited as Copleston, Greece & Rome). 
93~'1etaphysics, I, 99lb2-3. 
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the Aristotelian counterpart to the immaterial (extrinsic) Platonic 
Form. 
Because Aristotle insists that substantiality resides in material 
.being, matter and sensible experience are not barriers, but paths to 
knowing that being. It is not mere chance that leads him to open the 
Hetaphysics with a paragraph which links our natural desire to' knOl-T with 
the delight we take in our senses. 94 Consequently, Aristotelianism is 
a rejection of the Platonic eros which seeks reality in a realm beyond 
the empirically given. Instead, Aristotelianism assumes the intrinsic 
intelligibility of the material world, and seeks its knowledge of being 
through an analysis of that world. 
At this point, two clear differences between Plato and Aristotle 
are apparent. First, act and potency are contradictory in Plato but 
complementary in Aristotle . Because the Platonic potency is hostile to 
being, it must be identified with nonbeing. Because the Aristotelian 
potency is intrinsic to material being, it must be associated with that 
being. Here then we have the genesis of 'thin' and 'thick' potencies 
which, when transferred to the esse/essence distinction, translate into 
the 'thin' and 'thick' essences of the contemporary Thomist debate. 
The second difference is a necessary corollary to the first. Be-
cause Plato understands potency to be unintelligible and disruptive of 
essential being, the empirical world is, by definition, incapable of 
submitting to rational analysis. As Copleston notes, 
in the Platonic physics, the chaotic element, that into 
which order is "introduced" by Reason, is not explained: 
doubtless Plato thought that it was inexplicable. It can 
neither be deduced nor has it been created out of nothing. 
94 Metaphysics I, 98Da. 
It is simply there (a fact of experience), and that is all 
that we can say about it. 95 
Here lies the Platonic attraction to myth. Matter is irrational, yet 
it is also factual. "Incapable of being accounted for in terms of 
ontology and yet fundamental in the cosmos, it [matter] found its ex-
planation in mythical accounts of a primal tragedy.,,96 
75 
Aristotle, on the other hand, assumes the intrinsic intelligibility 
of material things. Act and potency, for him, are therefore the tools 
of an analytical approach which seeks in material things the intrinsic 
conditions of their possibility. Having rejected the Platonic Ideas, 
without denying the existence of formal intelligibilities in material 
things, he seeks to identify the immanent forms and primal causes of 
things. For this reason, as de Vogel points out regarding Aristotelian-
I I I 
ism, "la methode de la metaphysique est essentiellement une methode 
\ I 97 d'analyse logique et non pas de synthese speculative." Because im-
manent forms require material conditions for their multiplication in a 
species, Aristotle uses act and potency as Forrelative principles to 
explain the necessary intrinsic components of material beings. 
Aristotelianism does not pretend to be a psychologism; it does 
not result from an investigation of the phenomena of conscious-
ness; its concern is the logical coherence of the empirical world, 
and it is driven necessarily to an essentialism. 98 
In fact, both Plato and Aristotle are essentialist, identifying 
95 Copleston, Greece & Rome (part 1), p. 215. 
96 Keefe, Thomism, p. 12. 
97 ~ I C. J. de Vogel, "La methode d'Aristote en metaphysique 
Metaphysique A 1-2," in Aristote et Les Probl~mes de M~thode, 
Suzanne Mansion (Louvain: Publications Universitaires; Paris: 
Nauwelaerts, 1961), p. 152. 
98rceefe, Thomism, p. 40. 
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being with form or intelligibility. Because Plato's forms are extrinsic 
and immaterial, Plato necessarily separates being from existence. Be-
cause Aristotle's forms are immanent and materialized, Aristotle neces-
sarily identifies being and existence. Thomas, on the other hand, uses 
esse and essence to go beyond their essentialism. Hence the esse/essence 
distinction takes priority over that of form and matter in his system. 
It is, therefore, the relationship of esse and essence which must be 
examined in order to determine his methodology. 
The Methodological Resolution 
Is the Thomist enterprise Aristotelian or is it Platonic? Because 
Thomas was most explicitly Aristotelian in his early works and only 
later introduced a more Platonic or Neoplatonic strand into his writings, 
it is necessary first to isolate those explicitly Platonic elements 
which he undeniably and deliberately introduced into his thought, and 
then to see why he did so. If it can be shown that his reasons for 
adopting them were to introduce the principles of Platonic method, then 
there is good reason to suppose he deliberately veered from Aristotle 
toward Plato. If, on the other hand, those elements were introduced 
within the context or in support of the Aristotelian view with which he 
originally started, we shall have good reason to suppose that it was 
never his intention to abandon it . 
• 
There are two notions from the Platonic/Neoplatonic tradition 
which Thomas clearly and deliberately made use of in his own thought. 
The more important of these was the Platonic doctrine of the Forms 
which, under the authority of Augustine, entered the Thomist world 
in the guise of the Divine Ideas. The second was the Neoplatonic 
notion of God as infinite. Since reference has already been made to 
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the latter notion and its use by Thomas, it will be considered first. 
Infinity. As will be recalled, both Plato and Aristotle were pre-
vented from associating infinity and being because they identified per-
fection and determination. If the perfect is that which is determined, 
then only the imperfect or undetermined can be infinite (formless). For 
them, therefore, infinity was necessarily associated with quantity, not 
quality. Plotinus and the Neoplatonists were able to advance beyond 
this position, attributing infinity to God. Their position, however, 
fell short of that later adopted by Christian theologians, inasmuch as 
the infinity they attributed to God was an "extrinsic and relative sort 
of infinity" which could be applied to God as the God who is unlimited 
by anything prior or extrinsic to him. 99 Furthermore, God was not Being 
itself, but "the One beyond form and being."lOO In such a system, 
being is still linked with intelligibility, and intelligibility is 
still linked with the determinateness of form. 
The doctrine of creation enabled Christianity to break the Greek 
association between determinateness and intelligibility. As long as 
form and matter were regarded as uncreated, it was impossible to avoid 
the association of being with form (determination), inasmuch as there 
was nothing beyond form with which to associate it. By the same token, 
only matter could be r~garded as in potency to being (form). Once, 
however, the notion arose that both form and matter are created, then 
both form and matter came to be regarded as potencies in relation to 
a source of perfection which transcended both of them. Form then 
99Sweeney, "Mediaeval Opponents," p. 245n. 
lOOIdem., "Infinity," The New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), VII:506. 
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began to exercise a dual function as not only a determinate perfection 
which limited matter to the parameters of its own perfection, but as a 
receptive potency which exercised its determination in relation to a 
perfection beyond itself . 
When Thomas moved from an essential to an existential notion of 
God, he broke not only with the determinate forms of Plato and Aris-
totle, but also with the notion of form as the highest perfection. It 
might well be ,argued that, had there been no notion of God as infinite 
for him to adopt, Thomas would have had to develop one, inasmuch as his 
notion of God as Pure Act was a rejection of all previous notions of 
God as form, and therefore of all notions of formal limitation in God. 
Nevertheless, in On Being and Essence, Thomas doesn't speak of God 
as infinite . Rather, He is Pure Act. In fact, it is precisely His 
nature as pure being which distinguishes Him from all other beings, in-
asmuch as pure being is such that no add.ition can be made to it. Uni-
versal being, on the other hand, is susceptible of addition, and every 
other being is a composite of this universal being and one of those 
additions. 101 None of this is surprising in a work which is acknowledged 
to be Aristotelian. Within the Aristotelian act/potency framework, God 
as Pure Act and other beings as a combination of act and potency (esse/ 
essence) is the obvious, way in which to distinguish Ipsum Esse from 
creatures. That God is infinite and the creature finite would be the 
obvious corollary, but in itself not important to the discussion. 
If, however, Thomas had wanted later to move to a Platonic act/ 
potency framework, the notion of God as infinite would have helped him 
enormously, since it would have given him immediate grounds for shifting 
101 On Being and Essence, c. 5 . 
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to a notion of potency as a limiting principle. He could have spoken 
of God as the infinite act-of-existing, who creates finite acts-of-
existi~g. Any composition in creatures he could then have attributed 
to the distinction between infinite being and finite being. This is, 
as we have seen, the manner of speaking preferred by 'Esseist' Thomists, 
and we might expect to find Thomas using God's infinity to introduce 
this type of language, if these Thomists are correct. 
When we turn, however, to the two Summas of Thomas, we find that 
such a transformation does not take place. In fact, these two works, 
which give us the overall structure of Thomas' thought during a period 
when he is presumed to have moved to a Platonic participation/limitation 
framework, offer striking evidence that he did not incorporate the 
notion of God as infinite for any purpose which could be characterized 
as Platonic. 
First, the placement of .his discussion of God's infinity in both 
Summas clearly indicates how peripheral it is in his thinking. In Book 
I of the Contra Gentiles, his discussion of God begins with chapter 10. 
God's infinity isn't discussed until chapter 43. In the Prima Pars 
of the Summa Theologiae, God's infinity is put off until question 7. 
In both works, the proofs for God's existence are offered before His 
infinity is established. More importantly, in both works the notions 
of simplicity and composition are employed to establish the distinction 
between God and creatures before God's infinity is demonstrated. 
Secondly, the notion of infinity employed in both Summas is nega-
tive, not positive. That is to say, it is knowledge of God by way of 
negation. " . . in God the infinite is understood only in a negative 
way, because there is no terminus or limit to His perfection: He is 
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supremely perfect . It is thus that the infinite ought to be attributed 
G d ,,102 to 0 ". For Thomas, therefore, God is primarily Pure Act and only 
secondarily, and by way of negation, infinite act. 
In order to understand the significance of infinity as a neg~tive 
attribute of God, one need only compare it with Duns Scotus' positive 
notion of God's infinity. Scotus understood Infinite Being, when pre-
dicated of God, to be "the most perfect absolute concept we can have of 
him.,,103 For Scotus, therefore, infinity signalled not the absence of 
limitation, but "a certain grade of perfection--infinity.,,104 There-
fore, Scotus was forced to a univocal concept of being, in which the 
disjunctive transcendentals, infinity and finitude, express the primary 
distinction between God and creatures. Furthermore, since Scotus identi-
fied infinity with perfection in the sense of intelligibility, Infinite 
Being, for him, meant infinite intelligibility. That the 'esseist' 
Carlo sounds more like the 'essentialist' Scotus than like the 'exis-
tentialist' Thomas is an important point to which we shall return later 
in this chapter. 
Thirdly, the internal evidence of Contra Gentiles I, 43 ("Quod 
Deus est infinitus"), and the Summa Theologiae I, 7, 1 ("utrum Deus sit 
infinitus"), indicates that the issue is treated, for the most part, 
within an Aristotelian frame of reference. The first five arguments 
in Contra Gentiles supporting the notion of God as infinite are all 
102CG I, 43. 
103John Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings, trans. Allan Wolter 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1962), p. 80. 
104 " Ibid., p. 30. 
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based, in one way or another, on the act/potency composition in creatures 
as contrasted with the pure actuality of God. Only one argument, the 
sixth, is explicitly participationist. 
Question 7, article 1, of the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologiae, 
contains an analysis of form and matter which is half Aristotelian, half 
Platonic. Form is described as perfecting matter (Aristotelian), but 
matter is described as restricting form (Platonic). Thomas employs the 
Platonic notion of matter here in order to get to the notion of perfect 
unlimited form, so that he might transfer that notion into the order of 
esse itself. Therefore, he concludes that "maxime formale omnium est 
ipsum esse," and that God's existence is infinite because "esse divinum 
non sit esse receptum in aliquo, sed ipse est suum esse subsistens." 
Hence, Thomas uses the Platonic form for Aristotelian purposes, namely, 
to assert that esse divinum is unlimited perfection, par excellance, 
and, by implication, that form itself is limited perfection (the "ali-
quo" which "receives" esse).105 He ends the article with the state-
ment that "The very fact that God's existence itself subsists without 
being acquired by anything, and as such is limitless, distinguishes 
it from everything else, and sets other things aside from it." 
Here we see that, contrary to the view of 'esseists' such as 
Little, Clarke and Car~o, as well as many participationist Thomists, 
Thomas argues from the simplicity of God and the composition of the 
creature to their respective infinity and finitude. In other words, 
the Aristotelian notion of act/potency provides the framework within 
l05Thomas ' use of "reception" occurs in that stream of texts in 
which he has a positive notion of essence in mind. This point has 
not been lost on Carlo, who lists it as one of the characteristics 
of that stream ("Connnentary (a)," p. 126). 
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which he demonstrates the infinity of God. Furthermore, - the procedure 
he employs is analytical, not intuitive, dialectical, phenomenological, 
mythical or mystical. 
Nor should it go unnoticed that the same Aristotelian act/potency 
framework and the same analytical procedure govern his discussion of 
creation in both Summas. We have already examined in some detail 
chapters 52-54 in Book 2 of Contra Gentiles , where a) the composition 
in intellectual substances is established on the grounds of God's 
simplicity and subsistence before the notion of His infinity is intro-
duced (chapter 52), b) the notions of act and potency as proportionate 
and complementary to one another are established before the notion of 
participation is introduced and integrated into that act/potency frame-
work (chapter 53) and c) the act/potency distinction between esse and 
essence is said to transcend that of form and matter, including both 
material and non-material being in its scope (chapter 54). 
The same emphasis on the composition of act and potency appears 
once again in the Summa Theologiae I, 45, 4, where Thomas asks whether 
creation is proper to composite and subsisting things. Apart from the 
significance of the question itself (he does not ask if creation is 
proper to limited acts-of-existing), he states quite clearly (sed 
contra) that creation is properly attributed to composite subsisting 
things. 
Carlo, Clarke and others appeal to this article in particular, 
because Thomas says quite explicitly that forms and accidents are, 
properly speaking, not beings, but co-existents. 'Esseist' Thomists 
conclude from this that the Thomist essence is 'thin,' since esse (as 
the first effect of creation) would appear to be the only 'existent' 
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produced by creation. This overlooks two statements by Thomas, in 
this same article, which clearly indicate that esse cannot be regarded 
as an 'existent'. 
The first statement appears in the first objection, where the 
question is raised as to whether or not creation is proper to composite 
beings, inasmuch as, according to the De causis, "Prima rerum creatarum 
est esse." Thomas notes that, since "esse rei creatae non est subsis-
tens," it would seem that creation is not properly attributed to com-
posite (i.e., subsistent) things . In answer to this objection, Thomas 
again states that esse is not subsistent, and goes on to resolve the 
difficulty by explaining that the statement, "Prima rerum creatarum 
est esse" means "esse non importat subjectum creatum, sed importat 
propriam rationem objecti creationis." Although he does not refer 
to esse as a co-existent, he has already said, in the body of the 
article, that form is co-existent because it does not subsist, and 
that only subsistent things are created. Hence, the implication is 
quite clear that esse, although enjoying a certain ontological priority 
over forms and accidents, is also a co-existent. 
The second statement is made with reference to the second objec-
tion, which suggests that creation would not seem to refer to composite 
things, inasmuch as composite things come out of their components, not 
out of nothing. Thomas responds that there are no pre-existing prin-
ciples. Therefore, creation is the simultaneous bringing into being 
of the composite together with its component principles. Once again, 
esse is ruled out as the 'existent' produced by creation. 
There is no hint of a 'thin' essence in this text from the Summa 
Theologiae. Furthermore, and once again, the procedure employed is 
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analytical, proceeding from the fact of composite beings to an exam ina-
tion of what can, properly speaking, be said to be produced by creation. 
While the notion of God as infinite originated with Neoplatonism, 
it is a necessary corollary to the doctrine of God as Ipsum Esse as 
Thomas develops that doctrine in his early, Aristotelian writings. Neces-
sary, because Ipsum Esse removes God from the realm of all material and 
formal limitation. A corollary, because it can express only negatively 
what Pure Act says positively. Thomas could have used the notion of 
God's infinity to shift his thinking into a more Platonic framework. 
The fact that he did not do so strongly suggests that he did not intend, 
in theory or in practice, to abandon the Aristotelian methodology. Can 
the ·same thing be said of the Divine Ideas? 
Divine Ideas. In On Being and Essence, after discussing the es-
sential component (form/matter) in composite substances (esse/essence),106 
Thomas considers the relationship of essence to genus, species and dif-
ference. He comes very close to suggesting that the concepts the intel-
lect forms with regard to species are purely logical, quoting Averroes 
to the effect that "it is the intellect that causes universality in 
things." He does pull back from this position in the next paragraph, 
however, maintaining that the universal "is not due to the being it 
has in the intellect bqt to its relation to things in their likeness.,,107 
He does not, however, offer any explanation as to how several things 
are able to share in the single likeness which the mind is able to 
abstract from them. When we turn to the two Summas, however, . we find 
there the principle of explanation--namely, the Divine Ideas as the 
1060n Being and Essence, c. 2. 
107 Ibid., c. 3. 
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exemplars of all created things. 
Thomas' discussion of the Divine Ideas is rather sketchy in Contra 
Gentiles. In Book I, chapter 53, he takes up again the method which 
Carlo finds so questionable in the De Veritate, that of inferring from 
the human analogue of intellection to the presence in God of Divine 
Ideas . In the next chapter (54), he discusses the relationship of 
the Divine Ideas to the Divine Essence. 
The intellect of God, therefore, can comprehend in His essence 
that which is proper to each thing by understanding wherein the 
divine essence is being imitated and wherein each thing falls 
short of its perfection. Thus, by understanding His essence as 
imitable in the mode of life [modum vitae] and not of knowledge, 
God has the proper form of a plant; and if He knows His essence 
as imitable in the mode of knowledge [modum cognitionis] and 
not of intellect, God has the proper form of animal, and so 
forth. 
The statement, "wherein each thing falls short of its perfection", 
together with Thomas' repeated use of the word 'mode' (a favorite ex-
pression among 'thin' essence Thomists) might suggest he is introducing 
a Neoplatonic notion of essence as limitation, were it not for the fact 
that priority is given to the capacity of things to "imitate" the Divine 
Essence. Clearly, such an imitation must be positive, since finitude 
or limitation per se could not be regarded as an imitation or reflection 
of infinite being. That Thomas has a positive notion of essence in mind 
here is also reinforce~ by his use of the word 'mode' to designate 
perfections. 
When we turn to the Summa Theologiae, the use of the Divine Ideas 
to shore up a 'thick' essence becomes even more apparent. The three 
articles in question 15 of the Prima Pars deal respectively with the 
Divine Ideas as a) exemplars and principles of knowing (article 1), 
b) forms of the stable and unchangeable natures of things (article 2), 
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and c) principles of God's speculative and practical knowledge. The 
same insistence on a positive view of essence reappears in question 44, 
article 3, which deals with God as the exemplary cause of all things. 
Here the emphasis is on how God must be recognized as exemplar cause, 
in order to account for the fact that things reach out . to achieve de-
terminate forms.' Thomas attributes these determinate forms to the 
Divine Wisdom, concluding that, "Hence we should say that divine wisdom 
holds the originals of all things, and these we have previously called 
the Ideas, that is the exemplar forms existing in the divine mind." 
It should come as no surprise that Thomas incorporates the Platonic 
Forms into his system in order to underwrite a positive notion of es-
sence. The Platonic Form is, after all, the thick essence personified 
(or, rather, reified). Paradoxically, Thomas has recourse to the very 
doctrine which Aristotle so vigorously rejected in order to provide 
a transcendental grounding for the Aristotelian notion of positive po-
tency. And he does so for a most Aristotelian reason, namely, to fur-
nish a priori conditions of possibility for the essential component in 
existing things. The Divine Ideas, far from providing the occasion for 
a conversion to Platonism, are employed for strictly Aristotelian 
purposes. 
We are now in a PQsition to answer Carlo's question, "Why not 
describe essence, then, as the place where esse stops, bordered by 
nothingness?" The reason is clear. The Thomist project is not one of 
description, but one of analysis. To say that essence is the place 
where esse stops does nothing more than state a fact of our everyday 
experience, i.e., that things are finite. Such a description supposes 
the capacity (potency) of esse to stop, but provides no analysis of 
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the conditions of possibility which would permit esse to stop. If be-
ing is simple and unlimited by nature, then the positing of essence as 
a limiting principle intrinsic to being makes no sense. Being, by 
definition, would have no intrinsic capacity for such a limiting prin-
ciple. If, on the other hand, being does contain such a principle, 
then that principle must be essence (potency). But, in that 'case, 
essence cannot be understood as a negative principle, for it would lie 
on the side of being. To posit God as the efficient cause of limita-
tion doesn't improve upon the situation either, since God's ability to 
limit esse to particular modes presupposes the capacity (potency) of 
esse to submit to such a limitation. 
Carlo has, in fact, abandoned altogether the analytical approach 
employed by Thomas. He makes this clear in his characterization of 
act and potency as "schematic," not "ontological," principles. 
As in all other sciences we find in metaphysics both ontologi-
cal and schematic principles. By schematic principles I mean 
those whose primary purpose is to organize or unify the multi-
farious data of the science (like the atomic theory in physics), 
rather than to capture more directly some aspect of reality. To 
our mind potency and act are principles of this order. l08 
Carlo has adopted, in place of the Thomist methodology, a form of 
Platonism which, at its best, is phenomenological or descriptive, and, 
at its worst, is mythic. It is Carlo, after all, who characterizes 
• 
essence as rising "out of the flood of esse like Thetis from the 
frothy wave." 109 
Carlo's dilemma can be traced to his desire to synthesize Aris-
totelian and Platonic methodology in a way which is simply impossible. 
108carlo, Ultimate Reducibility, p. 92. 
109 d" ( )" 128 I em., Commentary a, p. . 
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He wishes to combine the Aristotelian notion of substantial reality as 
material reality (form/matter) with the Platonic notion of being as 
monist (form). This leads him to attempt to account for Aristotle's 
composed substances by means of Plato's single principle. When trans-
ferred into the existentialism of Thomas, this project forces a reduc-
tion of essence/esse to esse alone. Since, however, esse alone cannot 
account for finite being, the notion of non-being must necessarily be 
introduced. Once this notion is introduced, the Aristotelian substance 
has been abandoned in favor of the Platonic substance. 
At this point, two courses are possible. One can maintain, with 
Little, that finite acts-of-being are "shot through and through, as it 
were, with non-being" (the Platonic 'fall' from the full integrity of 
being) or one can maintain, with Carlo, that material beings are limited 
acts-of-existing enjoying the same nature (esse) as God, though in a 
finite mode. As Henle notes, the Platonic notion of participation can 
i 1 i . . . . . h i llO ssue on y n a pure extr1ns~c~sm or ~n a pant e sm. 
110R. Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism (The Hague: N. Nijhoff, 
1956), p. 377. The charge of pantheism is one to which 'thin essence' 
Thomists are particularly sensitive, and one which they, to a man, deny. 
Little tries to avoid the charge by recourse to the notion that 
finitude itself destroys any pantheist identity between God and crea-
tures. "Thus creatures are not miniature replicas of God, but rather 
constituted of limiting essences that smother every divine property in 
them while yet leaving ~n their existences indications that what has 
been smothered is divine" (The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, p. 116). 
However plausible this might sound, it does not actually explain any-
thing. No principle is offered to account for how a quantifying 
(finitizing) of esse could "smother every divine property," much less 
leave intact a limited, definable perfection in the esse so smothered. 
Nor is it easy to see how Little's notion· of essence as the "no-
moreness" of being is to be reconciled with the statement that finite 
beings are "shot through and through" with non-being. As "no more" 
being, non-being should lie outside the limit, not penetrate it. 
Actually Little's views are so ambiguous as to defy close analysis. 
Phelan maintains that pantheism is avoided because esse can never 
be regarded as a thing. "If one must talk the language of participation, 
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Plato and Aristotle: Can They Be Synthesized? 
Even if the above consideration of divine infinity and the Divine 
Ideas gives us good reason to suppose that Thomas never intended to 
abandon an Aristotelian notion of act/potency, the fact still remains 
that a great deal of what he says cannot be made to fit into that Aris-
totelian framework. If the doctrines of God's infinity and of the Divine 
Ideas offer evidence that Thomas actually employed an Aristotelian 
methodology, do they also offer evioence as to why Neoplatonic elements 
find their way into that methodology? Carlo's question, "How is a 
multiplicity of Divine Ideas rooted in the Divine Essence?" is very much 
I would say, also, 'There is no being, esse, save the divine being, Esse; 
and all beings participate it.' This sounds pantheistic only to the----
ears of those who still think of esse as something" ("The Being of 
Creatures," p. 125). A problem, however, then arises with regard to 
things. If esse is not a thing and essence is non-being, how does the 
composition of a non-thing with non-being produce a being or a thing? 
To fall back, as Phelan does, on essence as a 'mode of being' is either 
to import the very positivity which his original use of the word 'mode' 
was designed to eliminate or it is to suppose that a mere juggling of 
words will suffice to achieve plausibility. 
Carlo tries to avoid the accusation of pantheism by recourse to ef-
ficient causality. "The real danger in explaining the relations of 
creatures to God is not atheism but pantheism, the ties between Ipsum 
Esse and finite esses are much pro founder than any differences. But 
as long as we remember that esse is communicated through efficient 
causality and not formal causality there is no danger of pantheism, of 
making God the Form of the World as William of Auvergne was tempted to 
do" (Ultimate Reducibility, p. 109). Since, however, the reduction of 
essence to esse is sim~ltaneously the reduction of formal causality 
to efficient causality, the problem has merely been shifted to the 
existential order, where it remains unanswered and apparently unanswer-
able. For, as was previously noted, God's efficient causality can pro-
duce limited esse only if esse itself has the capacity (potency) for 
such limitation. By denying to potency any ontological status, Carlo 
denies the formal principle which God's efficient causality requires in 
order to operate at all. Carlo leaves the impression (in no way miti-
gated by his illustrations) that esse "flows" until it meets a wall of 
non-being, at which point it simply stops. To fall back upon efficient 
causality alone to account for this seems tantamount to saying that God 
creates the non-being which stops esse, an unhappy prospect on two 
counts, since it saddles God with non-being at the same time that it 
fails to provide any principle by which non-being can be understood to 
stop being. 
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to the point. For the point at issue is Thomas' synthesis of Aristotle 
and Plato. Can such a synthesis be done, or is the project itself an 
impossible, because contradictory, one? Before answering that question, 
we need to examine more closely the synthesis which Thomas attempted. 
What shall be argued here is that the Aristotelian methodology is 
incompatible with Plato's Forms. The notion of God as Pure Act stands 
in direct contradiction to the notion of God's Essence as containing 
formal distinctions. The fact that Thomas is careful to insist that 
God's essence does not actually contain a multiplicity of Ideas in no 
way mitigates the basic contradiction which this doctrine introduces 
into his thought. 
The basic contradiction stems from the fact that Thomas seeks a 
transcendental grounding for both components in the esse/essence dis-
tinction. Through esse, the creature is understood to participate exis-
tentially in the pure, infinite act which is Ipsum Esse. Through essence, 
the creature is understood to participate essentially or formally in the 
Divine Essence as God understands it to be imitable. In order to ac-
count for this notion of a dual participation in God, Thomas must re-
introduce into the notion of God, which he had previously purged of all 
formal connotations, the Divine Ideas as the forms or exemplars of His 
creative activity. Th~s contradiction is what Carlo's question addresses. 
And the answer to it is quite obvious. The Divine Ideas cannot be rooted 
in the Divine Essence, if God is pure, simple, infinite act. Nor can 
the Ideas themselves retain their qualitative character (i.e., as forms, 
perfections, intelligibilities) once they are placed there. This latter 
point is one which seems to have escaped most Thomists. 'Esseist' 
Thomists alone appreciate it. Their 'thin' essence is the product of 
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that appreciation. 
The quantification of the Divine Ideas stems from the fact that if 
Ipsum Esse is one utterly simple and infinite perfection, it cannot be 
conceived as split up into a multiplicity of perfections or intelligi-
bilities which are essentially different from its own perfection. A 
single infinite quality cannot itself be the source of a multiplicity 
of qualities. It can only be quantified or 'contracted' into smaller 
and smaller amounts, such that what is produced is not a multiplicity 
of natures distinct from the divine nature qualitatively, but a multi-
plicity of grades in being which are distinct from the divine nature 
quantitatively. Thomas himself cannot escape the logic of this situa-
tion. As a result, the Divine Ideas, which Thomas imports to ground 
the 'thick' essences he wants in created things, are unable to retain 
their 'thickness' or qualitative character vis a vis the infinite 
qualitative perfection of Ipsum Esse. Created qualities thus find 
themselves grounded in transcendental quantifications. 
The results are unfortunate. For the quantitative Idea (the 
'thin' essence which can now only limit the quantity of esse in finite 
beings) is forced to compete with the qualitative essence (the 'thick' 
essence which constitutes the intelligibility or perfection in com-
posite beings). As a result, qualitatively distinct species must try 
• 
to find a place for themselves in a Porphyrian universe of quantitative-
ly descending 'modes' of being. The two incompatible streams of texts 
in Thomas reflect these contradictions. 
The introduction of the Divine Ideas forces a reduction of quality 
to quantity from which there is no turning back. But the responsibility 
for this reduction cannot be laid entirely at the feet of the Divine 
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Ideas. Three other factors played an important role in its development. 
First, the path which Thomas takes here was, unhappily, blazed by Plato, 
Aristotle, Neoplatonism and Christianity before him. 
Plato's identification of the Forms with Numbers was an attempt to 
identify the qualitative with the quantitative. As Copleston notes, 
"Plato's motive in identifying Forms with Numbers seems to be that of 
rationalising or rendering intelligible the mysterious and transcendent-
al world of Forms. To render intelligible in this case means to find 
the principle of order."lll Although Aristotle rejected the Number-Form 
doctrine, he in fact trod down the same path with his notion that the 
differences which constitute species in their genus could be reduced 
to mathematical units of one. As Copleston notes (with regard to Plato, 
but it is applicable to Aristotle as well), this whole procedure of 
"panmathematicism" is a form of rationalization, the validity of which 
is highly questionable. 
That the real is rational is a presupposition of all dogmatic 
philosophy, but it does not follow that the whole of reality can 
be rationalised by us. The attempt to reduce all reality to 
mathematics is not only an attempt to rationalise all reality--
which is the task of philosophy, it may be said--but presupposes 
that all reality can be rationalised by us, which is an assump-
tion. 112 
The major factor which prevented this quantification process from 
coming to full term in .Plato and Aristotle was the fact that neither 
of them managed to locate the forms within a single identifiable per-
fection which transcended them qualitatively. Plato kept the Forms 
separate from the Demiurge, whereas Aristotle denied to the world any 
transcendent source of its intelligibility. As a result, the forms 
111 Copleston, Greece & Rome (part 1), p. 219. 
112 Ibid., p. 221. 
remained_qualitative in relationship to matter and qualitatively dis-
tinct in relationship to one another. 
When Plotinus and the Neoplatonists placed the Forms within Mind 
or Thought, a further quantification of them was inevitable. Now 
Quality was identified with Mind or Thought, such that the , Forms con-
templated by Mind could only be understood as diverse quantifications 
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of that single quality. The result was the so-called Porphyrian tree, 
by which the qualitative distinctions found in the universe were thought 
to be quantified degrees of the single perfection of Mind from which 
they originated and to which they could be reduced. When Christian 
theologians saw their way clear to placing the Platonic Forms in the mind 
of God, they also found a way to make the Porphyrian universe their own. 
Thomas, as heir to this long process by which form became increasingly 
associated with quantity, could not but be strongly influenced by it. 
The second factor contributing to Thomas' quantification of form 
stems from the fact that Thomas seems not to have recognized the full 
implications of his transformation of the act/potency distinction from 
the essential realm of form/matter to the existential realm .of esse/ 
essence. The act/potency distinction in Aristotle is specifically de-
signed to account for change, and change is defined as the reduction of 
potency to act. In a fDrm/matter universe, this necessarily means the 
reduction of quantity (matter) to quality (form). Under these circum-
stances, to be better means to be more in act. 
Once the act/potency distinction is transferred to the existential 
order, however, the relationship of act and potency can no longer be 
regarded in such reductionistic terms. For, at this level, essence 
itself is an act, and it makes no sense to speak of the reduction of 
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act (essence) to act (esse). Nevertheless, Thomas seems not to have 
recognized completely this transformation of the act/potency relation-
ship at the level of esse/essence. Hence, he accounts for the angelic 
hierarchy, in his early as well as his later writings, by a quantified 
notion of form which supposes that the superior angel has "more" act 
and "less" potency. This reduction of formal act to esse reflects a 
direct transfer of the essentialist notion of potency (matter) as 
quantitative to the existential level, where potency (form) continues 
to be regarded as quantitative. 
The third factor is Thomas' inconsistency with regard to the prin-
ciple that being cannot be the source of its own diversification. The 
principle itself is Platonic. It is precisely this principle which re-
quires Plato to appeal to meontic non-being as the source of diversity. 
Thomas, however, did not adhere strictly to this principle. Instead, 
he appealed, via the Divine Ideas, to the Divine Essence as the ground 
of diverse intelligibilities among creatures. This is the paradox, 
referred to earlier, of using one Platonic doctrine (the Forms) to deny 
another one (the monism of being). 
With the recovery of the primacy of esse, this paradox could not 
go unnoticed for long. Once the notion of esse as the source of all 
perfection and intelli~bility was rediscovered, it became all too ap-
parent that the real distinction between a formal intelligibility and 
its actuation was in fact a questionable distinction between a finite 
and an infinite intelligibility. In fact, it could be reduced to a dis-
tinction between the unlimited and the limited. This reduction was the 
discovery of 'thin' essence Thomists. It is also the source of their 
unhappiness with the Divine Ideas. To use the Divine Essence to ground 
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the essential diversification of esse is tantamount to saying that be-
ing does contain within itself the principles of its own diversifica-
tion. Unlike Thomas, 'thin' essence Thomists will not grant this. 
In reducing the paradox of Thomas to the "exclusivity of esse," 
however, Carlo and his colleagues have unwittingly introduced a new 
paradox into the history of Thomism. For their new 'esseist' position 
bears remarkable resemblance to the old 'essentialist' position. This 
has already been commented on with regard to Duns Scotus. We do not 
have to look far to discover the reason. In reducing the intelligibility 
of essence to esse, 'thin' essence Thomists return again to a view of 
esse as infinite intelligibility and to essence as its finite mode. 
Hence all beings are "grades of perfection" of one single infinite per-
fection. As Lindbeck, an adherent of the position developed by Little, 
notes, 
Simply by having esse, creatures imitate God. All their other 
similarities to the divine stem from this, for perfections 
onto10gica11y common to God and creatures are either convertible 
with being or are, as in the case of intelligence, pure per-
fections of being. 113 
In a revealing footnote to this remark, Lindbeck adds, 
The extraordinary way in which St. Thomas argues that to know 
is to contain the form of another, therefore that which contains 
all forms, Infinite Being, must be the supremely intelligent (v 
ST. I, 14, 1, resp.) has "led Hans Wagner to speak of "abso1ute-
idealism" and to say "der thomistische Universa1ienrea1ismus ist 
in Wahrheit ein konkreter Idea1isI:lus." Existenz, Ana10gie und 
Dia1ektik, Hunich, Reinhardt, 1953, 198-9. 
For this reason, Lindbeck maintains that "St. Thomas' doctrine of exis-
tence is participationist and--to use a word that thus becomes very 
nearly meaning1ess--' essentialist! ,,114 
113Lindbeck, "Participation," (June 1957), p. 115. 
114Ibid ., p. 110. There is one important distinction, nevertheless, 
" 
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The error Carlo makes in his interpretation of Thomas lies in the 
very starting point Carlo has chosen. The principle that being cannot 
diversify itself is Platonic, and, in adopting that position, Carlo can-
not but impose a Platonic methodology upon Thomas. Thus he fails to 
recognize the fact that Thomas himself does not adhere to that principle, 
and, in fact, explicitly employs the Divine Ideas to get around it. 
Carlo is, on the other hand, correct in thinking that the Divine 
Ideas cannot be placed in the Divine Essence. A real distinction in 
creatures cannot be accounted for by positing two separate streams of 
participation in a single, utterly simple source. One cannot simply 
identify in the Creator what is distinct in creation. 
Thomas' initial error lay in supposing that being does not contain 
the principles of its own diversification. This was both a methodo-
logical and a theological error. The Aristotelian methodology requires, 
as we have seen, that potency be both placed on the side of being and 
yet distinguished from it. Christian theology likewise, in its doctrine 
of the Trinity, demands acknowledgement of diversity within God. 115 
Thomas' second error was his use of the Divine Ideas to ground the 
qualitative diversity of created essence. Again, the mistake was both 
between essentialism and esseism. The essentialist, by reducing esse 
to essence, emphasizes ~he formal or static character of existing 
things at the expense of their dynamism. The esseist, by reducing 
essence to esse, emphasizes their dynamism at the expense of their 
formal characteristics or natures. 
115 Thomas was not unaware of this. In his discussion of the 
Divine Ideas in the Summa Theologiae, he cites the objection that if 
the Divine Ideas are eternal in God, "it follows that there is in God 
another real plurality besides that of the divine Persons: but this 
is contrary to the words of John Damascene that in God all is one ex-
cept Ungeneration, Generation and Procession" (ST I, 15, 2). 
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methodological and theological. The Aristotelian methodology does not 
require the positing of an extrinsic source for the formal principles of 
things. On the contrary, because Aristotle denied Plato's doctrine of 
the extrinsic Forms, the methodology forbids it. Instead, the Aristo-
telian inquiry is an inquiry into the intrinsic conditions of possibili-
ty for formal intelligibilities. At the same time, the Christian doc-
trine of creation ex nihilo also forbids the positing of a priori con-
ditions of possibility for creation. By introducing the Divine Ideas 
as the a priori conditions of possibility for created essence, Thomas 
attempts to rationalize what the doctrine maintains is beyond the reach 
of our reason. If this notion of the Divine Ideas is carried to its 
logical conclusion, it leads to a denial of creation ex nihilo. Phelan 
offers an excellent case in point, when he says, 
In being created creatures do not pass from potency to act; no 
potency precedes the act of absolutely beginning to be. They 
pass unintelligibly mysteriously by virtue of the wisdom and 
power of God, from being in the Divine Mode (i.e., in the Esse 
of God) to being in the created mode (i.e. in the esse prope-r---
to each). Thus God is each and every creature; but no creature 
is God, nor all creatures together. Existing from all eternity 
in the Esse of God, creatures emerge by the will of the Creator 
into another mode of being (esse), limited, determined, restricted 
but nevertheless not separat~though distinct, from the divine 
mode. 116 
Both Thomas and Carlo make the same error. It is the methodologi-
cal error of supposing ,that Plato and Aristotle can be synthesized. 
Each attempts in a different way to do so, and each fails. 
From a theological viewpoint, which was of course Thomas' view-
point, the temptation to synthesize Plato and Aristotle is enormous, 
inasmuch as each one seems to provide what the other lacks. Plato's 
being transcends the material world, and therefore lends itself more 
116 Phelan, "The Being of Creatures," p. 125. 
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easily t~ a theological conversion than does Aristotle's material being. 
Of course, Plato's notion of matter is impossible to reconcile with 
the 'good creation,' but then Aristotle is at hand to help out there. 
At the metaphysical level, Plato's transcendent being and Aristotle's 
immanent being seem complementary and, more importantly, their syn-
thesis would seem to provide the ideal metaphysical context for dis-
cussing the transcendent/immanent God of Christianity. 
At the level of methodology, however, the situation is quite dif-
ferent. Platonic and Aristotelian methodology are mutually exclusive, 
because a) they hold opposing views of being, and, as a result, b) 
they are diametrically opposed with regard to the role of potency 
(matter) in material things. 
Substance is the a priori unity of being, and therefore the 
understanding and the reality of substance is identified with 
the understanding and the reality of being itself. The notion 
of substance may be logical or intuitive. It has been seen that 
there are two mutually exclusive methods of ontology, which 
correspond to these two notions of substance: the logical 
method of Aristotelianism, and the intuitive method of Platonism. 
The former asserts the materiality of substance, the latter re-
quires its immateriality.117 
The notion of being which informs each of these methodologies 
cannot be separated from its corresponding notion of potency or matter. 
One cannot combine Plato's notion of being with Aristotle's notion of 
act/potency. The two &imply exclude one another. Thomas' attempt to 
synthesize them produced a number of contradictions in his thought. 
Carlo's attempt to interpret Thomas' thought as synthetic has issued 
in a suppression of the Aristotelian methodology which Thomas made his 
own. 
117Keefe, Thomism, p. 29. 
Thomist Methodology: Its Correct Application 
We have thus far maintained that 'Primacy of Esse' Thomists are 
correct in supposing that Thomas is Aristotelian, not Platonic, and 
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that the 'thick' Aristotelian essence does not shatter in a Thomist 
universe. Does this mean that it enters that universe intact, as Gilson 
and Owens presume? Or, to repeat Carlo's question, "Is essence indif-
ferent to being eternal or created?" Since we also maintain at this 
point that 'esseist' Thomists are correct in supposing that the Divine 
Ideas cannot be used to ground that essence, it might reasonably be 
expected that the Aristotelian essence is in for some severe shocks in 
a Thomist world, shocks which escaped the attention of Gilson and Owens. 
In order to understand just what changes the Aristotelian essence 
does undergo, in other words, to understand how Thomist methodology 
properly applies to essence, we must next examine, first, the Aristo-
telian essence itself, and, secondly, the impact of esse on that essence 
in the composite beings of Thomas' world, being which, in their compo-
sition, bear above all the mark of having been created. 
CHAPTER 3 
ARISTOTLE'S n~ENT FORM AND THOMIST METHODOLOGY 
We have alluded to the fact that Gilsonian Thomists understand 
Aristotelian substances both to enter Thomas' world intact and to be 
radically transformed by that entry. What do they mean by this? The 
primary thing Gilson means is that it is possible for us to make a 
"sharp contrast between the point of view of existence and that of sub-
stance"l in existing things. 
If we look at the world of creatures from the point of view 
of its existence, then it is true to say that it has no existence 
of its own. Existence is in it, just as light is in the air at 
noon, but the existence of the world never is its existence; so 
that, in so far, at least, as the world itself~ concerned, it 
can lose existence at a moment's notice, or, rathe~, without 
previous notice. On the other hand, if we look at this exist-
ing world from the point of view of its substance, there are 
aspects in it that tally with such a view, but there are others 
that do not. 2 
Existentially speaking, the world is radically contingent. So much so, 
in fact, that "even though it were demonstratively proven that this 
created world is destined always to exist, it still would remain a per-
manently contingent wo~ld.,,3 From the point of view of existence, 
Aristotelian substances do not exist, as they do in Aristotle's world, 
in their own right. This difference between the two worlds "should be 
4 
understood as both radical and total." 
lGilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 163. 
2 Ibid., p. 162. 
3Ibid., p. 160. 
4Ibid • 
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Nevertheless, what does not tally with such a view, according to 
Gilson, is the substantially indestructible character of things in 
themselves. 
Nothing looks more precarious than a thus-conceived world, 
in which no essence can ever be its own act of existing, yet 
the world of Thomas Aquinas is-IDade by God to wear as long as 
that of Aristotle, that is, never to wear away. tihy is it so? 
This is, I think, one of the most difficult points to grasp in 
the whole metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas, because we are here 
invited to conceive creatures as being, at one and the same 
time, indestructible in themselves, yet wholly contingent in 
their relation to God. 5 
The Thomist world is, therefore, "a world of Aristotelian substances 
which ~ in their own right. It is both a substantially eternal and 
an existentially contingent world.,,6 For this reason, Gilson maintains 
that "the Aristotelian substance remains intact in the doctrine of 
7 Thomas Aquinas." 
Yves Congar agrees that things can be understood in two different 
ways. Noting first that the Augustinian tradition tends to view things 
solely from the perspective of their relationship to God, such that 
things are regarded "not in their pure essence, but in their reference 
to the last goal,,,8 Congar points out that this is not the Thomist 
approach to things. 
On the other hand, for St. Thomas and for Albert the Great, 
his master, if it was true to say that everything had a relation 
to the last goal, ~.e., God, this, however, was under the form-
ality of the final cause and the exemplary cause, the latter, 
a kind of extrinsic formal cause. It was not under the relation 
5Ibid ., pp. 161-162. 
6Ibid., p. 162. 
7 Ibid., p. 170. 
8 Yves M.-J. Congar, A History of Theology, trans. and ed. Hunter 
Guthrie (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968), p. 104. 
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of the form itself, whereby a being is properly said to exist. 
Things had their own nature which did not consist in their 
reference or their order to God. So, concentrating merely on 
what things were in themselves, we could see in them the nature, 
the quid, by distinguishing this form from the mode or the con-
crete state or from the reference to an end. In this perspective, 
things, but particularly human nature, remained the same under 
the different states in which they were cloaked and, most signi-
ficantly, human nature under the regimen of the Fall as in the 
Christian dispensation. 9 
Congar, as can be seen, draws a somewhat different distinction 
than does Gilson. Gilson's distinction between the existential and 
. 
the substantial is, to all practical intents and purposes, the esse/ 
essence distinction. Things can be viewed either from the point of 
view of esse (existentially) or from the point of view of essence or 
form/matter (which is the Aristotelian substance). For Congar, on 
the other hand, the distinction drawn is entirely on the side of es-
sence, where a differentiation is made between the form in relation to 
its extrinsic formal cause and the form itself, as the proper nature 
of a thing. 
Both Gilson and Congar accept God as the source of created es-
sences. Gilson, however, is reluctant to conclude from this that es-
sences establish a bond of similarity and, therefore, of relatedness 
between the creature and God. On the contrary, since God as Ipsum 
Esse "is no particular essence," essence introduces an element of 
otherness, "namely, the very otherness which distinguishes it from 
10 its own possible existence." Congar, on the other hand, sees essence, 
under the rubric of finality and exemplarity, as necessarily related 
to God as extrinsic formal and final cause and yet, at the same time, 
9 Ibid., p. 105. 
10Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 180. 
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as a form in its own right which can therefore be considered apart from 
that relationship to God. "St. -Thomas, instead of looking at things 
more or less globally from the angle of a first cause and the final end, 
had a formal view from the standpoint of the things themselves."ll This 
notion that the intelligibility (essence) of the world both relates 
the world to God and establishes it in its own right is well -expressed 
by Hampus Lyttkens in his study of the Thomist analogy of being. 
. . . creation can according to St. Thomas be regarded in two 
different ways: absolutely, or in relation to God. The like-
ness to God existing in creation can either be regarded ab-
solutely, and creation is then designated in accordance with its 
own nature. The concept does not then imply any relation to 
something higher. The same property can, however, also be seen 
in the light of its perfect correspondence in God. It is then 
apparent that what exists in creation is merely an imperfect 
image of the divine perfection. A concept stating something 
of creation will consequently in this case also be imperfect. 
It has not its primary, perfect significance, but a lower, 12 
secondary. It becomes an analogous designation of creation. 
Thomists such as Gilson and Congar are inclined to view Thomism 
as a synthesis of Aristotle and Christianity, rather than of Aristotle 
and Plato. Since the Christian doctrine of creation accounts for the 
world's dependence on God, we must return to the Aristotelian notion, 
first, of form (Congar), and then of substance (Gilson) in order to 
determine why it is that these Thomists argue for a formal or sub-
stantial independence in existing things. 
Aristotle's Immanent Form 
As noted in chapter 2, Aristotle refused the Platonic Ideal Form. 
11 Congar, A History of Theology, p. 105. 
12 Hampus Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, trans. 
Axel Poignant (Uppsala: Almquist & Wiksells Boktryckeri AB, 1952), 
p. 267. 
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Instead, he insisted that form be located within material reality, not 
apart from it. As Copleston points out, we have here the "doctrine of 
the immanent Form.,,13 Because Aristotle's God is neither efficient nor 
e~emplary cause of the world, the world, formally considered, enjoys 
complete independence vis a vis him. The intelligibilities (forms) of 
the things of the world are, therefore, immanent not only in the sense 
of being accessible to the human mind, but also in the sense of de-
riving from no causes outside the world. A synthesis of Aristotle and 
Christianity, therefore, seemed to Christian minds to require the com-
bining of the Aristotelian immanent form with a Christian extrinsic 
formal cause (God as Creator). This signals once again the appearance 
of the Divine Ideas, which were used to effect this synthesis. 
Here, however, with regard to creation itself and our twofold view 
of it, Thomas adds a twist to the doctrine of the Divine Ideas. He 
draws a distinction between them as ratios and as exemplars. As exem-
plars, the Divine Ideas function as a part of God's practical knowledge 
whereby existing things are providentially ordered to Himself. As 
ratios, they function as part of His speculative knowledge whereby He 
knows things according to their proper natures. This distinction is 
set forth at some length in the Summa Theologiae,14 but the clearest 
brief account of it is .found in De Veritate, where Thomas writes, 
Two aspects of a creature can be considered: first, its species 
taken absolutely; second, its relation to an end. The form of 
each exists previously in God. The exemplary form of a thing con-
sidered absolutely in its species is an idea; but the form of a 
thing considered as directed to an end is called providence. 1S 
13 Copleston, Greece & Rome (part II), p. 41. 
14 ST I, 15, 3. 
15 De Ver., 5, 1 ad 1. 
Commenting on this passage, Leo Ward notes that, 
Anything in our world may be studied under the aspect of two 
realities at once, namely, the very nature of the thing and 
its "orderly relation (ordo) to the end"; the form belonging 
to each of these, to the nature of the thing and to its order 
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or direction, comes from God; the form of the thing as "directed 
to an end" is called Providence. 16 
This distinction between ratio and exemplar seems clearly to be 
what Congar has in mind when he speaks of Thomas' "strictly Aristotelian 
distinction between the order of exercise and that of specification.,,17 
As God has speculative knowledge of all essences, so do we. And that 
knowledge which we have is compatible with the Aristotelian principle 
of immanent forms which are both independent of God and accessible to 
the human mind. 
Certainly St. Thomas was not ignorant any more than St. Bona-
venture that all things must be referred to God. But along-
side that reference to God in the order of use or exercise, 
he recognized an unconditioned bounty to the speculative intel-
lect in the nature or specification of things, which was a work 
of God's wisdom. There was question of speculatively reconstruct-
ing the order of forms, of rationes, put into things and into the 
,very mysteries of salvation by the wisdom of God. Such a program 
could be realized only by a knowledge of forms and natures in 
themselves. This is why St. Thomas' Aristotelianism is not ex-
ternal to his theoloyical wisdom or to the very conception he 
has fashioned of it. 8 
Once again, however, the Thomist use of the Divine Ideas provokes 
a battle between thick and thin essences, this time with regard not to 
being per se, but to creation and its Creator. The exemplar, as 
• 
ordered to God, is the 'thin' essence'; the ratio, as containing no 
explicit reference to God, is 'thick'. We shall examine, as is proper 
from a theological perspective, first, the Creator and those dichotomies 
l6Leo R.' Ward, God and the World Order (St. Louis: B. Herder 
Book Co., 1961). p. 95. 
17 Congar, A History of Theology, p. 106. 
18 Ibid., p. 108 
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which the thick and thin essences produce with regard to Him, and then 
creation, with its corresponding dichotomies. 
God the Creator: The Good or Goodness? 
Arthur O. Lovejoy, in The Great Chain of Being, discusses at some 
length the dichotomy, which originated with Plato and continues into 
modern thought, between an "otherworldliness" which seeks "The Good" 
in a realm beyond the existential and a "thisworldliness" which locates 
goodness in the concrete actuality of existing things. Plato origi-
nated the dualism, with his supposition that the world constitutes not 
only a 'fall' from essential goodness but a shadowy manifestation of 
that essential goodness as well. 
The world as "the great chain of being," implicit in Plato's 
thought, came explicitly into its own at the hands of the Neoplatonists. 
According to this notion, the world is constituted by 
. • . an infinite number of links ranging in hierarchical order 
from the meagerest kind of existents, which barely escape non-
existence, through "every possible" grade up to the ens perfec-
tissimum--or, in a somewhat more orthodox version, to the high-
est possible kind of creature, between which and the Absolute 
Being the disparity was assumed to be infinite--every one of 
them differing from that immediately above and that immediately 
below it by the "least possible" degree of difference. 19 
Such a world was understood to be ordered by the "principle of pleni-
tude." According to this principle, in producing the world God produced 
a kind of mirror image of Himself. 'Natures' are therefore imitations 
of divine perfection, and the totality of divine perfection is mirrored 
in a descending hierarchy of perfections which contains no gaps because 
it encompasses the whole of the divine perfection. As Lovejoy points 
out, however, this notion of the universe promoted confusion regarding 
19Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, MS: 
Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 59. 
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man's ultimate goal, because it promoted two conflicting notions of God, 
The final good for man, as almost all Western philosophers 
for more than a millennium agreed, consisted in some mode of 
assimilation or approximation to the divine nature, whether 
that mode was defined as imitation or contemplation or absorption. 
The doctrine of the divine attributes was thus also, and far 
more significantly, a theory of the nature of ultimate value, 
and the conception of God was at the same time the definition 
of the objective of human life; the Absolute Being, utterly 
unlike any creature in nature, was yet the primum exemplar om-
nium. But the God in whom man was thus to find his own fulfil-
ment was, as has been pointed out, not one God but two. He was 
the Idea of the Good, but he was also the Idea of Goodness; and 
though the second attribute was normally deduced dialectically 
from the first, no two notions could be more antithetic. The 
one was an apotheosis of unity, self-sufficiency, and quietude, 
the other of diversity, self-transcendence and fecundity •.•. 
The one God was the goal of the 'way up,' of that ascending pro-
cess by which the finite soul, turning from all created things, 
took its way back to the immutable Perfection in which alone it 
could find rest. The other God was the source and the inform-
ing energy of that descending process by which being flows 
through all the levels of possibility down to the very lowest. 
. • . There was no way in which the flight from the Many to the 
One, the quest of a perfection defined wholly in terms of con-
trast with the created world, could be effectually harmonized 
with the imitation of a Goodness that delights in diversity and 
manifests itself in the emanation of the Many out of the One. 20 
\1hen Christianity adopted the Neoplatonic Scale of Being (the 
Porphyrian tree discussed in chapter 2), the conflict became even more 
apparent--and more complex. Now God's freedom as Creator had to be 
reconciled with a principle of plenitude which seemed to specify the 
kina of universe God must create in order to guarantee that the full-
ness of His perfection be completely mirrored there. 
. . . it· was impossible for a medieval writer to make any use 
of the principle of plenitude without verging upon heresies. 
For that conception, when taken over into Christianity, had 
to be accomodated to the very different principles, drawn from 
other sources, which forbade its literal interpretation; to carry 
it through to what seemed to be its necessary implications was 
to be sure of falling into one theological pitfall or another. 2l 
20Ibid., pp. 83-84. 
2IIbid., p. 69. 
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Hence, medieval theologians found it increasingly necessary to maintain 
God's freedom "by denying ... that the actual exercise of the creative 
potency extends of necessity through the entire range of possibility.,,22 
This, in turn, threatened the chain of being, by supposing that 'gaps' 
could exist in it, thereby jeopardizing the notion that the universe 
constitutes a complete mirror image of the divine perfection : At the 
same time, it seemed to suggest that God's freedom to deny the world 
some manifestation of His own goodness is nothing more or less than 
divine whim, the exercising of free will solely for its own sake. 
In Thomas' writings, the problem regarding God is most acute with 
regard to divine causality. Does God create according to nature or 
according to will? Thomas' answer to this question seems to rest on 
an identity of nature and will in God, such that what ~yould be regarded 
as natural causality in a created being is actually voluntary causality 
in God. For Thomas maintains that a natural agent is by definition a 
determinate being and therefore able to produce only one effect. If 
this is what it means to act 'naturally,' then clearly God does not and 
cannot do so. 
Now God's being is not of a determinate kind, but contains in 
itself the whole perfection of being, and consequently does 
not act by the determinism of a nature--unless perhaps it were 
to cause indeterminate and indefinite reality, and this we have 
shown to be impossible [I, 7, 2]. Therefore God does not act 
from necessity of nature, but defined effects proceed from his 
infinite perfection by the resolution of his intelligence and 
will. 23 
Furthermore, Thomas argues that, since God's being is His intellect, 
all effects of His will pre-exist in Him not by nature, but by 
22 Ibid., p. 70. 
23 ST I, 19, 4. 
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. 11 24 ~nte ect. Hence, he causes everything voluntarily, not naturally. 
Thomas has actually avoided the central issue at stake here by the 
simple expedient of defining his way around it. The central issue is 
not whether God could create an undetermined being such as Himself. 
The central issue is whether or not He is bound to create a universe of 
determined beings which mirror, in their diverse perfections; the total 
perfection of His own nature. In other words, is God capable of creat-
i ng a world genuinely 'other' than Himself (thick essence) or is He 
instead able to create only such worlds as imitate His own nature 
(thin essence). If the latter is the case, then there is excellent 
reason to argue that, just as a determinate being 'naturally' produces 
the one determinate effect appropriate to its nature, so God 'naturally' 
produces the one order of determinate effects (the world) appropriate 
to His nature. 
The issue is more important than is generally recognized, for it 
relates directly to whether or not God is The Good or Goodness. Love-
joy misunderstands the basic dichotomy here. For him, the fundamental 
split occu~s between The Good, which is indifferent to everything not 
itself, and the principle of plenitude, which Lovejoy characterizes 
as "the expansiveness and self-transcendence of 'the Good,,,.25 For 
him, therefore, the an~idote to a view of God as The Good rests on a 
reinvestment in the principle of plenitude, which reveals God as Good-
ness. '{hat Lovejoy fails to see is that the principle of plenitude, 
far from offering a solution to the problem, is the problem itself. 
If medieval theologians were aware of the pitfalls in such a principle, 
24Ibid . 
25Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, p. 63. 
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we could do worse than rediscover them for ourselves. In order to do 
so, we must turn to an examination of the doctrine of creation and the 
dichotomies which there correspond to the ones already seen in the 
doctrine of God. 
Creation: Theocentric or Anthropocentric? 
In his book, The Order of the Universe in the Theology of St. 
Thomas Aquinas, John Wright notes that one can find time and again, 
in Thomas' writings, two different ways in which the universe is said 
to be ordered to God. Wright refers to one of these as a "general," 
the other as a "particular," ordering. 
The "general" ordering is, although ~vright never designates it 
as such, "the great chain of being." 
God in His eternity contemplated the superabundant riches of 
His divine goodness and saw the infinite nUlllber of ways it could 
be shared by created imitations of Himself. He saw that it was 
lovable not only as His own proper good, but also as the common 
good of beings distinct from and dependent on Himself •• 
God, therefore, willed to manifest His perfection and to im-
press His likeness upon creatures "as far as this was possible". 
And since no single creature was capable of receiving in itself 
this divine outpouring, of showing forth the full splendor of the 
divine goodness, He decreed to create a vast multitude of beings 
so that the perfection which exists simply and uniformly i~6Him­
self might exist in variety and multiplicity in creatures. 
Within this ordering, the universe is the primary created effect which 
God intends, and all parts in it are ordered to one another for the 
sake of the common good which constitutes the universe as such. This 
type of ordering produces a theocentric world, i.e., a world which 
exists to mirror the divine perfection itself . The world's ordering 
to God as its final end is achieved through similitude to God. 
26John H. Wright. The Order of the Universe in the Theology of 
St. Thomas Aquinas (Romae: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 
1957), pp. 188-189 (hereafter cited as Wright, The Order of the Universe). 
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The "particular" ordering is centered primarily on intellectual 
beings. 
God contemplated His goodness and saw that it deserved to be 
shared with others by being known and loved by them in immediate 
vision. This then was the essential decision of God in creation, 
to share His divine life properly so called, granting others to 
know and love Him as He knows and loves Himself. Consequently 
He decided to create intellectual beings as the recipie~ts of this 
divine gift, and to create other beings which might assist them 
to achieve this destiny. The universe which God intends is thus 
essentially a society of intellectual beings, served in various 
ways by other beings. The perfection of this society in beatitude 
is what He most intends in creation; this is the ultimate essential 
good of the order of the universe. 27 
Within this ordering, intellectual creatures are the main effect which 
God intends, and all other parts of the universe are ordered to their 
service. Such an ordering produces a much more anthropocentric world, 
at least in the sense that the material world exists for the sake of 
h b · 28 uman e1ngs. Such a world is ordered to God as final end through 
intellectual activity, not assimilation, i.e., through that activity 
which is proper to intellectual beings themselves and not through 
their perfect imaging (similitude) to the divine perfection. 
The question remains, according to Wright, as to which ordering 
Thomas thought had priority. 
And here we encounter what is probably the most fundamental 
problem in the whole theology of the universe. For if the in-
tellectual creature transcends the order of the universe in the 
activity of beatiuude, how can it be that the order of the uni-
verse is the supreme created perfection and the reason for God's 
willing everything else? Is the perfection of the intellectual 
creature subordinated to this order, or vice versa? This ques-
tion has probably aroused more discussion than any other concern-
ing St. Thomas's doctrine on the universe. 29 
27 Ibid., pp. 191-192. 
28 In II Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 3; Compo Theol., c. 169; CG III, 
112; ST I, 65, 3. 
29wright, The Order of the Universe, pp. 118-119. 
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Wright supposes, as did Thomas, that these two orders are mutually 
compatible. In fact, Thomas often combined them, as in the following 
passage from the Summa Theologiae: 
Each creature has its proper operation and perfection; secondly, 
lower creatures serve the higher, as the creatures below man pro-
vide for his welfare; thirdly, individual creatures manifest the 
perfection of the entire universe; and finally, the whole uni-
verse and all its parts have God as their goal, in so far as 
the divine goodness is reflected through them and thus his glory 
manifested. Over and above this, however, rational creatures 
have God as their goal in a special way, since they can attain 
him by their own operations of knowing and loving. Thus it is 
apparent that the divine goodness is the goal of everything 
corporeal. 30 
Yet their compatibility is far from obvious. There are, in fact, 
several indications that they cannot be simultaneously embraced. The 
primary difficulty here, as the practiced reader should now suspect, 
can be traced back once again to thick and thin essences. 
A theocentric world imitating the divine perfection and ordered 
to God through assimilation is a world of 'thin' essences. In such a 
world, pleroma or plenitude is achieved to the extent that the universe 
imitates in its diversity the total perfection of the divine nature. 
The material world exists to manifest God3l and knowledge of the natures 
of things is knowledge of the universe as a hierarchy and of one's 
1 .. 32 proper pace 1n 1t. 
Diversity in such .a universe, as previously noted in chapter 2, 
necessarily produces inequality, because diverse things can only reflect 
different quantifications of the divine perfection. As 1~right notes, 
"Diversity of parts, furthermore, implies grades of goodness; for things 
30 . ST I, 65, 3. 
31 Compo Theol., c. 72, c. 102; ST I, 47, 1; ST I, 65, 2. 
32 Jerem. X, 2; CG II, 3. 
differ by being more or less perfect.,,33 Indeed, this problem mani-
fests itself most strikingly in Thomas within the context of sexual 
differentiation. For Thomas maintains, "Now just as variety in the 
grading of things contributes to the perfection of the universe, so 
variety of sex makes for the perfection of human nature. ",34 In a 
universe of thin essences, this can only mean that the sexes are un-
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equal. Interestingly, Wright cites this text and notes other examples 
of this 'grades of goodness' approach in Thomas without, seemingly, 
realizing the implications of such a view. 35 
On the other hand, an anthropocentric material world created for 
the sake of material rational natures and ordered to God by being 
ordered to human nature is a world of thick essences. In such a world, 
pleroma or plenitude is achieved to the extent that human beings attain 
union with God through those operations appropriate to human nature. 
The material world exists to support the human community,36 and there-
fore knowledge of that world enables human beings to make a proper use 
of it. Because diversity in things doe.s not exist to mirror either 
33wright, The Order of the Universe, p. 89. 
34 ST I, 99, 2. 
35"St. Thomas uses this example of the universe [incorruptible 
things are more perfecD than corruptible ones] whose perfection in-
volves many grades of goodness to explain the perfection of other 
things. Thus the diversity of sexes pertains to the perfection of 
human nature. Human society profits from having both those who marry 
and attend to contemplation. The perfection and beauty of the Church 
arises from the varied gifts of grace that God confers, manifesting 
the plenitude of grace to be found in Christ the Head. All these 
cases are presented as similar to the perfection of the universe" 
(Wright, The Order of the Universe, pp. 94-95). 
36"Creatura corporalis ordinatum ad rationalem naturam quasi ad 
finem" (Comp. Theol., c. 169). Cf. CG III, 22. 
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divine or human nature, diversity is not reducible to quantity. 
Lovejoy argues that the latter world can be rescued from the former 
by applying the logic of the prin~iple of plenitude. 
The good for any being, according to the accepted principle 
also inherited from the Greek philosophy of the fifth century 
B.C., lies in the realization of its specific "nature"; and it 
was, therefore, customary to formulate the argument even for the 
most extreme otherworldliness nominally in terms of "conformity 
to nature" in this sense. But the concrete meaning given to 
this was derived wholly from that dialectic whereby the good 
was identified with self-sufficiency. Man, as rational, was 
declared to be capable of realizing his nature only in the 
possession of absolute, underivative, and infinite good, that is 
to say, in a complete union or assimilatio intellectus speculativi 
with the divine perfection and beatitude. But this denaturaliza-
tion of the notion of specifically human good would have been 
impossible if the logic of the principle of plenitude had been 
applied at this point, as in a later age it was to be applied. 37 
However, this understanding of human good as an assimilation to the 
divine perfection cannot be circumvented by pursuing the logic of a 
principle which rests on the supposition that human "nature" is a 
finite quantification of an infinite perfection. To pursue the logic 
of such a position to its conclusion does not result, as Lovejoy would 
like to believe, in a "conformity to nature" view, but rather in a 
"conformity to divinity" (The Good) view, of human goodness. As Carlo 
has put it, essences or limited natures are simply "finite esse seek-
ing to remedy its own limitation and imperfection by the appropriation 
of further esse in secondary causality.,,38 
Lovejoy supposes that the Divine Ideas are the key to a logic 
which can rescue the world as a reality (nature) which has value in 
its own right. 
through the Middle Ages there were at least kept alive, 
in an age of which the official doctrine was predominantly 
37LOVejOy, The Great Chain of Being, p. 96. 
38Carlo, Ultimate Reducibility, p. 112. 
otherworldly, certain roots of an essentially 'this-worldly' 
philosophy: the assumption that there is a true and intrinsic 
multiplicity in the divine nature, that is to say, in the world 
of Ideas; that, further, "existence is a good," Le., that the 
addition of concrete actuality to universals, the translation 
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of supersensible possibilities into sensible realities, means an 
increase, not a loss, of value; that, indeed, the very essence 
of the good consists in the maximal actualization of variety; 
and that the world of temporal and sensible experience is thus 
good, and the supreme manifestation of the divine. 39 
However, it is precisely this doctrine of the Divine Ideas which under-
cuts Lovejoy's project. For the Divine Ideas as exemplars of creation 
are the basis for the assimilation of the universe to God. "For St. 
Thomas teaches that the divine ideas have the nature of an end. The 
universe achieves this end, then, by assimilation, by expressing what 
is contained in the idea of the divine mind.,,40 
The problem, as noted earlier, is most apparent in the area of 
causality. The universe imitates God not only by its existence, but 
also by its essence. As one writer expresses it, 
• . • not only does the existence of creatures declare to us 
that God exists, but their nature manifests to us God's nature. 
If, per impossibile, they were related to him only in the order 
of existence, then the perfections which their natures imperfectly 
exemplify could only be alleged to exist virtually in God; God 
would cause the perfections in creatures but those perfections 
would not necessarily in any way resemble God. But the communi-
cation of existence to creatures is not one act and the communica-
tion of essence another. Finite essence is only the mode of finite 
existence, and in the order of essence, as in the order of exis-
tence, creatures are related to God by his one creative act which 
both makes them anP makes them what they are. Creatures therefore 
manifest God's nature as well as declaring his existence, and we 
can thus assert with confidence that all the perfections that 
are found in creatures are also formally, though eminentiori modo, 
in God himself.41 
39Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, pp. 97-98. 
40 Wright, The Order of the Universe, pp. 52-53. As Thomas puts it, 
"because an exemplary form or ideas has, in some sense, the nature of 
an end, and because an artist receives the form by which he acts--if 
it is outside of him--we cannot say that the divine ideas are outside 
of God. They can be only within the divine mind. "(De Ver., 3, 1). 
41Mascall, Existence and Analogy, p. 123. 
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According to this view, God is prevented from creating anything genuine-
ly 'other' than Himself. Since created essences do not exist in God 
"by nature," then, so the argument runs, they must exist in God "by 
knowledge." For that reason, Gerard Smith maintains that "the divine 
ideas are the ideal conditions under which creatures may pre-exist in 
42 . God, their cause." The fact that God's nature (Esse) is His knowledge 
(Intelligere) means, the same author goes on to say, that such a pre-
existence is "extraordinarily mysterious. ,,43 Before concluding directly 
to mystery, however, we might first want to ask ourselves whether such 
an account is coherent. 
What we appear to have here is a view of divine causality which 
subordinates voluntary causality to natural causality. This is most 
appar.ent in Thomas, as Lovejoy points out, when Thomas tries to main-
tain that God creates in the universe "a perfect likeness of himself" 
without simultaneously producing an infinity of effects. 44 Thomas 
faces a real dilemma here. 011 the one hand, the principle of plenitude 
requires that the totality of divine perfection be mirrored in the 
universe. On the other hand, Thomas feels obliged by the doctrine of 
creation to insist that God, in His freedom, could have created other 
worlds. Hence, Thomas attempts a reconciliation of the two by recourse 
to ~n account of divine causality which leaves the impression that this 
world, containing (as Thomas tells us it does) all divine perfection, 
42Gerard Smith, Natural Theology: Metaphysics II (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1951), p. 246 (hereafter cited as Smith, Natural 
Theology). 
43 Ibid . 
44For discussion of this, see Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 
p. 76. 
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has exhausted the spectrum of intelligibilities without exhausting God's 
freedom. 45 Thomas tries to avoid such a conclusion by supposing that 
an infinite perfection can be completely imitated in a finite number 
46 
of effects. . 
Oddly enough, in trying to protect God's freedom to produce a 
variety of worlds, Thomas does not see God's ability to produce only 
one type of world (i.e., only such worlds as imitate His own nature) 
as an infringement of His freedom. There are, I think, two primary 
reasons for this--Thomas' analogy of being and the causal principle 
which underlies it. The principle that an effect must pre-exist in 
its cause leads inevitably to a reduction of voluntary causality to 
natural causality and produces necessarily a theocentric analogy of 
being. 
Thomas' Analogy of Being: Some Fundamental Dichotomies 
Nothing is more central to Thomas' work than the analogy of being. 
As Phelan notes, 
The importance of analogy in the philosophy of St. Thomas 
literally cannot be overestimated. There is not a problem 
either in the order of being, or in the order of knowing, or 
in the order of predicating, which does not depend for its 
ultimate solution on the principle of analogy. Not a ques-
tion can be asked either in speculative or practical philosophy 
which does not require for its final answer an understanding 
of analogy.47 
Phelan later points out that Thomas' "solution to the problems ex-
plicitly raised and implicitly suggested by 'the apparent antinomy of 
45An important key, perhaps, as to why Ockham follows Aquinas in 
the history of philosophy. 
46 CG II, 45. 
47Gerald B. Phelan, Saint Thomas and Analogy (Milwaukee: Mar-
quette University Press, 1948), p. 1. 
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Being and Becoming, the One and the Many, is to be found in his doctrine 
48 
of analogy." 
For Thomas, the analogy of being is fundamentally causal. As 
Gilson notes, few expressions ·occur more often in Thomas than "omne 
agens agit sibi simile," i . e., every cause produces an effect that 
resembles it. 49 Klubertanz' textual study of analogy in Thomas reveals 
causality to be one of the main components of this doctrine. "Creatures 
resemble God because they are proportioned to Him as effects to their 
cause.,,50 This confirms what Hampas Lyttkens' previous study on Thomist 
analogy had already established. 
All St. Thomas' analogies between God and the world are ulti-
mately based on the rplation of cause to effect. The likeness 
of an effect to its cause is the prerequisite of our knowledge 
and designations of God, and likewise of our conceiving creation 
as in relation to God. Ontologically, the analogy between God 
and the world is accordingly the likeness of effect to cause. 5l 
52 Thomas' notion of analogy, therefore and as Lyttkens notes, supposes 
a connection between God and creation that requires each one to approach 
the other. This twofold movement, of God toward creation and of creation 
toward God, allows us to pinpoint within the context of analogy those 
same dichotomies which it has been the purpose of this and the previous 
chapter to explore. 
48Ibid ., p. 21. 
49Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 95. 
50George P. Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy (Chicago: 
Loyola University Press, 1960), p. 48. 
51 Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, p. 244. 
52 Ibid., p. 477. 
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God's Approach to Creation: The Rationalization of God's Creative 
Activity 
Thomas' notion of analogy, when considered from the side of God, 
has two problems. Both have been discussed earlier, but are worth 
reconsidering within the context of his doctrine of analogy. First, 
there is the problem of whether or not God's causality as Creator is 
natural or voluntary. Lyttkens summarizes these two types of causality 
as found in Thomas. 
As regards causes acting by nature, Aquinas reckons with two 
different possibilities. An effect may be absolutely like 
its cause. The contents of its form are then identical with 
the contents of the cause. Aquinas called such causes univocal. 
But sometimes the effect, even of a cause acting by nature, is 
only imperfectly like its cause, and the form will be less per-
fect in the effect than in the cause. The cause is then called 
equivocal. A typical example of this is the sun as the cause 
of fire. But even then there is a natural likeness of effect 
to cause--a likeness in nature and essence. 
In rational causes, on the other hand, the form of the ef-
fect pre-exists as an intellectual prototype. The conceived 
and the realized form will accordingly be intellectually identi-
cal. The form will only have another kind of existence (modum 
essendi) in the cause than in the effect. In the form, it 
exists intellectually, in the latter materially. There will 
accordingly be no natural likeness, but the effect may be said 
to exist virtually in its cause, as this must have the power to 
realize the effect. As regards the relation of cause to effect, 
it should also be noted that the effect is produced for a purpose--
the acting cause tries to reproduce as far as possible its like-
ness in the effect. A perfect cause like God will accordingly 
produce an effect as like Himself as possible. 53 
There is a difficulty here, however. If God's intellect is His 
nature, it is not easy to see how we can avoid understanding His 
causality as a type of natural equivocity. If a natural equivocal 
cause produces an effect like itself in some respect and yet inferior 
to it, how does this differ from God's creative activity, which pro-
duces effects like His nature (His nature is His Esse, and His Esse 
53 Ibid., p. 189. 
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is His Intelligere) and yet inferior to it? In fact, we seem to have 
here a distinction without a difference. This does not go unnoticed by 
Lyttkens. 
The connexion between God and creation presumed by analogy im-
plies an approach on the part of God as well as of creation. 
On the part of God, this means that His very nature will to 
some extent be like the forms in the things. . . . On this point 
there is a risk of stressing more the natural than the volitive 
aspect of God. 54 
This is only part of the dilemma which the Thomist notion of 
causality produces. A second problem remains, namely, the hierarchy 
of beings which such a notion of divine causality cannot but produce. 
Lyttkens notes that this hierarchy of being "points in the same direc-
tion" as does the bond between God and creation, i.e., in the direction 
of emphasizing God as a natural cause. 55 In point of fact, the bond 
between God and the world, on the one hand, and the hierarchy of being, 
on the other, are simply two sides of the same causal coin. Just as 
natural equivocal causes produce effects like themselves, so does God 
(hence the bond). And, just as natural equivocal causes produce 
effects inferior to themselves, so does God (hence the hierarchy). 
The only sense in which God's causality can be regarded as voluntary 
lies in the fact that He is able to produce for a purpose and hence 
is able to realize a complete mirror image of His own perfection in 
• 
the diverse effects which he produces. This is the point at which 
Thomas is most Neoplatonic . 
In Aristotle, the likeness [between cause and effect] was on the 
one hand that the cause of an effect transfers a form of the same 
type as its own, and on the other that a rational cause realizes 
a conceived form or prototype. The idea of likeness between 
cause and effect is, however, not used to describe the relation 
54Ibid ., pp. 477-478. 
55 Ibid ., p. 478. 
between God and the world. This was done by the Neoplatonists. 
Three of their thoughts are adopted by St. Thomas: first that 
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the unitary precedes the manifold. The higher up in the hier-
archical scale, the greater will be the unity, while the higher at 
the same time comprises all that is subordinate and more divided. 
A higher cause can therefore comprise in its unity what is below 
it. In this way God can in Himself comprise all His effects, 
and creation will thus constitute a dwindling scale of likeness 
to God. Secondly, St. Thomas adopts the idea that cause is superior 
to effect by distinguishing between univocal and equivocal causes. 
In the relation between an equivocal cause and its effect, a 
property in the effect exists in the cause in a more perfect way. 
Thirdly, St. Thomas uses the thought that the effect exists in 
the cause in the mode of the cause, and the cause in its effect 
in the mode of the effect. 56 
Hence, Thomas is not altogether able to avoid the notion of creation as 
emanation. 
St. Thomas looks upon creation as having issued from God. The 
act of creation implies to him mainly an addition of esse, every-
thing else pre-exists in God--all forms "flow" out of the ideas 
in Him. All forms have a correspondence in God's nature. If 
the likeness of effect to cause is--as in St. Thomas--based in 
this, some sort of emanation is inescapable. 57 
As the same author also notes, however, "This is a conception which 
makes it difficult to uphold the thought of a creation from nothing. ,,58 
What we have here in Thomas is a rationalization of the doctrine 
of creation. Thomist philosophers would not disagree. 
The philosophy of St. Thomas purports to provide a rational 
explanation (complete in principle and capable of indefinite 
development in demonstrative detail and application) of the uni-
verse as a whole and of its relation to God, the Creator and Ruler 
of the world, insofar as such explanation can be afforded by the 
light of reason unaided by Faith. 59 
Congar goes further, arguing for a "rational theology" in Thomas which 
rests upon our ability to use the immanent forms of created things 
56 Ibid., pp. 349-350. 
57Ibid ., pp. 413-414. 
58Ibid ., p. 414. 
59 Phelan, St. Thomas and Analogy, pp. 2-3. 
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(their ratios) to arrive at analogous knowledge of the mysteries of 
faith. 
The process, which consists in abstracting something "formal" 
and disengaging this from its modes and then applying this 
"formality" to the mysteries of faith by the use of analogy, rests 
entirely on the distinction between a ratio and its mode and on 
the conviction that a ratio does not change its essential laws 
when it is expressed under these different modes. In sh~rt, a 
rational theology rests entirely on the conviction that in the 
transposition of an idea to the level of transcendent realities, 
whose positioe mode escapes us, the eminenter does not destroy the 
formaliter. 6 
~ 
Although Congar does not seem to be aware of it, there is, unfortunate-
ly, some sleight of hand at work here. If the eminenter does not 
destroy the formaliter, this is not because the formaliter is a ratio 
or thick essence which allows creation to stand in its own right. It 
is because the formaliter is an exemplar or thin essence which neces-
sarily refers a thing back to God. The analogy between God and the 
world is based on the Divine Ideas not as ratios, but as exemplars. 
. we can most adequately name the analogy between God and 
creatures as an analogy of causal participation. Implicit in 
this description are further qualifications: God is the cause 
of the world by intellect and will, and so as an intelligent effi-
cient cause He is both the primary exemplar and the ultimate 
goal of all creat~res, and they exist as images, made to the 
likeness (in imitation) of their Creator. 6l 
Therefore, the very rationality of theology which Congar wishes to de-
fend, on grounds that creation has formal principles within it which 
permit us to gain a knowledge of it apart from God, turns out to be 
rational only by virtue of the assumption it makes that ratios are 
actually exemplars whose transparency (thinness) permits us to see 
beyond them to the God whom they imitate. 
60congar, A History of Theology, p. 110. 
61Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, pp . 134-135. 
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Not only does such a view defeat its own purposes, by presupposing 
that very relatedness of the world to God which it then sets out to 
establish, such a process of rationalization also seems incompatible 
with the doctrine of creation ex nihilo sui et subjecti. 
In proving that everything is created, Aquinas often adduces 
the Neoplatonic thesis that a property which is realized to 
different degrees in different things is received from the 
source possessing the property most perfectly. But this 
argument puts more stress on how a property is propagated than 
on creation out of nothing . 62 
The key word here is 'how.' Thomas' attempts to explain the 'how' of 
creation are hard to reconcile with a doctrine of creation which would 
appear to rule out from the start any ability on our part to reason 
our way behind the scenes of God's creative activity. The doctrine 
rather suggests that the only source of such knowledge is revelation, 
not reason. 
Creation's Approach to God: The Spiritualizing of the t-Torld 
In chapter 2, we explored the reductionism of the thin essence 
position, whereby all qualitative differences are understood to be 
diverse quantifications of esse. This produces a rationalization of 
diversity whereby all specific differences are reduced to mathematical 
terms (species differ by units of one).63 The reductionism, however, 
is not simply formal; it is material as well. And this material re-
duction creates a great problem with regard to the analogy of being, 
inasmuch as the causal principles which underlie that analogy make it 
impossible to account for the material component in existing things 
as an imitation of the divine perfection. 
62 Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, p. 182. 
63 See p. 92. 
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This brings us to the principal question: how can God, who 
is entirely immaterial, create matter? Aquinas replies that 
there is nothing to prevent a rational cause from creating 
something quite different from itself. But that answer is in 
direct conflict with another thesis fundamental to his analogy, 
viz. that God as a cause creates everything in His own likeness. 
How can God then be conceived as creating materia prima, 
which is pure potentiality? As such, it lacks all likeness to 
God. Either must the applicability of the thesis that effect 
and cause are alike be restricted, in which case much of, what 
Aquinas teaches of God becomes uncertain, or else he has been 
unable to explain how God could create materia prima. 64 
In De Potentia, Thomas speaks of matter as that whereby created things 
differ from their cause. He goes on to add, 
Accordingly in creatures there are certain perfections whereby 
they are likened to God, and which as regards the thing signi-
fied do not denote any imperfection, such as being, life, under-
standing and so forth: and these are ascribed to God properly, 
in fact they are ascribed to him first and in a more eminent way 
than to creatures. And there are in creatures certain perfec-
tions wherein they differ from God, and which the creature owes 
to its being made from nothing, such as potentiality, privation, 
movement and the like. These are falsely ascribed to God: and 
whatsoever terms imply suchlike conditions cannot be ascribed 
to God otherwise than metaphorically, for instance lion, stone 
and so on, inasmuch as matter is included in their definition. 
They are, however, ascribed to him metaphorically by reason of 
a likeness in their effects. 65 
To paraphrase Congar, where matter is concerned the eminenter does 
destroy the materialiter. As Lyttkens says, "the causal analogy is 
really only applicable in the sphere of rational reality.,,66 
Esseist Thomists attempt to get around this situation by reducing 
matter itself to esse . • Carlo sees matter as either "a debile esse, a 
weakness at the heart of being,,,67 or the "elasticity or plasticity of 
esse," that is to say, "the ability of a being to become something 
64 Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, pp. 181-182. 
65 De Pot., 7, 5 ad 8. 
66 Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, p. 352. 
67carlo, Ultimate Reducibility, p. 131. 
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other, by an increase or decrease of esse.,,68 Rahner, a transcendental 
Thomist, takes the same path, maintaining that "what is material is 
nothing but a limited and as it were 'solidified' spirit, being act.,,69 
These Thomists are carrying to its logical conclusion that view of 
creation to be found in Thomas whereby creation mirrors God only to the 
extent that it imitates the divine Intelligere. As creation 'approaches 
God, therefore, "it must accordingly lose something of its massively 
concrete sensibility.,,70 The Thomist analogy forces a de-materialization 
of the world. 
Analogy makes us regard creation spiritualistically--if that 
expression is not misunderstood. The invisible spiritual 
reality is revealed in the visible, sensible reality by the 
forms and perfections in the things. There will further be 
a dualism between spiritual and sensible. The latter represents 
something potential and deficient. When the degrees of potential-
ity of the forms increase, the forms, to exist, must be joined to 
matter. Only the spiritual and intelligible can attain to real 
likeness to God. Analogy as the connecting link means that crea-
tion will primarily be regarded from the point of view of the 
rational and spiritual hidden in it. The visible things can only 
bear witness of God and imitate Him by properties from which all 
sensible imperfections can be abstracted, but as creation exists 
in order to imitate God in different ways--or to a lessening 
degree--creation cannot include anything that has no such 
likeness. 71 
Furthermore, the reduction of both matter and form to esse, even 
if it is able to avoid pantheism, undercuts God's transcendence. God's 
approach to creation and creation's approach to God produce a quantified 
68Ibid., p. 127. 
69Karl Rahner, Hominisation: The Evolutionary Origin of Man as a 
Theological Problem, trans. W. T. O'Hara (New York: Herder and Herder, 
1965), p. 57 (hereafter cited as Rahner, Hominisation). 
70 Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, p. 478. 
7lIbid ., pp. 478-479. 
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hierarchy of being in which God is regarded 
. • . as at the apex of a series of ever more perfect properties 
such as being, goodness, wisdom, etc. But if God is only the 
first in a rising series , it will be difficult to maintain His 
absolute transcendence, and He is in a way brought closer to 
creation. 72 
As can be seen, Thomas' theocentric analogy of being, by rational-
izing God's creative activity , produces several unfortunate consequences. 
First, it jeopardizes the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Secondly, it 
subordinates God's voluntary causality to natural causality. Thirdly, 
it produces a world of thin essences, in which neither the 'otherness' 
of immanent form nor the value of materiality can ultimately be salvaged, 
either in the existential or the essential realm. 
The Proper Thomist Analogy of Being: Creation in Christ 
The Thomist analogy of being, because theocentric, is incompatible 
with Aristotelian methodology, a state of affairs which is most apparent 
in its inability to save the Aristotelian immanent form. The problem 
lies in causality. Thomas maintains two contradictory positions. He 
desires, on the one hand, to retain Aristotle's immanent form as that 
which enables us to understand the world apart from its ordering to 
God. He provides, on the other hand, no condition of possibility for 
such an immanent form . • God is extrinsic exemplary cause, but not in-
trinsic formal cause, of created things. 73 Hence, although Thomas 
makes a distinction in the Divine Ideas between their function as 
72 Ibid., p. 478. 
73"God can be related to us only as a source. Since there are 
four causes and since He is not our material cause, He is related to 
us as our efficient cause, our telic cause, and our exemplar form, 
though not as an intrinsic formal cause" (In I Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 
5, c [English translation from Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 
p. 54]). 
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ratios and as exemplars, in point of fact the Divine Ideas function 
causally only as exemplars of the Divine Essence, ordering all created 
things to that Divine Essence. 
This contradiction introduces, in turn, a fundamental incoherence 
into Thomas' doctrine of participation. According to Thomas, "parti-
cipare nihil alid est quam ab alio partialiter accipere . ,,74 In chapter 
2 of his Commentary on Boethius' 'De hebdomadibus', perhaps the single 
most important text to be found on participation in his writings, Thomas 
points out that, in all existing things, there are two orders of parti-
cipation. 
Everything that is participates in that which is esse, in 
order that it may be; but it participates in something else 
in order that it may be something; and through this, that which 
is participates in that which is esse in order that it may be, 
but it is in order that it may participate in something else. 
Everything simple has its esse and that which is one has its 
esse. In every composite thing the esse is one thing, and that 
which is, is another. 
We have already noted, with regard to the real distinction, this re-
current insistence in Thomas' writings for the need to distinguish 
between an existential and an essential order of participation in crea-
tion. 75 Thomas goes on in De hebdomadibus to point out several differ-
ent types of participation. 
To participate is to receive as it were a part; and therefore 
when anything receives in a particular manner that which belongs 
to another in a universal manner, it is said to participate it; 
as man is said to participate animal, because he does not possess 
the intelligible notes (ratio) of animal according to the latter's 
total "community" [Le., universality]; and for the same reason 
Socrates participates man; in like manner also a subj~ct partici-
pates an accident, and matter form, because the substantial or 
accidental form, which of itself as such is common [or unparticular-
ized], is determined to this or that subject; and similarly an 
74 In II de Caelo et Munde, c. 12, lect. 18, n. 6. 
75 See pp. 68-69. 
effect is said to participate its cause, and especially when it 
does not equal the power of its cause, as, for example, if we 
say that air participates the light of the sun because it does 
not receive it with the same brightness that it has in the sun. 
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In summarizing this passage with regard to the Thomist analogy of 
being, Klubertanz says, 
A species participates in its genus; an individual participates 
in its species (logical participation); substance partic'ipates 
in its accidents; matter participates in its form (limitation 
of act by potency); effects participate in the perfections of 
their causes (analogous participation). Since Thomistic discus-
sions of the analogy of participation between God and creatures ~ 
always involve causal participation, we are directly interested 
only in the last of these types of participation, that of an 
effect in the perfections of its cause. 76 
Here Klubertanz brings us to the core of the problem. The Thomist 
analogy of being forces a reduction of all formal participation (i.e., 
generic and specific participation) to the merely logical order, be-
cause the formal components in things can find no ultimate home in a 
God who Himself lacks all formal elements. As Klubertanz says, "We 
hold • . . that outside the mind there are no formally common perfec-
tions, whether this community be one of specific unity of identity or 
of analogical unity.,,77 And, be it noted, the mind to which he has 
reference is the human mind. Outside the human mind, formally common 
perfections are found nowhere, not even in the divine mind. 
Klubertanz states here the only conclusion to be drawn from a doc-
trine of participation which attributes the formal perfections in things 
to the Divine Ideas understood not as a plurality in the mind of God, 
but as "a single entity, the divine essence, which knows itself as 
imitable in various ways. ,,78 This is why, as was noted in chapter 2, 
76 Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, p. 56. 
77 Ibid., p. 113. 
78Ibid., p. 53n. 
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there is no ultimate way in which to draw a distinction between the 
perfections derived from esse and those derived from essence, except 
by means of a dubious distinction in existing things between esse and 
the 'thin' essence which quantifies that esse. Because Thomas' analogy 
of being is causal and because no account can be given of formal causality 
which does not conclude to God as extrinsic efficient cause, no onto-
logical basis for intrinsic formal perfections can be found in Thomism. 
In other words, the Aristotelian immanent form cannot be salvaged. 
Even appeals to the divine wisdom, understood as the divine Word, are 
to no avail. For the divine '-lord is a Person, not a form. Any attempts, 
therefore, to identify the immanent forms of creation with Him must ul-
timately conclude to the same thin essence to which the Divine Ideas 
79 themselves conclude. 
If the Aristotelian thick essence (the immanent form to which 
Congar appeals, as well as the essence which Gilson characterizes as 
genuinely 'other' than esse) is to be saved, it can only be done by 
providing a causal source for immanent forms which cannot be reduced 
simply to the efficient causality associated with esse. There is no 
question here, as many Thomists might fear, of reifying universals; 
rather, it is a question of locating an immanent formal causal prin-
ciple which can account, for immanent formal effects in created things. 
As Owens and Gilsonian Thomists in general insist, "Existential act 
79It should be noted, with respect to the Hord, that a thin es-
sence position is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the 
doctrine of the Incarnation. According to 'thin essence' Thomism, 
to become incarnate can only mean to become finite. Yet the doctrine 
states that the Word became man. It supposes essence to be a positive 
perfection in its own right and not simply a diminishment (quantifi-
cation) of esse, a supposition which finds support in Thomas himself. 
See ST III, 2, 1. 
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• . . can be a thing or a reality or a nature only in its primary in-
stance, God. Outside God it cannot be a thing or reality or nature, 
but only the actualizing of some other nature.,,80 If this be so, then 
some causal principle must be given which can account for the existence 
of natures other than God's. 
Such an account must, in the first instance, provide a causal 
source of created formal effects which is distinct from Ipsum Esse, the 
Divine Ideas, the divine mind, the divine essence, the divine Wisdom or 
the Word of God. Any attempt to locate the source of immanent formal 
effects in God as extrinsic exemplary cause defeats itself from the 
start, as has already been noted. The Aristotelian essence is 'thick' 
precisely because Aristotle, contra Plato, refused to identify it with 
an extrinsic Form or perfection. This means that the Thomist analogy 
of being cannot be theocentric; "rather, the analogy is necessarily 
81 
anthropocentric." 
An anthropocentric analogy of being is necessary not only in order 
to avoid the reduction of all created perfections to the single perfec-
tion which is God, but also in order to provide an account of the 
material world as existing for the sake of man {Thomas' "particular" 
ordering of the universe}. An anthropocentric analogy of being allows 
us to consider the diversity of material things in terms not of 
quantifications of the divine perfection, but of qualitative differences 
which serve human purposes, making the world a suitable environment 
for man. 
To say that the analogy of being is necessarily anthropocentric, 
8°Owens , "Quiddity," p. 20. 
8lKeefe, Thomism, p. 82. 
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however, is not to go far enough. For the problem is not merely one 
of locating an immanent formal cause distinct from God's extrinsic ef-
ficient causality. If we were to do only that, we would not only dis-
tinguish but also separate at the level of causality that which is dis-
tinct but inseparable in existing things. What we must locate is a 
causal source which corresponds to the esse/essence distinction in be-
ings. What we require is a single source which is both esse and es-
sence, both transcendent and immanent. That source can only be Christ, 
the God-man, the Creator immanent within His creation. 
Creation in Christ 
In his book, Foundations of Christian Faith, Karl Rahner notes 
that "we can understand creation and Incarnation as two moments and 
two phases of the ~ process of God's self-giving and self-expression.,,82 
What he means here is perhaps better understood with reference to an 
earlier article of his on the knowledge and self-consciousness of 
Christ, within which he discusses how we might understand the Incarna-
tion. 
The Hypostatic Union implies the self-communication of the 
absolute Being of God--such as it subsists in the Logos--to 
the human nature of Christ which thereby becomes a nature 
hypostatically supported by the Logos. The Hypostatic Union 
is the highest conceivable--the ontologically highest--
actualization of the reality of a creature, in the sense that a 
higher actualization would be absolutely impossible. 83 
He goes on to point out that, 
82Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, trans. William V. 
Dych (New York: Seabury Press, A Crossroad Book, 1978), p. 197. 
83 Idem., "Dogmatic Reflections on the Knowledge and Self-Conscious-
ness of Christ," Theological Investigations, trans. Karl-H. Kruger 
(Baltimore: Helicon Press; London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966), 
V:205. 
In as much as the Hypostatic Union involves an ontological 
'assumptio' of the human nature by the person of the Logos, 
it implies a determination of the human reality by the person 
of the Logos and is therefore at least also the actualizing 
of the potentia obedientialis, i.e. of the radical capacity of 
being 'assumed', and hence is also something on the part of the 
creature, particularly since . . . the Logos is not changed 
through the Hypostatic Union, and anything happening (which is 
the case here in the most radical way) takes place on the side 
of the creature. 84 
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Without apparently realizing it, Rahner here points the way to an ex-
plicit understanding of creation as Christocentric. The one thing 
missing is the recognition that the human species itself comes into 
existence by means of the Incarnation. The Incarnation is, in fact, 
creation, and its most immediate formal effect is the human race itself. 
With or without the Fall, Christ is the existential formal 
cause of humanity; He is the creator immanent in his creation. 
His formal effect, co-extensive with humanity, is the existence 
of the human race, the human substance. Since this existence is 
contingent, it is the equivalent of the creation of humanity; 
this creation, since it pertains to a temporal substance, is 
continual, passive spectata. The continuum of humanity and 
humanity's world is unified and given intelligibility by its 
immanent formal cause. When this cause, and the consequent 
effect of the cause, is understood to be contingent, it is under-
stood to be the existential formal cause: this is the Thomist 
insight and starting point. 85 
A Christocentric analogy of being offers solutions to all of the 
major problems posed by the Thomist theocentric analogy. First, it 
solves the causal dilemma posed by the real distinction, i.e., the 
problem of distinguishing without separating formal causality from 
efficient causality. As a result, two distinct orders of participation, 
one existential and the other formal, can also be distinguished with-
out being separated. 
84 Ibid., pp. 204-205. 
85Keefe, Thomism, p. 125. 
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Christ, as human, is a created participation in human substance; 
as a divine Person, He is the uncreated actuality of that parti-
cipation; i.e., He is the creator of His, and of all, humanity. 
The terminus of His creative act is the Incarnation, by which 
His divinity, as Esse, is correlated to His participated human 
nature. This correlation is thus the creation of all men; it 
is the contingent existential actuality of the human substance, 
in which all human persons participate, and by participating 
in which they are human persons. The human substance is therefore 
actual by the actuality of Christ; He is the formal cause of the 
substantial actuality of men. 86 
Esse orders the world to God by virtue of the world's created partici-
pation in the Esse of the Incarnate Logos, while essence simultaneously 
orders the parts of the world to one another and to man by virtue of 
the essential participation of every existing thing in Christ as im-
manent formal cause of humanity. 
Secondly, a Christocentric analogy of being allows us to avoid 
the quantifying of diversity and the rationalizing of creation which 
necessarily accompanies every view which links diversity with the 
Divine Ideas. Consequently, it enables us to avoid as well the incon-
sistencies which attach to the Divine Ideas when they are employed to 
cope with the problem of the One and the Many. Gerard Smith pinpoints 
those inconsistencies well when he writes, 
Creatures pre-existing in God's knowledge are known as distinct 
precisely because the ~ of God is variously imitable and He 
knows it. On the other hand, the distinctly kno~m creatures 
have no esse in God which is not His intelligere; they have no 
esse of their own .• Thus, if one says creatures in God's knowledge 
are-either God or not-God (the .first alternative swamping the 
distinction between God and creatures, the second destroying the 
pre-existence of the effect in the cause), the answer would seem 
to be: creatures as the divinely known principle of plurality 
are God; creatures as the known plurality of that same known 
principle of plurality are not God, because they are not known 
as God. Thus the known principle of plurality is at once one 
and, equivalently, many. 
86 Ibid., p. 91. 
The difficulty, as always, persists inasmuch as we do not 
know this divine principle of plurality.87 
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Creation in Christ not only avoids such quandaries but identifies 
the divine principle of plurality as well. For, within a Christocentric 
analogy of being, "the Thomist concrete universal which has no particular 
name but is constituted by the contingent existence or creation of 
humanity in time and space by means of the Incarnation, is best under-
stood as the human species, correlated to the Trinity in the Incarnation, 
in the spatio-temporal continuum proper to a material species.,,88 Hence 
created diversity, mediated by Christ, finds its ultimate source in 
the plurality of divine Persons. Such a view of creation forbids a 
quantification or rationalization of created essences by forbidding 
their reduction to the divine essence. 89 Although it identifies the 
ultimate source of diversity as the Trinity, that source remains a 
mystery inaccessible to and, in fact, even unidentifiable by human 
reason itself. 
Thirdly, a Christocentric analogy provides a positive role for 
materiality. Because creation is in and by the Incarnate Word, and 
not simply in and by the Word Himself, "creation is material, and 
87Smith, Natural Theology, p. 247. 
88Keefe, Thomism, p. 103. 
890nly in the Trinity "is there assurance that the difference 
between qualities, which is given in humanity as male and female, is 
not a matter of more or less, for each of the divine Persons possesses 
the e~tirety of the Godhead, suo modo, and does so by a complete self-
reference to a qualitatively different Person or Principle. . . I do 
not believe there is any other way of finding a qualitative analogy 
between man and God than by understanding the imaging as trinitarian 
or covenantal. 'Nature' or 'essence' or 'immanent form' won't do it; 
their concept is monist, and inevitably any analogy to a supreme monad 
is going to be a quantitative proportion" (letter from Donald J. Keefe 
to author, June 16, 1983). 
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implies, as its correlative, the material universe, which is the con-
text of human existence.,,90 Material things are positive entities, 
both formally and materially, because they fill human needs in a world 
designed explicitly for human habitation. 
Finally, just as a Christocentric analogy of being (because of its 
provision for immanent formal causality) salvages Aristotle's notion of 
intrinsic substantiality, so also does it salvage theology's notion of 
intrinsic gratuity, by making possible a methodological means of 
accounting for creation as graced from within as well as without. 
the ontological effect of the Incarnation cannot be under-
stood as though it were an accidental incursion into natural 
humanity of an extraordinary God-man bearing extraordinary in-
formation, as an adventitious remedy for the Fall. Such a view 
of Christ makes his coming irrelevant to the immense multitude 
who lived before Him, and to the possibly more immense multitude 
who, since His birth, have remained in ignorance of Him. The 
Incarnate Word described in the Johannine Prologue and in Paul's 
letters to the Romans, to the Colossians and to the Ephesians 
must be taken rather more seriously. He enlightens every man, 
all men are created in and through him, and the universe is 
recapitulated in him. In the systematic language of Thomism, 
Christ cannot be other than the cause of all created actuality, 
and he is such, not simply as the Logos but as the Logos Incar-
nate. 91 
The Aristotelian Substance 
Creation in Christ forces two radical transformations in the 
Thomist notion of subs~ance. First, it requires an identification of 
substantiality with humanity, not with individual human beings. 
The Logos is not incarnate by assuming finitude, but by assuming 
a human nature. This assumption was the actuation of a human 
nature, the creation of man. But "a man" is not the object of 
creation, for it is substance which is actual; a man, in 
90 Keefe, Thomism, p. 62. 
9lIbid., pp. 91-92. 
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isolation from the substance in which his nature participates, is 
only potential, and cannot so exist. Therefore the Incarnation, 
the creation of the man Christ, is the creation of humanity, whose 
contingent, existential actuality of intellectus is the actuality 
of the cosmos; intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu. The 
formal cause of this intellectus is the created actuation of 
Christ's human nature, His intrinsic essence-Esse correlation. 
In no other way can the existential contin§ency of man and the 
created universe be understood by Thomism. 2 
Secondly, it locates grace at the substantial, as well as the 
accidental, level of being. As Keefe puts it, "this creation, the · 
Incarnation of the Word in humanity, is a grace, for it need not have 
been so; the Incarnation is not deduced from the necessities of human 
nature. ,,93 In other words, a proper reading of Thomist methodology 
can account for creation solely in terms of the Incarnation. Without 
the Incarnation, there is no immanent formal cause; without Christ, 
there is no human race. "Creation is complete by man's participation 
in the event of Christ; . . . Participation in this event is possible 
only because the event exists, immanent in the human substance, as the 
94 formal cause of that substance." 
To say that the proper application of Thomist methodology produces 
such radical changes in Thomas' notion of substance raises obvious ques-
tions as to whether or not the Aristotelian substance can be said to 
play any role in a world created in Christ, particularly in view of 
the fact that Thomas' methodology has been defined as fundamentally 
Aristotelian. In order to examine this issue more closely, we shall 
next consider Gilson's view that Thomas' world, properly understood, 
92 Ibid ., p. 88. 
93Ibid ., p. 62. 
94Ibid ., p. 128. 
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is "a world of Aristotelian substances whi-ch are in their own right.,,95 
Since Gilson's view of the world as both autonomous and ordered to 
God rests on a distinction which he makes between substance and exis-
tence (essence and esse), we shall consider, first, Gilson's position, 
with a view to establishing that the Platonizing of Thomism by reduc-
ing it to a single order of participation cannot adequately he countered 
by the denial of participation itself. Secondly, we shall consider the 
existential order of things, examining first the principle of esse and 
then the relation of essence to esse in existing things, with a view 
to establishing that Gilson's distinction between physics (the substantial 
realm) and metaphysics (the existential realm) is methodologically in-
coherent unless it be converted into a distinction between nature 
(essence) and grace (esse). 
95Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 162. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE ARISTOTELIAN SUBSTANCE AND THOMIST METHODOLOGY 
In order to see what Gilson means when he says that the Aristote-
lian substance remains intact in the Thomist doctrine, it is necessary 
first to review briefly Aristotle's notion of substance. According to 
Aristotle, substance can be understood in two ways, as "(A) the ulti-
mate substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything else, and 
(b) that which, being a 'this', is also separable--and of this nature 
is the shape or form of each thing. IIl Substance is, in the first in-
stance, the individual thing, and, in the second instance, the essential 
nature of that thing. As David Ross points out, "this double meaning 
pervades Aristotle's whole treatment of substance."2 
Substance as the individual thing is the primary meaning Aris-
totle gives to the term, and in this sense, substance is inseparable 
from being. 
. . . there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but 
all refer to one star~ing-point; some things are said to be be-
cause they are substances, others because they are affections .of 
substance, others ,because they are a process towards substance, 
or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or pro-
ductive or generative of substance, or of things which are 
relative to substance, or negations of one of these things or 
of substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even of 
non-being that it is non-being. 3 
~etaphysics, V, l017b23-25. 
2 w. D. Ross, Aristotle, 5th ed. rev. (London: Methuen, 1949; New 
York: Barnes & Noble, University Paperbacks, 1949), p. 166. 
3Metaphysics, IV, l003b6-ll. 
138 
139 
Therefore, as Aristotle notes later in the same work, while being has 
many meanings, "that which 'is' is the 'what', which indicates the sub-
stance of the thing.,,4 Furthermore, since unity is identified with 
being and the being of a thing with the thing itself, Aristotle can 
maintain that 'man', 'one man' and 'one existent man' all refer to the 
h · 1· 5 same t 1ng or rea 1ty. 
Gilson's most thorough treatment of the role played by Aristotle's 
substance within Thomist metaphysics occurs in chapter V of Being and 
Some Philosophers. The chapter title itself, "Being and Existence," 
is significant, inasmuch as Gilson will argue that being, in Thomas, is, 
in the first instance, "what Aristotle had said it was, namely, sub-
stance.,,6 Hence, Gilson's distinction between being and existence is, 
on one level, a distinction between the concrete thing (Aristotle's 
substance in its primary sense) and that concrete thing's esse (act of 
existing). Thus Gilson is able to identify the Thomist notion of being 
(the existing thing) with the Aristotelian notion of substance. It 
is this identification which provides the substantial point of view 
from which, as Gilson will argue, Aristotelian substance can be under-
stood to enter the Thomist world intact. This substantial point of 
view is one which identifies, as Aristotle did, essence and existence. 
For those who ~dentify what Thomas calls being with what is com-
monly called substance, there can be no distinction between essence 
and existence, since being and oua~a are one and the same thing. 
Each time Thomas Aquinas himself is looking at being as at a sub-
stance, he thereby reoccupies the position of Aristotle, and it is 
4 Ibid., VII, l028a13-l4. 
5Ibid ., IV, l003b27-33. 
6Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 157. 
no wonder that, in such cases, the distinction between essence 
and existence does not occur to his own mind. 7 
Nevertheless, the Thomist distinction between esse and essence 
does, according to Gilson, produce a genuine and far-reaching trans-
formation of Aristotle's world, such that the Aristotelian substance 
which "remains intact in the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas" also "will 
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have to undergo many inner transformations in order to become a created 
substance. ,,8 In the first of these transformations, the Aristotelian 
substance, "which is one with its own necessity," will have to become 
"radically contingent.,,9 
In order to illustrate what this means, Gilson draws upon an analogy 
employed by Thomas in the Summa Theologiae, in which the esse of sub-
stances is compared to the light which permeates the air without mix-
ing with it. Thomas concludes, "sic autem se habet omnis creatura ad 
Deum, sicut aer ad solem illuminantem."lO Thus, as Gilson notes, "In 
short, whereas the substance of Aristotle exists qua substance, exis-
tence never is of the essence of any substance in the created world of 
Thomas Aquinas."ll Hence, Gilson concludes that in addition to the 
substantial order, there is an existential order in which the Thomist 
notion of being (esse/essence) cannot be identified with the Aristotelian 
notion of substance (essential nature) and in which, therefore, Aris-
totelian substances do ~ndergo important changes in a Thomist universe. 
7 Ibid., p. 158. 
8 Ibid . , p. 160. 
9Ibid . 
10 ST I, 104, 1. 
llGilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 161. 
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Just as the substantial order considers Aristotelian substances in their 
primary sense (existing things), so the existential order considers 
them in their secondary sense (essential natures). 
This dual order produces a seeming paradox in Thomism, according 
to Gilson. Although the Thomist universe is radically contingent, it 
is nevertheless made to endure as long as Aristotle's necessary universe. 
This paradox arises from the fact that creatures are "indestructible 
in themselves, yet wholly contingent in their relation to God.,,12 Ac-
cording to Gilson, therefore, we see juxtaposed at the core of the 
Thomist universe the substantial and existential orders. Creatures 
understood as intact Aristotelian substances are "indestructible in 
themselves," yet the same creatures understood as transformed Aristo-
telian essential natures correlated to the Thomist principle of exis-
tence (esse) are "wholly contingent in their relation to God." Here 
we have the same dual ordering as was found in Congar, with one very 
important difference. Gilson avoids the Divine Ideas altogether. His 
rejection of a Platonic reading of Thomas is most apparent at precisely 
this point. 
For Gilson, the notion that creatures are understandable in them-
selves is based on their character as Aristotelian substances, not on 
the Divine Ideas as ratios. And the notion that creatures are related 
• 
to God is based on their existential character, not on the Divine Ideas 
as exemplars. Hence, Gilson avoids the Porphyrian or Neoplatonic uni-
verse, with its view of creatures as constituting a hierarchy of 
formal participations in the divine essence. To the extent that crea-
tures are related to God, they are so by virtue of esse, not essence. 
l2Ibid ., p. 162. 
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It is, in fact, the existential character of the creature, accord-
ing to Gilson, which makes the above-mentioned paradox in Thomas ~o dif-
ficult to grasp. Returning to the light/air analogy, Gilson points out 
that just as light permeates the air without rooting itself in the air, 
so "existence 'has no root in even actually existing things.,,13 There-
fore, one is forced to ask, "How is it that those very substances in 
which existence never takes root can nevertheless be everlasting in 
their own right?,,14 
The answer to this question, according to Gilson, is twofold. On 
the one hand, Aristotelian substances (essential natures), because dis-
tinct from esse, have no potency within themselves for non-being. Both 
being and non-being lie on the side of existence, not essence. lS On 
the other hand, esse itself, though a gift, is not a series of acts of 
existing which stands in need of constant renewal, but a gift which is 
whole and enduring by its very nature. 
God is not eternally busy retailing existence to beings, nor are 
substances applying for it from moment to moment. The gift of 
existence is irrevocable, when it is granted to beings which, 
as regards themselves, are unable to lose it. 16 
Thus in the substantial order, Aristotelian substances remain intact 
and indestructible. Only in the existential order do they undergo a 
transformation which makes them radically contingent . 
• The world of Aristotle is there whole in so far as reality is 
substance. It is the world of science, eternal, self-subsistent 
and such that no problem concerning existence needs nor can be 
13 Ibid., p. l6l. 
l4 Ibid ., p. 163. 
15 Ibid., p. 164. 
l6 Ibid . 
143 
asked about it. It is one and the same thing for a man in it to 
be "man," to be "one" and "to be." But, while keeping whole the 
world of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas realizes that such a world can-
not possibly be "metaphysica1." Quite the reverse, it is the 
straight "physical" world of natural science, in which "natures" 
necessarily entail their own existence; and, even though such 
natures may happen to be gods, or even the supreme God, they still 
remain natures. Physics is that very order of substantial reality 
in which existence is taken for granted. As soon as existence no 
longer is taken for granted, metaphysics begins. 17 
What Gilson desires to establish here is the autonomy of both 
science and philosophy. Science is substantial in its own right, i.e., 
it proceeds as though reality were the uncreated Aristotelian world of 
necessary substances. Thomist metaphysics is existential in its own 
right, i.e., it proceeds as though reality were the correlation of the 
Aristotelian substance with its corresponding act of existence. Theology, 
or the realm of the supernatural, is a third order which lies beyond 
both the physical and the metaphysical, because 
With Thomas Aquinas, the supernatural does not begin with a cer-
tain class of substances. Precisely because composite substances 
are natures, only that which is beyond such substances can be 
said to be supernatural. 18 
This threefold order of the world is not, however, without its 
problems, especially with regard to metaphysics. One can understand 
how science as Gilson defines it might be viewed as autonomous, inas-
much as its precision from both creation and esse is simultaneously a 
precision from all theqlogical and philosophical concerns. But how is 
metaphysics, with its advertence to esse and existential contingency, 
able to declare itself autonomous vis a vis theology (this is simply 
another way of asking how a created and therefore existentially con-
tingent world can be regarded as autonomous in any sense)? Such 
l7 Ibid., p. 166. 
18 Ibid., p. 167. 
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autonomy can only find its justification in an existential order which 
is itself autonomous. In fact, the very autonomy of science also de-
pends on establishing the existential autonomy of the world. For the 
Aristotelian substance can hardly be the proper object of scientific 
inquiry if either creation itself or the principle of esse introduces a 
relationship between God and existing things from which no precision is 
possible. Hence, Gilson's assertion of a substantially intact Aris-
totelian world in Thomas depends upon his being able to demonstrate the 
existentially autonomous character of that Thomist world. 
In order to establish the world as autonomous, Gilson considers 
the relationship between esse and essence. Focusing on the reciprocal 
causality exercised by these two principles, he notes that the Thomist 
transformation of Aristotle resulted in both a more precise definition 
of efficient causality and a clear-cut distinction between the orders 
of efficient and formal causality.19 Gilson returns to the light/air 
analogy to illustrate the relationship between these two causal orders. 
Just as the light of the sun causes light in the air, so also does the 
diaphaneity of the air cause that light. Both esse and essence cause 
existence, each in its own order and in its own way. As esse is 
supreme in the order of existence, so form is supreme in the order of 
substance (essence). Thus, Gilson concludes that "just as essence is 
• 
in potency to the act of its own existence, so also is the act of exis-
tence in potency to the formal act of its own essence.,,20 Hence, form 
is the cause of existence just as the diaphaneity of the air is the 
19 Ibid., p. 168. 
20Ibid ., p. 171. 
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cause of light. In fact, existence can be understood to arise from 
the principles of the thing, as Thomas himself pointed out when he 
said, "esse in re est, et est actus entis, resultans ex prin"cipiis 
rei, sicut 1ucere est actus 1ucentis.,,22 
What concerns Gilson most here is the sharp distinction which he 
understands Thomas to have drawn between formal and efficient causality. 
Gilson is, in particular, intent upon establishing that all formal ef-
fects in existing things arise solely from the side of form or essence 
(the substantial order). His purpose is twofold. First, if the Aris-
tote1ian substance is to enter the Thomist world intact, this means, 
minimally speaking, that all of its formal characteristics must con-
tinue to be identified in Thomas, as they were in Aristotle, with its 
own essential nature. 
Secondly, if the existential order is to be understood as autono-
mous, on the one hand, and non-disruptive of the Aristotelian substance, 
on the other, esse must be completely detached from all notions of 
formal causality. For, if esse were to act in any way as a formal cause, 
it 'wou1d necessarily introduce (through efficient causality) formal 
changes into the Aristotelian substance, thus destroying its intactness, 
while simultaneously introducing (through the same efficient causality) 
formal characteristics , into existing things which would necessarily re-
late those things to Ipsum Esse, thus jeopardizing the world's exis-
tential autonomy. Hence Gilson's statement that "existence may well be 
said to be 'formal,' but it is not a form.,,23 
21Ibid ., p. 174. 
22 In III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2. 
23Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 171. 
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So important is this point to him, that he indulges in one of his 
rare criticisms of Thomas over precisely this issue. The issue itself 
is participation, and the question at hand is whether or not esse must 
be understood not only as a principle which actualizes existing things, 
but also as a principle which necessarily draws them into a participated 
relationship with the divine nature. After quoting several texts in 
which .Thomas designates esse solely as the act or actuality of all forms, 
Gilson adds, 
Where he is merely following his pen, Thomas Aquinas is liable 
to go still further and to say, as he once did: "Each and 
every created being shares, so to speak, in the nature of 
existence: quodcumque ens creatum participat, ut ita dixerim, 
naturam essendi," which of course does not mean that "to be" is 
itself a nature, and still less that it has a nature, but that, 
as Saint Anselm had already said, God is the very nature essendi 
in which each and every being, so to speak, participates. Z4 
Gilson's earlier-noted reluctance to speak of creatures in terms 
of formal participation in the divine nature is bound up with his desire 
to avoid a Platonic interpretation of Thomas. His reluctance here to 
speak of creatures in terms of existential participation in·the divine 
nature is equally bound up with his desire to affirm the Aristotelian 
character of Thomism, an affirmation which requires him to deny the 
notion that esse introduces any intelligibility into the created order 
which is not already there by virtue of' Aristotle's substance. The 
• 
notion of esse as the principle of the divine nature by which we parti-
cipate existentially in God as in His nature (Intelligere) is avoided 
by Gilson not the least because it threatens our autonomy both es-
sentially (substantially) and existentially. 
For Gilson, the problem with regard to esse is "precisely to know 
24Ibid ., pp. 175-176. 
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if existence can be nothing else than either an empty logical concept in 
the mind or a relation in the thing.,,25 And this is a problem becaus~ 
"what is at stake is the metaphysical realization of the autonomous 
character of the order of existence.,,26 For, if existence is merely 
an empty logical concept, then it is identical with the essence of a 
thing, and we are back into an essentialist metaphysics in which the 
relation of a thing to God (its existence) is identical with its es-
sence, and there is thus no point of view from which it can be regarded 
as autonomous. Only by dissociating conceptual representation (form) 
from esse (act) can we avoid a metaphysical stance which is able to 
understand the world solely in its relationship to God. Hence, the 
clear-cut distinction between efficient and formal causality translates 
into an equally clear-cut distinction between esse as actuality and 
essence as intelligibility (conceptual representation, form). "For 
'to be' is, in things, the very act by which they are actual beings 
whose essences can be conceived as universals by way of conceptual 
abstraction. ,,27 
At this point, it would appear that Gilson has saved the Aris-
totelian substance in its secondary sense, i.e., as essential nature, 
from any formal disruption by esse, but how can the autonomy of Aris-
totelian substance in its primary sense, i.e., as the existing thing, 
• 
be salvaged existentially, when esse itself is the very principle by 
which Aristotle's necessary substance is transformed into Thomas' con-
tingent one? The answer to this question, according to Gilson, lies 
25 Ibid ., p. 177. 
26Ibid. 
27Ibid . 
in the primacy of esse itself. 
What the contingency of existence means is, that all actual be-
ings are contingent with respect to their cause, and this is 
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but another way of saying that they might not exist; but, if they 
are actually produced by their cause, they do exist, and what they 
are in themselves is being. The primacy of existence means pre-
cisely that the radical contingency of finite beings has been 
overcome, and once it has been overcome, we should no longer 
worry about it. 28 
In other words, the esse component in existing things signals not a 
created participation in God's existence, but a created imitation of 
that existence. Through esse we are related to Him (because we image 
Him in our existence) while remaining independent of Him (we have our 
own principle of being). 
It is here that Gilson speaks of a second transformation undergone 
by Aristotelian substances, in which Aristotle's "dynamism of the form" 
becomes, in Thomas' hands, a "dynamism of esse (to be).,,29 Esse is 
thus both the "supreme act of creatures" (first act) and the "active 
energy through which the corresponding essence shall progressively re-
ceive all its determinations.,,30 Esse is the energy which underwrites 
all of an existing thing's operations (second act). Just as we have 
our own principle of being, so do we have our own ability to function 
31 
causally. 
Once again, however, the Aristotelian substance remains intact 
• 
even as it is transformed. It remains intact, for it exercises in 
second act the same range of formal operations and moves toward the 
28Ibid., pp. 178-179. 
29Ibid ., p. 185. 
30Ibid ., p. 182. 
3lIbid ., p. 186. 
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same level of formal completion and perfection in a Thomist universe 
as it did in Aristotle's. Furthermore, it does so by a principle of 
energy intrinsic to itself as a concrete being. As Gilson says, "the 
actual perfecting of essences is the final cause of their existences, 
and it takes many operations to achieve it. Existence can perform those 
operations. ,,32 From the substantial point of view, therefore, Aris-
totelian substances as existing beings are both intact and autonomous, 
proceeding on the basis of an energy source which is within them and 
performing those natural operations which Aristotle had already de-
fined and which constitute the proper object of science. 
From the existential point of view, however, the Aristotelian 
substance is transformed from a concrete thing having its own· intrinsic 
source of energy into an essence which must acquire that source of 
energy from a correlative principle (esse). "Instead of a self-
achieving end, form becomes an end to be achieved by its own ~, which 
progressively makes it an actual being. ,,33 Thus, whereas science need 
consider Aristotelian substances solely as existing things, metaphysics 
must distinguish between those substances as existing things and as 
essential natures. They remain, however, just as autonomous and as 
complete"in philosophical as in scientific hands, thanks to esse, which, 
because both irrevocab~e gift to and immanent principle within existing 
things, makes them to be in themselves and to operate in a purely Aris-
totelian manner. 
This analysis by Gilson of the role played by Aristotelian sub-
stances in a Thomist universe is precisely the type of analysis which 
32 Ibid., p. 184. 
33 Ibid., p. 186. 
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prompted the earlier-cited question by Carlo, "Is essence indifferent 
to being eternal or created?" This question of indifference is a good 
one, and directly challenges the notion that Aristotelian substances 
can enter Thomas' world with as much ease as Gilson suggests they can. 
For they enter that world not as things, but only as principles of 
things, and this fact alone should give us pause before we endorse the 
Gilsonian view. 
Apart from the obvious incongruity of separating at the level of 
human knowledge (physics and metaphysics) what is not separable in 
things themselves (essence and esse), there are a great many difficul-
ties with Gilson's position, difficulties which resolve into three 
fundamental problems. These problems correspond to the threefold order 
which Gilson understands ultimately to exist in the Thomist universe: 
1) the problem of substance (physics), 2) the problem of esse (meta-
physics) and 3) the problem of creation (the supernatural). The remainder 
of this chapter will concern itself with those three problems. 
The Problem of Substance (Physics) 
Gilson's statement with regard to Thomism that "The world of 
Aristotle is there whole in so far as reality is substance,,34 pinpoints 
the problem of substance with regard to the relationship between the 
• 
Aristotelian and Thomist worlds. If Thomas' transformation of Aris-
totle is a genuine transformation, it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to see how this statement can be true. Since substance in Aristotle 
is either the concrete thing (form/matter) or that thing's essential 
34 Ibid., p. 166. 
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nature (form), substance in either sense can enter Thomas' world only 
as a principle in existing things, never as an existing thing itself. 
As a principle, that substance must enter into correlation with esse 
in order to enter into Thomism. As de Raeymaeker points out, 
. the act of being, esse, is distinct from the substance. 
That is to say, in material beings, esse is distinct from the 
substance composed of prime matter, the principle of individua-
tion, and of substantial form, the principle of specific per-
fection; and it is to this substance, taken in its entirety, 
that there corresponds an esse as an act to its potency.35 
If this means anything at all, it means that Thomas' existential being 
can never be identified with Aristotle's essential substance. Gilson's 
view, therefore, that Aristotle's world is wholly present in Thomism 
"in so far as reality is substance" can only mean that Aristotle's 
world simply isn't wholly present in Thomism. It is present in potential-
ity, but not in actuality. 
The fact that Gilson is able to speak of it as though it were 
present is a function of the fact that Gilson inadvertently falls into 
the very error which Thomas himself had already fallen into, the error 
of treating a principle as though it were a thing. In this case, it 
is the error of looking at beings as though they were Aristotelian 
substances. Actually, Gilson is not unmindful of the fact that Thomas 
himself did this. "Each time Thomas Aquinas himself is looking at 
• being as at a substance, he thereby reoccupies the position of Aris-
totle, and it is no wonder that, in such cases, the distinction be-
. 36 
tween essence and existence does not occur to his own mind." 
Gilson, as Thomas before him, supposes that the real world does 
35de Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being, p. 135. 
36G"1 ~ son, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 158. 
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offer a perspective from which things may be understood correctly with-
out advertence to the real distinction. 
It · is the world of science, eternal, self-subsistent and such 
that no problem concerning existence needs nor can be asked about 
it. It is one and the same thing for a man in it to be "man," 
to be "one" and "to be." ... Physics is that very order of 
substantial reality in which existence is taken for granted. 37 
The analogy which he borrows from Thomas to illustrate the relationship 
between esse and the Aristotelian substance lends support to the notion 
of such a substantial order of things. For, we are told, the Aristo-
telian substance (as essence) is like the air which receives its light 
(esse) from a source outside itself. This analogy is unfortunate, 
however, for it suggests that the Aristotelian substance, apart from 
esse, is already a thing in its own right, just as air, apart from 
light, is a thing in its own right. It suggests, furthermore, that the 
Aristotelian substance is an already constituted subject which then re-
ceives esse. Hence, this analogy supports Gilson's supposition that, 
although existence does not take root · in Aristotelian substances, 
nevertheless those substances can be regarded as everlasting in "their 
own right.,,38 
He states that "if you look at simple substances such as they 
actually are, it is obvious that they are made to endure.,,39 Here 
we can see the source qf the problem. Simple substances as they 
actually are can only be existing substances. They are simple sub-
stances only in an Aristotelian world in which substance and existence 
identify. In a Thomist world, they are composite substances (esse/ 
37Ibid ., p. 166. 
38Ibid ., p. 163. 
39Ibid., p. 164. 
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essence) and that complexity rules out our capacity to identify auto-
matically and a priori their endurance with their essential principles. 
Aristotle's view that "man," "one man" and "one existent man" all 
40 
refer to the same thing or reality stems directly from his identifi-
cation of substance and existence. To suppose, as does Gilson, that 
such a perspective remains possible in a universe in which such an 
identification is no longer possible is to suppose that an accurate 
knowledge of things can arise from an inaccurate presumption about 
their structural principles. Yet the air/light analogy, whatever its 
other drawbacks, demonstrates very clearly the misleading character of 
such a supposition. For, if one need make no distinction between air 
(substance) and light (esse), one will be led to assume that air, by 
definition, is bright or luminous. vfuile it might be argued that the 
failure here is not a failure of supposition, but of the analogy itself, 
two facts nevertheless remain: 1) the Aristotelian substance as prin-
ciple is much more difficult to isolate in a Thomist world than the 
Aristotelian substance as concrete thing is in Aristotle's world, and 
2) an understanding of that principle is as crucial to accurate scienti-
fic knowledge in a Thomist world as is understanding the concrete thing 
in an Aristotelian world. 
Both Thomas and G~lson fail to recognize that, while logic and 
ontology identify in Aristotle, they do not in Thomism, where essences 
and actually existing things no longer are the same. 
. . • when esse is taken to be the correlative of essence, as 
act to potency, substance and essence are no longer the same; 
substance is then not constituted by essence, but by the correla-
tion of essence, as potency, with ~, as act. The actuality of 
40Metaphysics, IV, 1003b27-33. 
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substance is then not included within the necessary intelligibility 
of essence, for essence is only the potential correlative of the 
act-potency ,correlation which constitutes substance: essence is 
potential, but not actual, substance. No necessary understanding 
of actual substance is any longer possible; such an understanding 41 
is only of potential substance and is not an actual understanding. 
As Owens points out, "Only as already having real being in the outside 
world, or as having cognitional being through the act of being known, 
can the essence function as a direct object of intellectual considera-
tion.,,42 In a Thomist world, therefore, "man," "one man" and "one 
existent man" can never refer to one and the same thing. "Man," "one" 
and "existent" refer respectively to essence, the existing being and 
esse. The Aristotelian substance survives only as the essence in such 
a ,"lOrld, and therefore can never be known both "in its own right" and 
as actually existing simultaneously. 
Instead, we have in Thomism a kind of metaphysical uncertainty 
. i 1 43 prl.nc p e . Aristotelian substances can either be positively known 
in their own right but then only as uncreated (potential), or they can 
be negatively known as actually existing correlative principles of 
esse. To presume that their logic coincides with their ontology is to 
deny the real distinction, because it is to ?resume that esse has no 
discernible (intelligible) impact on reality as we know it. It is, in 
4lKeefe, Thomism, pp. 55-56. 
---- . 
42Owens , St. Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics, pp. 43-44. 
43The analogue for such a metaphysical uncertainty principle is, 
of course, the scientific uncertainty principle associated with the 
physicist Werner Heisenberg, which states the impossibility of deter-
mining simultaneously both the speed and the location of subatomic 
particles. Just as the quantum physicist must choose between knowing 
the speed or the location of subatomic particles, so the Thomist meta-
physician must make a similar choice regarding Aristotelian substances 
between knowing them logically (potentially) or ontologically (actual-
ly). Possible and actual knowledge do not coincide. 
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short, to presume that Aristotle's essentialist account of the world's 
intelligibility was entirely correct. But such a presumption is, in 
fact, an even greater problem than the problem of substance. 
The Problem of Esse (Metaphysics) 
According to Gilson, "As soon as existence no longer is 'taken for 
44 granted, metaphysics begins." In other words, the principle of esse 
is what warrants the independence of metaphysics from science. "And 
this discovery of the act of existing--esse--is the moment of discovery 
of metaphysics. ,,45 Herein lies the source of Thomism's claim to be 
the one genuine existential philosophy, namely, in its positing of 
"existence in being, as a constituent element of being.,,46 Heidegger's 
critique of Western thought for having forgotten being47 is met by the 
Thomist counter-assertion that Thomas, and Thomas alone, did not forget. 
. . • it would be vain for us to go farther back into the past 
than the time of Thomas Aquinas, because nobody that we know of 
has cared to posit existence in being, as a constituent element 
of being. And it would be no less vain to look in the more im-
mediate past for a more modern expression of the same truth, 
because, paradoxically enough, what was perhaps deepest in the 
philosophical message of Thomas Aquinas seems to have remained 
practically forgotten since the very time of his death. 48 
As a result, Gilson concludes that "Thomistic metaphysics is existential 
in its own right.,,49 
44Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 166. 
45Klubertanz, Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, p. 50. 
46Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 154. 
47Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph 
Manheim (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1961), pp. 
15-16, 20. 
48Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 154. 
49 Ibid., p. 167. 
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We have already seen how Carlo and other Esseist Thomists presume 
the existentialism of Thomism to be so powerful a break with previous 
Greek essentialist thinking as to signal an end to the Greek essence 
altogether. They presume this, because, identifying the principle of 
esse with Ipsum Esse who is also Ipsum Intelligere, they see no way 
to avoid the conclusion that all of existence, including its 'intelligi-
bility, must be reduced to esse. No positive role, therefore, remains 
for the essence to play. 
Gilson, on the other hand, presumes that Aristotelian essences 
(substances) not only play an important role in Thomas' universe, but 
also reflect "in their own right" the real order to such a degree that 
science need look no further than them to understand the physical 
nature of the world. Only when one moves 'beyond' physics is it neces-
sary to take their existential component into consideration. Clearly 
Gilson is working with a very different notion of esse than are Esseist 
Thomists. 
Broadly speaking, there are two major areas of disagreement 
between Gilson and Carlo. First, while Carlo identifies intelligere 
with esse, Gilson refuses to esse any notion of formal causality what-
ever. A thing's formal determinations, every one of them according to 
Gilson, arise solely f~om the side of essence. Esse is an act without 
a form, and to the extent that Thomas ever refers to esse as formal, 
he is to be understood as meaning no more than that esse stands in 
the same relationship to essence as form does to matter. Therefore, 
Gilson can maintain that "existence does not monopolize the whole 
actuality of existing substance. Rather, just as essence is in potency 
to the act of its own existence, so also is the act of existence in 
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50 potency to the formal act of its own essence." In other words, so 
important is essence to actually existing things that esse itself is 
dependent upon the essential structures of the thing for its own 
presence. As Thomas noted (and Gilson quotes him), "esse in re est, 
et est actus entis, resultans ex principiis rei, sicut lucere est 
actus lucentis.,,51 Gilson, in fact and as already noted (see pp. 144, 
156-157) goes Thomas one step better, maintaining, as Thomas never did, 
that esse is in potency to its own essence. As a result, Gilson con-
cludes that the intelligibility of the existing thing lies with essence, 
the act or actuation of that thing with esse. 52 Hence the Aristotelian 
substance remains intact ~vithin Thomism. 
The second major disagreement between Gilson and Carlo, a corollary 
to the first, has to do with the nature and importance of participation 
in Thomas. Because Carlo defines creatures as existential quanta, he 
is forced to a notion of crea~urely participation in divinity which 
comes perilously close to pantheism. Gilson, on the other hand, so 
emphasizes the positive role of Aristotelian substances in a Thomist 
world that he necessarily associates esse much more with the Aristotelian 
substance esse actuates than with the divine source which produces that 
esse. Hence, he is driven to the opposite extreme from Carlo, that of 
ignoring participation pr of reducing it to nothing more than a created 
imitation of the divine existence. 
According to Gilson, existing things can be said to exist for two 
reasons--first, by virtue of an extrinsic efficient cause that produces 
50 Ibid., p. 171. 
51In III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2; Being and Some Philosophers, p. 174. 
52Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 175. 
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them, and, secondly, by virtue of an intrinsic principle ~hich is con-
stitutive of them. This immanent principle not only confers being upon 
things, but also makes things to be beings. Therefore, things as be-
ings can be proper objects of the intellect apart from the extri~sic 
cause which makes them beings. Hence, the world can be understood as 
autonomous with reference to God, inasmuch as participation in God 
does not make things dependent on Him, but rather effects a kind of 
transfer of some of His attributes to the creature. Just as God exists, 
so does the creature. And just as God exercises efficient causality, 
so does the creature . Thus, Gilson can say that '''To be' is to be 
cause, that is, both immanent cause of its own being and transitive 
cause of other beings through efficient causality.,,53 The creature 
therefore does not so much participate (share) in the nature of God as 
imitate His nature. All creatures, therefore, and not just man, may 
be said to image God existentially. 
All beings, from the most exalted to the humblest ones, are 
just as really distinct and as ultimately alike as the children 
of the same father; for, indeed, they all have the same Father, 
and He has made them all in His image or resemblance. They act 
because they are, and they are because His name is He l~o Is.54 
Just as the enormous problem with Carlo's interpretation of Thomism 
lies on the side of essence, in his notion that essence is reducible 
to esse, so Gilson's problem lies, as one might expect, on the side of 
• 
esse, first, in his notion that, insofar as science is concerned, esse 
is reducible to essence, and, secondly, in the unmistakable impression 
he gives, insofar as metaphysics is concerned, that esse is an accident 
of Aristotelian substances. It is this latter which will be explored 
53 Ibid., p. 186. 
54 Ibid., p. 187. 
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in some detail, since once one has reduced esse to accident, it is but 
a small step to eliminating it altogether. 
In examining Gilson's treatment of esse as accident. it should 
first be noted that such a treatment is not original with him. In his 
1958 article, "The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the 
Doctrine of St. Tnomas Aquinas," Joseph Owens discovers in Thomas' 
writings a series of texts which indicate that Thomas himself understood 
being to be in some sense accidental, as well as substantial. 
It is the same being, in a word, that is both accidental and 
essential to creatures. It is the act of being that results from 
the principles of the essence by way of formal causality, yet only 
when it is caused efficiently by a different and external agent. 
It is the act in regard to which every nature is essentially a 
being, and yet it is identified as a nature only with the divine 
essence. In all other natures it is an accident, though it is 
not subsequent to the essence like predicamental accidents, but 
prior to it. It is accordingly both accidental and essential. 55 
Although Gilson carefully avoids the use of the word accident with re-
gard to esse, his arguments depend directly upon those texts in Aquinas 
which treat esse as an accident, and it is therefore not unreasonable 
to suppose that, to the degree that Thomas understood esse as accident, 
so does Gilson. 
According to Thomas, esse is an accident only in the larger sense 
of the word 'accident,' not in its proper sense. "An accident means 
in a wide sense everything that is not part of the essence; and such is 
the character of being [esse] in created things. . ,,56 Thomas drew 
this distinction between a proper and a wider sense of the term 'acci-
dent' because the traditional (proper) use of the term made no allowances 
for a substantial principle of being as accident. 
55 Owens , "Accidental and Essential Character," p. 40. 
• 56 Quodl. XII, 5 (English translation from Owens, An Elementary 
Christian Metaphysics, p. 7ln). 
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The proper sense of accident, in the tradition that lay behind 
the mediaeval metaphysical controversies, would be understood as 
denoting the accepted Aristotelian meaning of a predicamental 
accident. But the substantial being of a thing can hardly be a 
predicamental accident. A predicamental accident supposes its 
substance already complete as substance, and is added to a so 
completed subject. Without substantial being, howeverS there is simply no subject to which an accident could be added. 7 
What Thomas was searching for and found in Hilary was a notion of 
accident which could accomodate esse as a principle in existing things 
and yet outside the essence of those things. As Thomas saw it, 
"quidquid est in aliquo praeter essentiam ejus, inest ei accidentaliter.,,58 
~fuat Thomas really sought, as Owens argues, was a way of accomodating 
the Aristotelian notion that the essence is the source of its own exis-
tence. As Thomas expressed it in In III Sent. (a well-known text 
employed by Gilson and cited earlier, pp. 145, 157), "et hoc quidem 
esse in re est, et est actus entis resultans ex principiis rei, sicut 
lucere est actus lucentis.,,59 The point is made more strikingly in 
In IV Uetaph., where Thomas writes, 
Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab ejus essentia, non tamen est 
intelligendum quod sit aliquod superadditum ad modum accidentis, 
sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae. 60 
On the other hand, Thomas wants to insist simultaneously that 
esse is not a predicamental accident. For esse must be understood as 
somehow prior to the essence of which it is an accident. It must, in 
• 
other words, be understood as a substantial principle as well. 
In order to accomodate both notions, Thomas had recourse to 
57 Owens , "Accidental and Essential Character," p. 11. 
58 Compo Theol., C. LXVI. 
59 In III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2. 
60 In IV Metaph., lect. 2. 
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reciporocal causality to explain them. In the order of efficient 
causality, esse is prior to essence and efficacious on the substantial 
level. In the order of formal causality, however, esse is subsequent 
to essence, a product of the principles the essence exercises as formal 
cause. 
Herein lies the clear-cut distinction between efficient 'and formal 
causality which Gilson understands to be central to the Thomist trans-
formation of Aristotelianism. Owens agrees. After noting the "radical 
change" which the separation of act (esse) and form (essence) produces 
with regard to Aristotle, who understood act and form to identify, 
Owens goes on to point out that the separation of efficient from formal 
causality allows Thomas to make a distinction between esse as essential 
and as accidental. 
If the form is the cause of being in its own special way, that 
is, as formal cause, it will in its own order necessarily determine 
the essence to being. Formal causality is a necessary type of 
causality. All formal results follow necessarily from their 
formal causes, as may be seen in the procedures of mathematics. 
If its form determines every nature to be a being, then every 
nature is essentially a being. There is nothing in the form 
itself, however, that requires its submission to any efficient 
causality. That it is acted upon by another efficient cause 
does not follow with necessity from its own formal nature. If 
its act of being has to be given in this way by an external ef-
ficient cause6 that act can only be accidental to it in this order of causality. 1 
When we ask the question, why is it necessary for Thomas to find 
• 
a way to accomodate esse as accident, the answer seems fairly obvious. 
Thomas sums it up twice in the Summa Theologiae, when he says, "esse 
secundum se competit formae,,62 and "esse per se consequitur forman 
6lOwens , "Accidental and Essential Character," p. 22. 
62 ST I, 50, 5 ad 3. 
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creaturae.,,63 As Owens notes, "This is reminiscent of the Aristotelian 
doctrine that form is the cause of being.,,64 In other words, esse as 
accident is the manner in which Thomas attempts to get Aristotle's 
essentialist metaphysics into his own world intact. Inasmuch as Thomas 
himself developed both the notion of form as the realm of intelligibility 
and necessity and the notion of an existence which "belongs to" that 
form, it is little wonder that Gilson is able to interpret Thomas in 
such a way as to speak of science as having to inquire no further than 
the realm of Aristotelian substances. Esse can have no empirically 
discernible effect upon Aristotelian substances once they have become 
that 'thick.' For the same reason, one can see why Gilson insists 
that revelation (Ex 3.14) and not human reason is the source of our 
knowledge of the existential character of reality. Only a revelation 
could cut such essences down to size. 
The question remains, nevertheless, as to whether Aristotle's 
world can be accomodated to that of Thomas by the use of principles 
so much at variance with Aristotelianism as are Thomas' notions of 
esse as 1) substantial and accidental and 2) a non-predicamental acci-
dent which is both prior to and creative of its subject. In the final 
analysis, it is a question about substance once again. For, in fact, 
whenever esse is spokeq of as an accident, essence is treated as though 
it were a substance (concrete thing). Owens comments that the doctrine 
of esse as accident "is intended as a defence of the Aristotelian 
teaching that the addition of the participle 'being' does not denote 
63 ST I, 104, 1 ad 1. 
64 Owens , "Accidental and Essential Character," p. 19. 
anything new in the thing, and that every substance is of its very 
nature a being. ,,65 Here is the source of Gilson's view that "one," 
163 
"man" and "to be" refer to the same thing. But is not the doctrine of 
the real distinction designed to combat just that very Aristotelian 
teaching? Isn't the Thomist transformation of Aristotle a transforma-
tion of just such a notion of substance? 
Unfortunatel~ the central problem lies in Thomas himself, in his 
desire to have Aristotle and to transform him too. The possibility 
that these two projects are mutually incompatible seems never to have 
occurred to him. Hence, he tried to introduce into his worl~ the very 
same twofold notion of substance which Aristotle had employed before 
him. 
Like Aristotle, Aquinas uses substance in a double sense. It 
is in the first place the individually existing thing, i.e., 
that which can really be said to exist in the usual sense. 
Properties and definitions, which can only be said to exist 
through the substance, are then accidents. In that case the 
difference is in the manner of existence. Substance may also be 
identified with the essence of a thing, and is then equivalent 
to essentia or natura. Everything added to, but not part of, 
the definition of the essence of a thing are then accidents. 66 
This was not, in itself, a decision which would necessarily lead to 
any problems. The problems arose when the primary Thomist sense of 
substance (esse/essence) came to be identified with the primary Aris-
totelian sense of subs~ance (form/matter). For, by this identifica-
tion, the Thomist existential substance was reduced to the Aristotelian 
essential substance. 
Thomas himself opened the way to such a reduction when he drew a 
distinction in the notion of abstraction which Aristotle had not drawn 
65 Ibid., p. 20. 
66 Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, p. 170. 
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(his system had neither the need nor the capacity for accomodating such 
a distinction). According to Thomas, essence may be abstracted either 
with or without precision from being (esse). In the former case, the 
essence one abstracts is the principle which correlates with esse to 
constitute a being; in the latter case, it is the concrete existing 
h " " If 67 t ~ng ~tse . 
Whatever Thomas' reasons for drawing the distinction, a point to 
which we shall return in the sixth chapter, the distinction itself 
makes it possible for Thomists such as Gilson and Owens to identify 
Aristotle's essential substances with Thomas' existing things. For 
Aristotle's substances can enter Thomas' world only on the essence 
side of the real distinction. The Aristotelian substance can go no 
further than the Thomist essence is able to take it. As long as es-
sence remains only a principle of being, Aristotle's world of essential 
substances can be retained as potential principles, ?ut not as actual 
realities. Once, however, the essence is capable of being identified 
with the existing thing itself, which is precisely what the notion of 
abstraction without precision makes possible, the Aristotelian world 
is able to gain that substantial toehold in Thomism which essentialist 
substances can on no grounds of their own claim in an existentialist 
universe. Because they get into that universe by virtue of a principle 
• 
of abstraction which allows their existence (esse) to be reduced to 
their essential nature (essence), they can be understood as indifferent 
to esse at the level of physics and as only accidentally modified by 
esse at the level of metaphysics. 
67For discussion of this, see Owens, "Accidental and Essential 
Character," pp . 3lff. 
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"That this process of reduction is at work in Thomas himself is 
apparent when Thomas speaks of esse as "resultans ex principiis rei." 
There he clearly identifies the thing with its essence. And when he 
employs the air/light analogy to illustrate the relation of esse to 
essence, he only succeeds in twice compounding the error, treating 
essence as a thing (air) and its potency to being (diaphaneity) as 
an aptitudinal (predicamental) accident which requires but an extrinsic 
efficient cause to effect its accidental modification from potential 
to actual being. Gilson, in choosing these texts to argue for an in-
tact Aristotelian substance in an existential Thomist world, gives 
the medieval error a modern blessing. 
The problems on the side of essence, because they ultimately re-
duce the existential substance of Thomas to the essentialist substance 
of Aristotle, necessarily make themselves felt in equally severe 
problems on the side of esse. The first problem is that esse, far from 
dominating essence and its act, as Gilson maintains elsewhere,68 be-
comes only an accidental component vis a vis that essence. Nowhere is 
this made more apparent" than in the fact that esse never rises, in 
Gilson's account of it, above the status of a servant to essence. 
For, while Gilson does indeed speak of esse as "the supreme constituent 
of 'being",69 and as the "supreme act of creatures, ,,70 the fact remains 
• 
that its role never goes beyond the bounds of supplying "the active 
energy through which the corresponding essence shall progressively 
68Gilson, Christian Philosophy of Aquinas, p. 40. 
69 rbid., p. 35. 
70rdem., Being and Some Philosophers, p. 182. 
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receive all its determinat~ons.,,71 By drawing an absolute distinction 
between act (esse) and form (essence), esse can be the source of all 
perfections only as the act which "realifies" them. It cannot be the 
source of any of the positive perfections which are thus realified. 
Those belong to Aristotle's essence which, in Thomas' world as in 
Aristotle's before him, commands the entire spectrum of intelligi-
bilities. It is the job of esse simply to transform that spectrum of 
potential intelligibilities into real things. 
. • • this transition from the merely possible to the actual is 
simultaneously a transition from the non-perfect to the perfect, 
from what is without value and worth to what is valuable and 
worthwhile. Because it does contribute perfection, value and 
worth to existents, then, actual existence is the factor which 
makes them real. Despite what radical essentialist may say, it 
does not nullify, but literally realifies them. It does not 
detract from, but adds to them. It does not lessen, but enhances 
them. 72 
As Owens puts it, esse "is the core of all else, the axis around 
which all the rest revolves, even though it is not part of the thing's 
nature. From within, however, it is actuating everything in the 
73 
nature." According to such a view, therefore, the proper product 
of creation is not esse, but essence, because only essence is a nature. 
Existence as a nature cannot be bestowed on anything. • • . A 
thing whose existence is caused, then, inevitably must be of a 
different nature from existence itself. The characteristic ef-
fect of subsistent existence, it is true, cannot be other than 
existence. But is the new existence what is produced? No. 
What is produced i 's a galaxy, a metal-:-atree, an animal, a man. 
To issue from subsistent existence, the new existence has to be 
the existence of a finite thing such as these. Each new exis-
tence, accordingly, involves a potency that limits it and remains 
other than it. The potency is the thing that is produced. 74 
71Ibid . 
72 . Sweeney, Authentic Existentialism, p. 81. 
73Joseph Owens, An Interpretation of Existence (Milwaukee: Bruce 
Publishing Company, 1968), p. 71. 
74Ibid ., p. 106. 
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The dynamism, the driv'ing force, of created things therefore lies 
on the side of esse; but the specific perfections which that energy 
underwrites lie on the side of essence. As Gilson says with regard to 
human beings, "the question never is for a soul to become what it is 
(it is such qua form) but to become that which it is. In other words, 
a human soul has more and more to actualize its very definition.,,75 
Hence esse is that principle which first actualizes the Aristotelian 
substance and then provides the energy for those operations which are 
proper to that substance, all with a view to achieving a series of 
perfections which are specified entirely from the side of the Aristo-
telian substance (essence). Esse exists for the sake of essence, not 
the reverse. 
Gilson speaks of how Thomists betray Thomism "first, and only too 
often, by presenting it as a philosophy occupied principally with forms, 
whereas it never speaks of them save as of constituent elements of 
actual beings.,,76 But does not his own preoccupation with formal 
causality to the point of treating esse as accidental to existing 
things (metaphysics) or identical with them (physics) constitute pre-
cisely the kind of betrayal to which he refers? On the other hand, 
if this be betrayal, might not Thomas himself be partially to blame 
for the situation, with his insistence that esse is, from the point 
• of view of formal causality, accidental to essence? 
Owens asks with regard to esse as accidental, "Is this distinction 
of a proper and a wide sense of accident merely an ad hoc invention?,,77 
75Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 181. 
76 Idem., Christian Philosophy of Aquinas, pp. 34-35. 
77 Owens , "Accidental and Essential Character," p. 11. 
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The answer, it would appear, must be yes if one accepts Owens' inter-
pretation of it. For, according to Owens, it complements Thomas' dis-
tinction between abstraction with and without precision. If the two 
distinctions are related to one another, as Owens supposes, then both 
serve the single purpose of acconodating Aristotle's world to that of 
Thomas. As a result, "a fundamental equivocity in the basic 'notion of 
being" enters his system, producing an ambiguity which, as Owens goes 
on to say, "may be expected to follow through in all subsequent meta-
physical thinking.,,78 This ambiguity is simply one more example of 
the tension between thick and thin essences, now manifesting itself as 
a tension between accidental and essential esse. The more accidental 
the esse, the thicker the essence. Gilson has chosen those texts which 
Carlo ignores, just as Carlo has chosen those which Gilson ignores. 
The texts which Gilson ignores point to the second major problem 
in his interpretation of esse. And that is the almost total absence 
in Gilson of the notion of participation, a notion which, as one writer 
puts it, "occurs almost on every page,,79 of Thomas' writings. Just 
as Gilson's contention that Aristotelian substances enter Thomism 
intact depends heavily upon those texts in Thomas which treat esse as 
accident, so does Gilson's defense of the world's autonomy depend just 
as heavily on avoiding , those texts which deal with participation. Gil-
son uses instead only those texts which treat esse as act or actuality, 
while suggesting, as we have seen, that Thomas is "merely following his 
78Ibid ., p. 40. 
790wen Barfield, Saving the Appearances (New York/London: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, a Harvest/HJB Book (1965), p. 79. As John points out, 
the word 'participation' does not even appear in the index of Gilson's 
work, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas (Thomist Spectrum, 
p. 44). 
pen" when he speaks of every being as participating in the nature of 
80 
existence. 
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Thomas does make a distinction between esse as nature in God and 
as actuality in existing things. He writes, on the one hand, that 
"Oportet quod hoc quod est esse, sit substantia vel natura Dei,,,8l and, 
on the other, that "Esse est actualitas substantiae vel essentiae.,,82 
The difficulty with the latter statement, however, is that it seems to 
suggest that essence or substance is a complete entity in its own 
right (the intact Aristotelian substance) which receives from esse 
only its actualization. The essential component in things, however, 
is not a complete essence, it is an essential principle; it is not a 
complete nature, but only the principle of such a nature. By the same 
token, esse is not God's nature, but a created participation in His nature. 
Thus, Owens is correct when he says that "Existence as a nature cannot 
be bestowed on any thing. ,,83 But is not the same thing true of the Aris-
totelian substance when it becomes the Thomist essence? As an Aris-
totelian substance in an Aristotelian world, it can be identified with 
the thing itself. But in a Thomist world, how can essence be bestowed 
on existing things as their complete nature, when it, like esse itself, 
is only the principle of a nature? In other words, -in Thomism, don't 
creatures constitute the point at which an existential principle drawn 
I 
from the divine nature correlates with an essential principle drawn 
from Aristotle's physics? 
80 See page 146. 
81 De Pot., VII, 2. 
82 ST I, 54, l. 
83 Owens, An Interpretation of Existence, p. 186. 
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If this be the case, then Thomas' notion of participation as the 
possession of a nature higher than one's own84 or a share in an act 
higher than one's own85 would seem to reflect more accurately the re-
lationship of essence to esse than does the notion of esse as no more 
than the simple actualization of an essential nature. For Gilsonian 
Thomists, the major problem in viewing the esse/essence correlation as 
the participation of a lower nature in a higher nature is clear. 
Owens states it well. 
In its application to being, the doctrine ' of participation has 
to be purged of any aspect of formal causality. In no sense can 
you say that part of being goes to each of its recipients. There 
is here no form to be divided among different subjects. If being 
as a nature may be called a form, it is a form that is entirely 
indivisible and unable to be shared as a nature with anything 
else. As the first efficient cause it can just make other natures 
be. In this communication of being, on the side of the first 
cause, there is no trace of strictly formal causality whatsoever. 
Being is imparted, from that viewpoint, to creatures only through 
efficient causality. The finite nature is made to exist, without 
any addition at all in the order of nature. Nothing of formal 
nature is shared when being is participated. 86 
If Owens and Gilson are right, however, t,vo questions immediately 
arise, and they are both theological. The first is the question of 
grace itself. If Owens is correct in saying that "If being as a nature 
may be called a form, it is a form that is entirely indivisible and un-
able to be shared as a nature with anything else," how are we then to 
account for the theolo&ical doctrine that human beings are, by grace, 
raised by God to a share (participation) in the divine nature? Secondly, 
how are we to avoid the naturalizing of God's creative activity? If 
being, as the first efficient cause, "can just make other natures be," 
84Comment. in Ad Coloss., c. 1, lect. 4. 
85 Quodl., XII, q. 5, a. 5. 
86Owens , An Elementary Christian l1etaphysics, pp. 106-107. 
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does this not subordinate the higher principle of esse to the lower . 
principle of essence, reducing both God's activity as Creator and esse 
as the intrinsic existential component in existing things to the con-
fines of an essentialist Aristotelian universe? 
The Problem of Creation (The Supernatural) 
The temptation to naturalize creation is, in metaphysics, the 
temptation to rationalize it. Since, in Thomist metaphysics, the 
introduction of an existential component at the esse/essence level 
constitutes the primary transformation of Aristotle's necessary world 
into Thomas' created world, the temptation to rationalize creation is 
the temptation to rationalize esse. Leo Sweeney goes about as far in 
that direction as one can when he says, 
• . . although a theologian originated the notion of esse as 
the actualizing component within creatures, still that doctrine 
does not belong of its very nature to theology. It is not a 
strict mystery, transcending the grasp of human reason. That is 
to say, the illumination which Thomas experienced while reflecting 
upon Exodus 3. 14 did not superimpose any intelligible content 
upon the data already gained from material existents through 
direct experience. Rather, its function was to enable him to see 
what actually was already contained within that data but hereto-
fore overlooked by previous thinkers. 87 
Although Gilson is unwilling to grant that the notion of esse is 
available to the metaphysician qua metaphysician, he goes nearly as 
far in his assertion tHat the primacy of esse overcomes the contingency 
of the world. Because the world's contingency has been overcome, the 
created character of reality (i.e., its relationship to God) can safely 
be ignored by both science and metaphysics. 
This error is not the property of 'thick' essence or Gilsonian 
Thomists alone. Lt is shared by Esseist Thomists, whose rationalization 
87Sweeney, Authentic Existentialism, p. 74. 
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of esse, as we have already seen, consists in reducing created esse to 
hierarchized quantifications of the divine Intelligere. Nor is this 
error the property of modern Thomists alone. It goes back to Thomas 
himself, in his association of essences with the Divine Ideas, an asso-
ciation which, by replacing the ex nihilo of revelation with the divine 
essence as source of created intelligibilities, moved creation from the 
theological to the philosophical realm, where esse was reduced to 
serving (actualizing) the necessary structures of Aristotle's essential 
universe. 
the essentialist and necessitarian ontology of Aristotle 
was converted to a creationist viewpoint without ceasing to be 
committed to the intrinsic rationality of finite reality. The 
major difference is that such rationality is now seen, from the 
Thomist stance, to be contingent. Logic is thereby freed from 
necessity without ceasing to be rigorous. From being closed upon 
essence, it is converted to openness upon existence. 
That openness was not seen in the thirteenth century to be 
theological; creation was then taken to be a "natural" truth, 
a matter of correct inference from common-sense experience. 88 
This reduction of creation to the natural realm produced a correspond-
ing relegation of grace to the accidental order. 
This identification of grace as an ontological accidens is the 
consequence of the cosmological supposition that substantial 
contingency, creation, is 'natural'; the only level of gratuity 
then remaining is the accidental, to which all supernatural 
efficacy is then reduced. 89 
There are indications among Thomists, however, that the situation 
I 
may not be quite as straightforward as their own metaphysics suggests. 
Owens, for example, while denying that esse may be regarded as formal 
or natural, concedes that "there is one viewpoint from which the act of 
88 Donald J. Keefe, "A Methodological Critique of von Balthasar's 
Theological Aesthetics," Communio 5 (Spring 1978):34-35. 
89 Ibid., p. 37. 
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bE!ing may be thought of as a nature that is participated, ,,90 while 
Gilson himself speaks of the very different view one gets of the world 
when one looks at it in terms of participation and analogy: 
. to the Christian mind the physical world in which we live 
offers a face which is the reverse of its physicism itself, a 
face where all that was read on the one side in terms of force,. 
energy and law, is now read on the other in terms of participa-
tions and analogies of the divine Being. For whoever understands 
this, the Christian world takes on the character of a sacred 
world with a relation to God inscribed in its very being and in 
every law that rules its functioning. 91 
Many Thomists are not at all reluctant to speak of the ~ystery 
which attaches to esse and the real distinction. Kopaczynski sums up 
the situation very well: 
Father Cornelio Fabro tells us that Tho~sm is difficult and 
paradoxical. Etienne Gilson speaks of the "mystery of actual 
existence," Fr. Gerald Phelan likewise notes the "mystery of the 
being of creatures." Father Vl. Norris Clarke sees Thomas' 
essence-existence theory as one of "extraordinary daring, paradox, 
and mystery" which "stretches the resources of language up to, 
if not beyond, their limits." Jacques Maritain defines reality 
in one place as "intelligible mystery" and goes on to claim that 
a philosophy not aware of mystery is not worthy of the title 
"philosophy." 
Fr. Owens, while rejecting in one sense the puzzling label 
he terms the "mystery of being" . . . does observe that "real 
mystery, notwithstanding, is encountered when one reaches sub-
sistent existence ..•. The nature of existence, in a word, is 
shrouded in mystery, even though the occurrence of existence in 
observable things is obvious." .•. and Father Copleston contends 
that the paradoxical character of metaphysical utterances serves 
the valuable purpose of shaking us up, forcing us to ask ourselves: 
Why do metaphysicians talk like this? Why do they say the strange 
things they do?92 
Kopaczynski himself goes on to remark that "the very existence of 
creatures as well as their metaphysical composition is ultimately a 
9°Owens , "Accidental and Essential Character," p. 18. 
91Gi1son, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 100. 
92Kopaczynski, Linguistic Ramifications, pp. 150-151. 
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mystery hidden in Ipsum Esse, God.,,93 
In fact, Copleston's question, "Why do metaphysicians talk like 
this? Why do they say the strange things they do?" becomes even more 
relevant, especially to the theologian, when a philosopher such as 
Gerard Smith, in his book on natural theology, describes creation in 
terms .of love. 
If God loves creatures, yet not as means or ends, there must be 
that about His love whereby it is of things which have absolutely 
no reason in themselves why they are loved. The name of such a 
love is infinite generosity. All love is generous; only God's 
love is generous to the point of arranging for the presence of 
a reception committee. [essence] at the receiving end of an act 
[esse] which would be infinite love even without the committee. 
Here then, the adage, good is self-diffusive, describes that 
characteristic of love, in all cases generous, by which, in the 
divine instance, love is purely gratuitous. 94 
Or when a philosopher such as W. Norris Clarke describes God's creative 
act as "an efficacious act of intentionality, of willing-to-share, of 
willed self-communication,,95 and asks, 
And is it not as it should be that the truly ultimate mystery 
of the universe, that which illumines all else, should turn out 
to be the mystery of self-communicating love? There is no further 
explanation possible for anything, if "God is Love," a:s St. John 
says. 96 
Or when a philosopher such as Louis de Raeymaeker describes every exist-
ing being as "a pure gift of the Absolute, on which it depends com-
pletely, and it cannot do otherwise but reveal, in the measure of its 
• 
reality, the value of being of the absolute principle in which it 
. . ,,97 part~c~pates. 
93 Ibid., p. 152. 
94Smith, Natural Theology, p. 219. 
95Clarke, "What Cannot Be Said," p. 31-
96Ibid ., p. 35. 
97 de Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being, p. 287. 
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Since these. are the kinds of terms in which theologians today are 
wont to speak of God's grace, the above-noted Thomists might easily 
give the impression that grace is substantial by virtue of the absolute 
gratuity of God's creative act in which he communicates something of 
Himself to His creation. Until, that is, one realizes that the mystery 
to which they refer is, in their judgment, a "natural mystery,,,98 just 
as the gift is "the supreme gift in the natural order,,,99 making meta-
physics, in its turn, "the highest natural gift of God to men. ,,100 
E. Mersch, in describing the notion of God's self-communication 
in Western theology, points out that, according to that theology, 
l'Etre infini a deux mani~res de se communiquer aux ~tres 
finis: la premi~re par laquelle il se donne a leur mani~re ~ , 
eux, et qui les fait eux; la seconde par laquelle il se donne a 
sa mani~re k lui, et qui les fait un avec lui. lOl 
The first of these, in Thomism, is the 'natural' gift of esse by which 
things are made themselves, the second is the 'supernatural' gift of 
sanctifying grace by which they are 'accidentally' elevated to union 
with God. The critical theological question which this dual notion 
of gratuity raises is whether or not the gift of God's self-communication 
can ever be understood as 'natural.' With regard to Thomist methodology, 
this means asking whether or not esse can be regarded as a 'natural' 
principle in existing things. In short, can esse be understood as con-
I 
fined to specific dimensions determined entirely from the side of essence, 
or must esse be understood as the principle of a 'higher' nature or 
98 Clarke, "What Cannot Be Said," p. 3l. 
99Henri Renard, "Essence and Existence," PACPA 21 (1946):65. 
100 Owens, St. Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics, p. 61. 
101E. Mersch, "Filii in Filio," Nouv. Rev. Theol. 7 (Jly-Aug 1938): 
820. 
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a 'higher' act which itself elevates the essential principle in an 
existing thing to a level inaccessible to that essential principle in 
an Aristotelian world. On the answer to this question hinges the proper 
correlation of nature and grace in an Aristotelian act/potency methodo-
logy as transformed by the real distinction. In order to answer this 
question, we must examine more carefully the notion of participation 
with regard to the principles of essence and esse, with a view to 
establishing the proper Thomist, as opposed to Aristotelian, notion of 
substance. 
CHAPTER 5 
ESSENTIAL PARTICIPATION AND ARISTOTLE: MATERIAL SUBSTANCE 
We have argued thus far that Thomas' fundamental intention was to 
employ an Aristotelian metaphysics in the service of Christian theology. 
We have argued further, however, that his attempt to use the Divine 
Ideas to ground the 'thick' essences of such a metaphysics introduced 
into his work a Platonic element which could not but clash with the 
methodology he had taken over from Aristotle. As a result, two con-
flicting streams of texts can be found in his writings, those which 
underwrite a 'thick' essence and those which deny such a notion of 
essence. Gilson has rightly understood Thomism to be a correlation of 
Christianity and Aristotelianism. He has also rightly understo~d that 
such a correlation requires us to understand essence as providing with-
in things a positive notion of intelligibility distinct from esse. His 
zeal for establishing the genuinely Aristotelian character of Thomism, 
however, led him to subordinate the theological elements of the correla-
tion to the Aristotelian ones, a subordination nowhere more apparent 
than in his treatment qf esse as having no discernible impact upon the 
Aristotelian essence. 
In order to avoid Platonizing Thomas, Gilson thought it necessary 
to avoid the notion of participation in Thomas. On the surface, this 
seems quite plausible, not only because the notion of participation is 
so clearly linked with Platonism but also because, as we have seen, 
those Thomists who emphasize participation are also led to emphasize 
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the fundamentally Platonic character of Thomism. particularly in their 
reduction of essence to esse. However. there are three reasons for 
refusing the path which Gilson took. First. such a path leads to a 
reading of Thomas which denies the genuinely radical character of his 
transformation of Aristotelianism (essence) by theology (esse). Second-
ly, the real surd in Thomas' thought is not the notion of participation, 
but, as has been repeatedly pointed out. the Platonic Forms introduced 
as the Divine Ideas. Finally, while it is clear that the restriction 
of Thomism to a single order of participation (existential) has the 
effect of turning Thomas into a Platonist. it is by no means clear 
that such a restriction is either consistent with Thomas or valid in 
itself. 
1 L.-B. Geiger. as we have already seen, insisted upon the need to 
maintain in Thomism two orders of participation, participation by compo-
sition and participation by formal hierarchy. In this way, Geiger sought 
to preserve the positive character of essence (participation by composi-
tion) without denying the function of limitation exercised by that es-
sence on esse (participation by formal hierarchy). Unfortunately, 
Geiger's attempt to trace the intelligibilities found in created es-
sences directly to God, while loyal to Thomas' notion of the role played 
by the Divine Ideas, a~so served to underscore the fundamental irrational-
ity of trying to ground the esse/essence distinction found in things in 
the absolute unity of Ipsum Esse. 
Cornelio Fabro, recognizing the impossibility of deriving from 
Ipsum Esse two transcendental orders of participation, withdrew to 
lower ground, seeking instead a single order of transcendental participation 
1 See pp. 48-49. 
buttressed by a second order of "predicamental" participation. 
The first and most fundamental division of participation is 
into transcendental and predicamental. The former is concerned 
with esse, with the pure perfections that are directly grounded 
in it; the latter is concerned with univocal formalities, such 
as genera with respect to species and species with respect to 
individuals. 2 
I With regard to this second order of participation, Fabro points out 
that "as far as their ontological content is concerned, genera and 
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species are present in their respective subjects and must therefore be 
predicated essentially (secundum [per] essentiam) and not by participa-
tion (per participationem).,,3 What Fabro is trying to salvage here, 
as he himself goes on to say, is "the Aristotelian doctrine of imma-
nence, ,,4 i. e., the notion that true substance resides in the concrete 
singular and not in the genus or species in which that concrete singu-
lar is said to 'participate.' This differs from transcendental parti-
cipation, in which the divine nature which is being participated re-
mains itself whole and intact. 
. . . whereas in the quantitative and material order participa-
tion attains directly to the object inasmuch as a certain "whole" 
is being divided and distributed in its parts, in the moral and 
in the strictly metaphysical order participation concerns properly 
speaking the mode of having and receiving, in the sense that the 
"whole" remains intact and undivided, while an aspect or form of 
the object is being participated. 5 
This relegation of essential participation to the logical order 
• does not, however, work. First, it runs counter to Thomas' understanding 
2Cornelio Fabro, "The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Metaphy-
sics: The Notion of Participation," Review of Metaphysics 27 (1974): 
471 (hereafter cited as Fabro, "Intensive Hermeneutics~I). 
3Ibid . 
4Ibid . 
5 Ibid., p. 453. 
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of predication and participation and of the relationship between the 
two. For, as Thomas says, 
Something is predicated of a subject in two ways: in one way by 
essence, in the other by participation; for light is predicated 
of an illuminated body by participation, but if there existed 
some separated light it would be predicated of it by essence. 6 
In other words, something exists in a subject either per essentiam or 
per participationem. To treat per essentiam predication as though it 
were "predicamental participation" is to introduce a rift between onto-
logy and logic . 
The situation is a very difficult one. For, on the one hand, Thomas 
points out that "That which is totally something does not participate 
it but is by essence identified with it.,,7 No specific perfection, there-
fore, can be predicated per essentiam of any created thing. That is to 
say, no material singular can be identified with the genus or species 
which is predicated of it, for it would then be the sole member in that 
genus or species. On the other hand, "What, however, is not totally 
identified with something but has something else joined with it is 
properly said to participate."B Hence, some form of participation would 
seem to be required for the essence as well as the esse in created things, 
inasmuch as the doctrine of the real distinction prohibits our being able 
to identify any existing thing exclusively with either its essence or 
its esse. However, no 'essential or specific perfection can be predicated 
per participationem in God, for God's nature cannot be identified, per 
essentiam, with the perfection of any created essence (this is the 
6 ~. II, 2, 3. 
7 In I Metaph., lect. 10, n. 154. 
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ultimate reason why the Divine Ideas, whether singular or plural, do 
not work). 
Secondly, this relegation of essential participation to the logi-
cal order does not solve anything. To place essential perfections with-
in concrete singulars, while simultaneously denying the intactness and 
undividedness of the genera and species to which those intell·igibilities 
are attributed, can ultimately result in one of only three positions: 
1) nominalism, in which genera and species are understood to be merely 
mental categories within which we organize the data of our experience, 
2) Esseism, in which the intelligibilities in things are simply reducible 
to the divine Esse, or 3) Exemplarism, in which the essential intelligi-
bilities are traced to the Divine Ideas. Fabro himself takes the third 
9 
way out. 
But this third way, as has been shown, is simply a half-way house 
to Esseism, a stopping-place for those who are not entirely willing 
to abandon the notion of essence as positive but who can find no locus 
other than Ipsum Esse in which to ground its intelligibility. As 
O'Grady points out, 
. • . the object of Thomistic metaphysics tends to remain Aris-
totelian, somehow completely defined by the third degree of ab-
straction rather than by actus essendi, by modes of being that 
can be and be thought without matter rather than by the very act 
of being itself. 
The question th~n that needs to be asked again is whether, 
for Thomistic metaphysics, there is any principle of perfection, 
any energizing, determining act in any being other than esse. 
Is there an act in any being other than ~ that 5ives it the 
degree of perfection that it has above non-being. l 
9Fabro, "Intensive Hermeneutics," p. 474. 
l°Donald O'Grady, "Esse and Metaphysics," The New Scholasticism 
39 (1965):286. 
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O'Grady himself has no use for such a stopping-place. Since esse is 
the fullness of perfection, O'Grady maintains that "the total perfection 
and the esse of a creature are one and the same."ll This being the case, 
it then becomes necessary to deny the act/potency character of the real 
distinction • 
. . . one cannot, then, identify essence and potency in ·any being. 
Potency is not act; perfection is act, and essence is perfection. 
Composition in creaturely being must be affirmed, but composition 
of act and potency cannot be equated with the real composition 
of esse and essence. 12 
The only conclusion one can reach is that "forma est esse.,,13 
In O'Grady, we see a man explicitly willing to accept the full 
implications of Esseist Thomism, in its denial of any distinct, positive, 
essential intelligibilities. However, this denial of positive essential 
intelligibilities is ultimately difficult for any Thomist, even a Gilson, 
to avoid entirely. In The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 
for example, Gilson writes, 
Indeed, the essence of a finite act-of-being consists in only 
being such or such an act-of-being (esse), not the pure, absolute 
and unique Esse we have spoken about . The finite act-of-being, 
then, is specified by what it lacks so that here it is the potency 
which determines the act, at least in the sense that its proper 
degree of potentiality is inscribed in each finite act-of-being. 
. Each essence is set up by an act-of-being which it is not 
and which includes it as its own determination. Outside the pure 
act of existing, if it exists, nothing can exist save as a 
limited act-of-being. It is therefore the hierarchy of the 
essences which establishes and governs that of beings, each of 14 
which expresses only the proper area of a certain act-of-being. 
As Helen James John points out, 
llIbid. 
l2Ibid • , 
13Ibid . , 
l4G· l ~ son, 
p. 290. 
p. 283. 
Christian Philosophy of Aquinas, p. 36. 
From this text, which gives perhaps the clearest explanation of 
Gilson's view of the relation of essence and esse, it appears 
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that essence is a name given to the finite act-of-being considered 
precisely as self-limiting. Our author nowhere gives evidence 
of having seen to what extent this explanation raises the question 
of the meaning of a real distinction; and the passages in which 
he stresses its reality seem to regard it simply as a metaphysical 
expression of the contingency of creatures. 15 
For those who wish to retain the Aristotelian elements in Thomism, 
the issue at stake is whether or not essence can be understood as con-
tributing its own positive note of intelligibility to existing things. 
"The problem is to provide it with positivity without encroaching upon 
the positivity of being.,,16 The problem is simultaneously that of 
essential participation and that of Aristotelian methodology. As a 
problem of essential participation, it is a question of locating in the 
essential realm that "whole" intelligibility which "remains intact and 
undivided" even as it is participated. As a problem of Aristotelian 
methodology, it is the question which Aristotle himself confronted when 
he denied the Platonic Forms, namely, the question of substance or of 
the "really real," and of where it is to be found if one denies that 
it lies outside the material realm. In the final analysis, as this 
chapter will attempt to establish, these two problems are the same. 
Aristotelian Methodology: The Problem of Substance 
• To ask "Uhat is being?" is, Aristotle tells us, the same as to 
ask "What is substance [ousia]?,,17 The question of substance is the 
question of being. Furthermore, the question of substance is also the 
15 John, The Thomist Spectrum, p . 42. 
16H k' aw ~ns, Being and Becoming, p. 56. 
17Metaphysics, VII, 2, l028b3-4. 
question of form. "By ' form I mean the essence of each thing and its 
primary substance.,,18 This seems straightforward enough. Substance 
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means the form within a concrete thing. Unfortunately, this is the point 
at which Aristotle's thought on the matter ceases to communicate itself 
with perfect clarity. For while he does say that substance is the form, 
he also identifies substance as both the 'substratum' and the 'shape' 
f h " 19 oat l.ng. But what does 'substratum' mean? Does it mean 'matter' 
or does it at least incorporate the notion of matter into the notion of 
substance? If so, then in what sense is substance identical with 
material reality? If not, then what sort of relationship exists be-
tween substance as the form in things and the universal as the intelli-
gibility abstracted from things? 
These are not easy questions to answer. As Geach has pointed out, 
"there is hardly a statement about form in the Metaphysics that is not 
20 (at least verbally) contradicted by some other statement." As for 
the relationship between form and universal, Ross notes that "Aristotle 
is not very successful in solving the problem,,,2l while Lacey maintains 
that he "never makes unequivocally clear just what is the difference 
between form and universal. 22 
The fact that Aristotle speaks of substance in various ways is, in 
18 • Ibid., VII, 7, .1032b33. 
19Ibid ., V, 8, 1017b23-25. 
20G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach, Three Philosophers (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 75. 
2~. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, A Revised Text with Intro-
duction and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924), note 
at 1039a22. 
22A. R. Lacey, "OUC11.0 and Form in Aristotle," Phronesis 10 (1965): 
61. 
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itself, not a problem. · For it is generally recognized that he under-
stands substance to be a pros hen equivocal. As he says in the Meta-
physics, 
There are many senses in which a thing may be said to 'be', but 
all that 'is' is related to one central point, one definite kind 
of thing, and is not said to 'be' by a mere ambiguity. Everything 
which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that 
it preserves health, another in the'sense that it produces it, 
another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another be-
cause it is capable of it. 23 
The problem arises when one tries to locate the one definite and central 
notion of substance which controls all of the others. 
No general agreement exists among students of Aristotle as to where 
he located primary substance. Three possibilities recommend themselves. 
The first of these is the concrete singular thing. As Owens says, 
"There is not the least doubt that the singular sensible composite is 
truly Entity [ousia, substance] for the Stagirite.,,24 This seems, on 
the surface, the most plausible answer to the question. The obvious 
antithesis to the Platonic Form is the concrete thing. This answer, 
however, is not without its problems, for it would seem to place an 
abyss between the real and the intelligible. For we know the universal, 
not the singular. 
The second candidate for primary substance is the form within 
concrete things. Owen~ points out that the formal element in things 
is also, in Aristotle's view, correctly designated as substance. 
"Within the sensible composite it [substance] has form as its primary 
23 Metaphysics, IV, 2, l003a32-l003b5. 
24Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Meta-
physics (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1951), 
p. 336 (hereafter cited as Owens, Doctrine of Being). 
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instance. The matter and the composite itself are secondary instances.,,25 
The matter and the composite are, in other words, pros hen equivocals. 
One commentator on Aristotle, E. S. Haring, tries to include within 
the notion of substance both the form in the thing and the thing itself. 
Distinguishing between the form per se and the form expanded-in-a-
milieu, she notes that "matter's role is to afford form an exPansion.,,26 
In the final analysis, however, she falls back on form per se as primary 
substanceo 
Substantial form is ousia because, real though an individual be, 
that reality is mainly derivative from form. Form is the ousia 
of such derivative ousiae, and, in the doctrine presented in Z 
[Book VII of the Metaphysics], form is the chief meaning of the 
term 'ousia. '27 
According to this reading of Aristotle, "Essence, form, is independent 
of matter. ,,28 It is also independent of the universal, since form is 
29 
not the common nature, but the "ground of the common nature." As 
Owens puts it, "apparently, though itself neither singular nor univer-
sal, it is the cause of both individuality in the singular thing, and 
universality in the definition.,,30 
If the form itself is primary substance, however, this raises the 
difficulty of how it is to be distinguished from the universal. If no 
such distinction is possible, then substance would appear to be no more 
25 Ibid • 
26E. S. Haring, "Substantial Form in Aristotle's Metaphysics 
Review of Metaphysics 10 (1956-7):485 (hereafter cited as Haring, 
stantial Form"). 
27Ibid., p. 309. 
28 Ibid., p. 500. 
29Ibid., p. 482. 
30 Owens, Doctrine of Being, p. 382. 
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than Plato's Form revisited. If such a distinction is possible, it is 
not easy to determine the relationship between form and intelligibility. 
In response to an article on substance in Aristotle by W. Sellars, Al-
britton points to the confusion in Aristotle himself. 
. . . Professor Sellars seems to me to be mistaken in his confi-
dence that "if anything is clear about an Aristotelian form it is 
that its priI:lary mode of being is to be a this. • . as c'ontrasted 
with a universal." The evidence is rather that just this is the 
point of unclarity and conflict in the Hetaphysics, not fully 
resolved even in the special case of animate things. 3l 
Lacey points to what may well be the source of that confusion, when he 
writes, "I find it difficult to grasp how the form can be 'not as such 
universal' but yet have universality as the form of all As ... ,,32 It 
is not impossible that Aristotle himself had the same problem. 
Understating the situation, perhaps, when he speaks of the Aris-
totelian form as "located in a very unsatisfactory setting," Owens 
points out that 
It is not an Idea. It is in sensible things and nowhere else. 
But these things are of their very nature changeable. The 
unchangeable form has therefore to be prior to them, yet to be 
within them and to be identical with them per se. It cannot be 
a universal, and yet it has to be the basis of the specific 
identity of the singular things. It cannot be singular, yet it 
has to cause the individual unity in the sensible thing. 33 
One way out offers itself. 
Under all these limitations, can the sensible form be the absolute-
ly primary instancF of Entity? Or does it not by its very nature34 prompt the search for a higher type of Entity than the sensible?" 
3lRogers Albritton, "Forms of Particular Substances in Aristotle's 
Metaphysics," Journal of Philosophy 54 (1957):707 (hereafter cited as 
Albritton, "Forms"). 
32LaCey, "ou<1l.a and Form in Aristotle," p. 6l. 
33Owens , Doctrine of Being, pp. 376-377. 
34Ibid., p. 377. 
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This possibility, immaterial or separate substance, is the third 
contender for the designation of primary substance. Owens himself be-
lieves that this is, in fact, what Aristotle ultimately concluded. 
Separate entity is the prime analogate of Being, sensible things are 
all pros hen equivocals by reference to it. 
Being - the divine - eternal duration - life - act, all these in 
their highest expression are synonymous with separate Entity. 
Being is derived to all other Entity and all other Beings accord-
ing to the degree in which the actual permanence of the separate 
Entities is shared or imitated. All sensible things strive to 
attain as best they can that actual permanence. They are Bei3~ 
according to the degree in which they attain that perpetuity. 
According to Owens, this is the means by which Aristotle is ulti-
mately able to bring together substance and intelligibility. For pure 
act at this level is identified with pure thinking or knowing. 
. . form and knowledge, despite the priority of form from the 
viewpoint of human science, turn out in their highest instances 
to be absolutely identical. The Aristotelian form, when found 
separate from matter, is actual in the highest degree. It is a 
'knowing'--for to know is to have a form without matter; and what 
it knows is itself--for it has and is itself without matter. It 
is a 'knowing' of 'knowing.' There is nothing in any way what-
soever passive in it from either the viewpoint of Being or of 
Knowledge. It is all act. 36 
Anscombe also has noted how Aristotle is able to join substance and 
intelligibility in this notion of pure act as mind. 
Why, we may ask, does Aristotle suppose that this being, which 
absolutely 'cannot be otherwise' than it is, is a mind? This 
appears to be because of his identification of form without matter 
with thought. Th~ that which has no matter or potentiality at 
all is an eternal mind which always thinks. Thus there is a 
singular connexion between Aristotle's philosophy of logic, 
epistemology, and theology.37 
35 Ibid., pp. 463-464. 
36 Ibid., p. 458. 
37Anscombe, Three Philosophers, p. 59. 
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This notion of pure act as mind is what Hoodbridge also has in view when 
he says that, according to Aristotle, "what nature really is, is mind or 
intelligence in operation.,,38 
The Problem in Aristotle: Theological or Methodological? 
Christian theologians have always recognized Aristotle's notion of 
primary substance, whichever of the above it might be, as inadequate 
for their purposes. Unfortunately, they have ~isunderstood the funda-
mental character of that inadequacy. They have supposed that the primary 
problem lies in Aristotle's failure to provide for any notion of divine 
exemplarism. 
Though he often considers the immaterial immanent forms in things, 
it cannot be said that there is a doctrine of divine exemplarism 
in Aristotle's philosophy. The exemplary cause is met only where 
he treats of human products of art. This deficiency in Aristotle's 
philosophy has been called by St. Bonaventure, "the error of 
Aristotle" and was somewhat of a scandal to the Augustinians of 
the Middle Ages. 39 
It is not surprising that the Augustinian tradition should find 
the absence of divine exemplarism problematical. Their essentialist 
theologies absolutely require some means of accounting for a formal 
participation of creation in the divine essence. The reason why this 
lacuna in Aristotle should be the object of Thomist concern as well is 
perhaps less obvious, inasmuch as the esse/essence transformation of 
the Aristotelian act/PQtency schema gives Thomists a ~eans of relating 
creation to Ipsum Esse by means of esse instead of essence. 
In point of fact, the absence of divine exemplarism has made 
38Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, Aristotle's Vision of Nature, ed. 
John Herman Randall, Jr. (New York/London: Columbia University Press, 
1965), p. 61. 
39M. Armise, "Historical Sketch of the Theory of Participation," 
New Scholasticism 26 (1952):54-55. 
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itself felt for Thomists in epistemology much more than in ontology. 
This, above all, explains why Thomists have, by and large, been content 
to treat the question of essential participation as "predicamental" or 
logical rather than as ontological. The Divine Ideas have been called 
upon primarily to ground the intelligibilities in created things rather 
than to account for the participation of those things in Ipsum Esse. 
The burden of accounting for the latter has fallen, for the most part, 
on esse. 
What Thomist theologians (going back to Thomas himself) have failed 
to realize is that the fundamental inadequacy in Aristotle lies not in 
his failure to meet the demands of Christian theology, but in his failure 
to meet the demands of his own methodological project. The central 
problem is not his failure to provide a doctrine of divine exemplarism; 
quite the opposite, the central problem lies in his failure to provide 
a notion of substance which can account for the intelligibilities in 
sensible things without recourse to a Platonic-type immaterial or 
separate entity. It was precisely this failure which led Thomas to 
reintroduce the Platonic Forms in order to ground the intelligibilities 
in creation. It is precisely this failure which has yet to be overcome 
in contemporary Thomism. 
Thomism does not require an Aristotelianism which, in itself, meets 
• 
the theological exigencies of Christian revelation. The esse/essence 
transformation of Aristotle is sufficient in itself for introducing the 
required elements into Aristotle's system. What Thomism does require 
is an Aristotelian method which offers a genuine alternative to the 
Platonic notion of immaterial exemplarism. To introduce such an exem-
plarism into Aristotle, on the one hand, and then to transform Aristotle 
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by the real distinction itself, on the other, is to gild the lily, 
leaving Thomism to struggle for seven centuries with an existential 
participation that is epistemologically irrelevant and an essential 
participation that is ontologically irrelevant. In other words, Thomism 
has been forced back into the very situation in which Platonism found 
itself, unable to reoncile ontology and logic. For logically, the 
individual, according to Thomists, partic'ipates in a specific perfection, 
but ontologically that same person participates only in absolute per-
fection (Ipsum Esse). As a result, the world itself, like Plato's, has, 
existentially speaking, lost all essential integrity . Essential sub-
stance (specific perfection) has been shattered by existential (indi-
vidual) substances. 
The Problem in Aristotle: The Failure to Locate Material Substance 
If Aristotle located primary substance either 1) in the separate 
entities or b) in the formal element within things, it remains to be 
shown why this was, methodologically speaking, a failure to carry out 
his own project. In order to do this, we must examine Aristotle in 
light of the Platonic doctrine of immaterial Forms which Aristotle 
opposed. 
Plato's Forms served not only the epistemological purpose of 
accounting for how we ~an know immutable truth in a constantly changing 
world, but also the ontological purpose of providing a source for such 
truth. For Plato, therefore, the "really real," substance itself, 
could reside only in the Forms. As Keefe points out, 
One may, with Plato, refuse to find any permanent, fixed intelli-
gibility within the temporal and spatial order of historical 
change, growth and decay, and therefore transfer the object of 
the ontological quest or eros to that which transcends these 
limitations: the One or the Good, in whose intelligibility and 
value material things participate, but by a means which imports 
a diminution and a failure of true reality, and a consequent 
necessity to recover from that degradation of materiality by 
striving for reunion with the One where alone is true reality 
and intelligibility.40 
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Aristotle's rejection of the Forms was itself a refusal to go the 
route of Plato. As Aristotle saw it, such a decision denied the only 
reality in which we are truly interested. "And in general the argu-
ments for the Forms destroy the things for whose existence we are 
41 
more zealous than for the existence of the Ideas .. • " It was 
Plato's separation of substance and material reality which most dis-
turbed him. "Above all one might discuss the question what on earth 
the Forms contribute to sensible things. . ,,42 
At the same time, Aristotle was by no means willing to reject 
Plato's notion of substance entirely. Substance as the source of per-
manent, universal intelligibility played as important a role in Aris-
totle's thinking as it had in Plato's. As Hawkins points out, "Aris-
totle remains half a Platonist,,43 because he takes the universal for 
granted. The Aristotelian project, therefore, is a search for sub-
stantial intelligibility in material reality. "The Aristotelian atti-
tude is a reversal of the Platonic, but only in its insistence upon 
the substantiality of temporal and spatial being.,,44 The Aristotelian 
methodology, therefore, is based on a different notion of the relation-
ship between form and matter. Matter, instead of fragmenting the form, 
40Keefe, Thomism, p. 10. 
4~etaphysics, I, 9, 990b18-l9. 
42 Ibid., I, 9, 99la8. 
43Hawkins, Being and Becoming, p. 76. 
44 Keefe, Thomism, p. 10. 
~ 
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provides the condition of possibility for there being formal intelligi-
bilities. Form provides the condition of possibility that material 
reality be itself intelligible. Form and matter compose, they do not 
conflict. Their composition is, in fact, the condition of possibility 
for the reality of the sensible realm. 
Neither matter nor form have any reality in this understanding ex-
cept as in union with one another, and hence their union is not 
understood as a temporal coming together, but rather as the con-
dition of possibility of a fact in being. 45 
Given this act/potency composition of form and matter at the heart of 
Aristotelian methodology, it would seem that the Aristotelian primary 
substance must be composite and material. 
The situation takes on additional complexities, however, once 
Aristotle posits an Unmoved Mover as the ultimate cause of movement in 
the material realm. As Lacey notes, a contradiction appears to enter 
his thinking at this point with regard to the form/matter relationship. 
On the one hand he realises that a spirit such as the Unmoved 
Mover cannot be the form of a body, which raises the question 
what it is the form of, and on the other he wants his Unmoved 
Mover to be supremely actual, and so free from matter, and so 
pure form. 46 
The problem then arises as to how pure form, apart from its material 
counterpart, can be actual. As Lacey goes on to point out, "he should 
surely admit that if he gets rid of matter the notion of form, in the 
• sense in which it was correlated with that of matter, becomes inappli-
cable. ,,47 Owens grants that the pure form to which Aristotle gets is 
quite different from those forms found in sensible things and, in fact, 
45 Ibid., p. 13. 
46Lacey, "ouol.a and Form in Aristotle," p. 67. 
47 Ibid . 
views this as one of Aristotle's' genuine achievements contra Plato. 
the procedure of the Primary Philosophy gives to Being a 
nature that is utterly alien to the Platonic Dialectic. . . . 
What the Primary Philosophy studies is a nature different from 
the nature of any sensible thing. The Platonic conception pro-
vides no such nature among its Forms. The Platonic Forms are 
merely sensible natures plus the characteristic 'eternal.' The 
nature of separate Entity, which is the Being studied by the 
Primary Philosophy, is nowhere to be found in the Platonic 
world. 48 
If one is a Thomist and has the Christian conception of a God 
altogether 'other' than His creation in mind, such a notion of ~eing 
might well look like a happy achievement on Aristotle's part. The 
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only element then missing would be the Divine Ideas by which one could 
link such an entity to the sensible world. The fact that Aristotle 
fails to provide for any link between the intelligibility of primary 
substance and the intelligibilities of its pros ·hen equivocals could 
be regarded as a genuine failure. For it is precisely at this point 
that the Aristotelian project, if it indeed locates primary substance 
either in separate entities or in the forms of things considered apart 
from their composition with matter, does genuinely fail to answer 
Plato. For it fails to provide a source for the intelligibilities of 
the material realm. The separate entities may account for motion, and 
the forms within things may account for our ability to derive immutable 
truth from sensible things, but neither of these theories even attempts 
to account .for the source of materialized intelligibilities. 
One can say, as in fact many commentators on Aristotle have said, 
that the source of material intelligibilities simply did not arise as 
a problem for him. As Grene puts it, 
48awens , Doctrine of Being, pp. 471-472. 
Things as he saw them sorted themselves out in defiance of the 
philosophers. The Forms of the Platonists and the' invisible 
atoms of Democratius were for him unnecessary. The Forms were 
verbiage, a superfluous addendum to the order inherent in the 
perceptible world. 49 
Owens takes much the same position, seeing here the significance of 
Aristotle's notion of pros hen equivocity. 
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Unlike a Christian and unlike an Idealist, the Stagirite ' was 
under no obligation to posit a strict unity as the all-embracing 
foundation of things. He saw a plurality of forms and categories, 
and reduced them to a ~po~ £v unity. That unity was consequent, 
not prior. The derivation of plurality from unity does not 
appear as a problem in Aristotle . The problem is merelS to re-duce the plurality to a unity sufficient for a science. 0 
To say that Aristotle did not see this problem would appear, however, 
to be tantamount to saying that he did not properly understand the notion 
of primary substance. For the problem is precisely that of unifying 
in a single notion of substance both intelligibility and reality. To 
suppose that he understood the "really real" to be beyond intelligi-
bility and the material intelligibilities to be only pros hen equivocals 
of the "really real," would not only mean that he failed to provide, 
contra Plato, an alternate source for material intelligibilities, it 
would also seem to mean that he fell into the very error which he had 
attributed to Plato, namely, that of denying as "really real" the only 
reality which we are really . interested in, the material realm. It is 
very difficult, theref~e, to disagree with Lacey when he says that the 
search for the "really real" in Aristotle "does not lie in the direction 
51 
of pure form." 
49Majorie Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 79. 
50 Owens, Doctrine of Being, p. 468. 
5lLacey , "ouO'I.Q and Form in Aristotle," p. 69. 
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The possibility still remains, however, that Aristotle actually 
located primary substance in the concrete sensible singular. Since 
Thomism also, on grounds that it is following Aristotle in this matter, 
recognizes the concrete singular, at least in the material realm, as 
the primary analogate of substance, we must next consider why this th~rd 
candidate for primary substance also fails to meet the demands of Aris-
totelian methodology. 
The Problem of Material Substance in Aristotle and Thomas: The Fallacy 
of Misplaced Concreteness 
Both Aristotle and Thomas agree that a substance is "an essence 
or thing to whose nature it is proper that it should not exist in a 
subject." Substance is a subject; it therefore cannot exist in another 
subject. Both Aristotle and Thomas also agree that the starting-point 
of metaphysical inquiry is the sensible realm itself. If substance is 
a subject and sensible things are the starting-point, the obvious con-
clusion to be drawn is that concrete singulars are the primary sub-
stances, at least in the sensible order. This conclusion both Aris-
totle and Thomas drew. 
The world of our experience is a world of definite, concrete 
individual things which act and react upon one another. St. 
Thomas does not challenge the objective reality of this datum of 
spontaneous perception. Rather, with Aristotle, he accepts it 
and employs it as pne of the corner stones of his system. Through-
out his philosophy the fundamental assumption runs that whatever 
is actual or capable of actual existence is singular. Singularity, 
particularity and not universality must characterize being if it 
would exist other than as a mere representation of the mind. 52 
Both Aristotle and Thomas are, however, at least as much interested 
52Joseph M. Marling, The Order of Nature in the Philosophy of St. 
Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 
1934), pp. 12-13 (hereafter cited as Marling, Order of Nature). 
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in universal intelligibility and our knowledge of it as they are in 
concrete singulars, and so a problem immediately arises, the problem of 
relating concrete singulars (ontology) to universal knowledge (logic). 
As Ross points out with regard to Aristotle, and the same holds truth 
for Thomas, 
The primacy of individual substance is one of the most fixed 
points of Aristotle's thought--the point at which he most clearly 
diverges from Plato's doctrine. But whiie primary substance is 
for him the most real thing, secondary substance, and in particular 
the infima species, is the central point of his 10gic. 53 
As a result, the notion of species, and particularly the notion of an 
eternal duration of the species, assumes central importance to Aris-
totle. What Haring calls "the career of a form," its incarnate exis-
tence through time, is possible only because of the ongoingness, so 
to speak, of the species. Hence the disproportionate attention which 
Hart sees Aristotle giving to the species over the individua154 is a 
product of Aristotle's logical concerns. For, as Grene points out, 
"Only the fixity of each ontogenetic pattern through the eternity of 
species makes Aristotelian nature and Aristotelian knowledge possible.,,55 
This concern for epistemology leads both Aristotle and Thomas to 
forge a close identity between the individual and the universal, ex-
pressed in the 'two-substance' doctrine adopted by both. 
"First" substance ,is the singular substance which exists as such 
in the real order (George \vashington, the Charter oak). First 
substance is never a predicate; it is not in a subject but is 
the subject itself .... "Second" substance is the substance 
53 Ross, Aristotle, p. 24. 
54Charles A. Hart, Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act 
of Existing (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), p. 130 
(hereafter cited as Hart, Thomistic Metaphysics). 
55 Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle, p. 137. 
which is a predicate (man, oak); it does not exist as such in 
the real order. It is called "second" substance, because it 
presupposes the existence of first substances in the real order 
of which it can be predicated. 56 
This dual notion of substance leads Grene to assert "a glaring con-
tradiction at the head of the [Aristotelian] logic itself. ,,57 1fuat 
is perhaps not so apparent is that such a dual notion of substance 
introduces a contradiction into Aristotle's metaphysics as well. As 
Keefe points out with regard to Thomism, and it can be said equally 
of Aristotelianism, 
The unity of men in the human species is then a necessity of 
logic, of essence, which is contradicted in existence, for 
existing men are substantially separate entities. 58 
198 
Where Aristotle is concerned, this means that the essential unity 
of the specific form is fragmented in its individuation by matter. 
Where Thomas is concerned, it means that the essential unity of the 
specific form is fragmented by existence itself. Act and potency no 
longer can be understood as composing in the real order; instead, they 
oppose. The Aristotelian act/potency method Ras been exchanged for the 
Platonic. The Platonic elements in Thomas and in some of his most 
recent interpreters have, in fact, their roots back in Aristotle him-
self, who was never successfully able to locate that concrete primary 
substance which could offer a genuine alternative to Plato's Forms . 
• Primary Substance in Aristotelian Methodology 
The problem for Aristotelian methodology is to locate substance 
in the concrete realm in such a way as to avoid fragmenting the essential 
56Klubertanz, Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, p. 251. 
57Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle, p. 25. 
58 Keefe, Thomism, p. 87. 
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or intelligible integrity of that realm. As Haring notes, "Living 
individuals are the natural world, in a way, but only if they are seen 
non-atomistically, as parts of a genetic continuity.,,59 Owens also 
underscores the importance of such genetic continuity, when he points 
out that, for Aristotle, 
It is the species that is divine and eternal. The singular 
thing does not matter in itself. It is only on account of the 
species; its every act naturally strives to perpetuate its 
species. That is the goal of itself and of all its activity. 60 
It is divine, as best it may be, by being perpetual in its kind. 
As Aristotle says, perpetual coming-to-be is "the closest approximation 
61 to eternal being." Thus Haring speaks of the species as "supra-
individual binders." 
The series - matter, individual form - is a sequence in the 
direction of superior whatness; it is also a sequence in the 
direction of greater binding force. Matter is a diffusion 
determined within the individual; the living individual is a 
brief existent connected with others through form. 62 
To regard the concrete singular or individual as primary substance 
in the material realm is to overlook the essentially inconplete character 
of such individuals. 
. . • individual members of a species cannot be substantially 
complete; they are not indivisum in se et ab omni alio, for 
their actuality is achieved in common; considered as divisum ab 
omni alio, they are not actual, but potential. As members of 
a finite species or substance, they participate in existence 
by participating in the existential actuality of the species, 
and not otherwise., Otherwise stated, human or potential 
persons participate in existence secondarily, by means of 
59Haring, "Substantial Form," p. 331. 
6°Owens , Doctrine of Being, p. 461. 
6lOn Generation and Corruption, II, 10, 336b3S; cf. Ibid., II, 
11, 338bll-17, Generation of Animals, II, 1, 73lb3l-3S; On the Soul, 
II, 4, 4lSa26-b7. 
62Haring, "Substantial Form," p. 331. 
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the primary participation of the species. Only the latter parti-
cipation is properly substantial. 63 
Only an identification of substance with the species can account for 
the essentially incomplete character of the individual and provide for 
a substantial reality which is transcendent without being separate or 
immaterial. As Keefe points out, "this transcendence is accounted for 
by attributing continual and unending duration to the collective species, 
in which collective the individual members come into being, persist in 
being for some finite period of time, and then cease their participation 
in the species.,,64 
The primary reason for refusing to identify substance with the 
species centers upon the question of unity. Only pure form or the 
concrete singular would seem to provide the necessary unity required 
by primary substance. Substantial form, as the specifying difference 
in concrete things, would appear to exemplify the purest notion of 
unity, even though not actual apart from matter. The concrete singular 
would appear to exemplify the most actual or real kind of unity possible, 
even though composite. However, as Haring points out, the species does 
enjoy a type of unity by virtue not of the form per se, but by virtue 
of the form expanded-in-a-milieu. 
The complexity of genus-pIus-difference is the necessary con-
comitant of form's having a formal effect in a domain. The 
peculiar unity of the genus-difference complex does reflect 
the unity of pure form. 65 
In fact, as she points out, the unity in species is a unity precisely 
because "its generic and differential parts stand to one another as 
63Keefe, 
64 Ibid . , 
Thomism, p. 85. 
p. 10. 
65Haring "Substantial Form," p. 701. 
66 
matter does to form." 
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Aristotle's notion that form and matter compose rather than oppose 
provides his methodology with the means of locating within the material 
realm precisely that substantial unity which Plato's methodology, 
with its notion that form is opposed by matter, can never find. Aris-
totelian substance, therefore, if it is to offer some genuine alternative 
to the Platonic Forms, i.e., if it is to be found in the material realm 
rather than in the realm of pure form, must consist of some type of 
form/matter unity. 
To suppose, however, that such unity is found in its primary 
instance in the concrete singular is to fall back into a Platonic 
notion of matter as that which atomizes the formal unity of the species. 
This an Aristotelian methodology cannot permit. To isolate the in-
dividual from the species is to cut the individual off from being. As 
Keefe notes, with regard to the Aristotelian notion of being, 
What is insisted on is that the individual participates in being, 
that it has intelligibility, though participate and finite, and 
that the immanence of its form, or its intelligible component, 
in potentiality, or matter, does not eliminate intelligibility, 
but rather provides a composite, act-potency intelligibility 
corresponding to the composite structure of logical understand-
ing . This insistence is identical with Aristotelian ontology. 
It states the isomorphism of intelligibility and intellection--
intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu--and postulates 
the intelligibility of material reality.67 
Contemporary participationist Thomists tend to relgate all es-
sential participation to the logical or predicamental realm. Hart 
maintains that "The Thomist participation is the participation in the 
66Ibid., p. 700. 
67Keefe, Thomism, p. 19. 
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perfection of existence rather than in the eternal Ideas.,,68 Lindbeck 
agrees, suggesting that categorical participation "has a purely cog-
.. 1m l' 1 . . f . ,,69 n~t~ve, a ost og~ca, s~gn~ ~cance. John, in reviewing Fabro's 
work in this area, notes that the only value which predicamental 
participation has stems solely from the order of transcendental (exis-
tential) participation, because "it is the act of being, received into 
the essence, which is in the finite being the source not only of its 
factual existence but of its value and intelligibility.,,70 
There are indications, here and there, however, that predicamental 
participation needs to be taken more seriously. First, there is Aris-
totle's own vie~, shared by Thomas and Thomists, that metaphysics and 
logic enjoy an isomorphic relationship with one another. As Copleston 
points out with regard to Aristotle's doctrine of the categories: 
From the logical viewpoint the Categories comprise the ways in 
which we think about things--for instance, predicating qualities 
of substances--but at the same time they are ways in which things 
actually exist: things are substances and actually have acci-
dents. The categories demand, therefore, not only a logical 
but also a metaphysical treatment. Aristotle's Logic, then, 
must not be likened to the Transcendental Logic of Kant, since 
it is not concerned to isolate a priori forms of thought which 
are contributed by the mind alone in its active process of 
knowledge. Aristotle does not raise the "Critical Problem": 
he assumes a realist epistemology, and assumes that the cate-
gories of thought, which we express in languare, are also the 
objective categories of extramental reality.7 
Secondly, there are susgestions in Thomas himself, as we have already 
68Hart , Thomistic Metaphysics, p. 92. 
69Lindbeck, "Participation" (June 1957), p. 112. 
70Helen James John, "Participation Revisited," !-1odern SchoolI!lan 
39 (January 1962):155. 
71 Copleston, Greece & Rome (part II), p. 21. 
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72 hi' h' , , I' b' seen, t at ex st~ng t ~ngs part~c~pate not on y ~n esse, ut ~n some-
thing else as well. 
Finally, among contemporary Thomists who emphasize the importance 
of participation in Thomas, Louis de Raeymaeker, though denying full 
ontological valu~ to the realm of essential participation, has accorded 
it a significance conspicuously absent in most other Thomists'. De 
Raeymaeker points out that 
No one man is identified with the whole human species, for there 
are other men who possess human perfections which this man has 
not; and by this very fact every individual is limited in the 
species, but the ensemble of all possible men embraces all, un-
limited, unbounded human perfection. 73 
This makes it impossible for us to understand any man apart from his 
membership in the species. 
By reason of the particular way in which the material individual 
possesses its formal perfection, it is limited by reference to 
other individuals that resemble it specifically. This is why it 
is essential to it to be referred to them, that is, to form a 
part of the order or the specific unity which the complexus of 
these individuals constitutes. Hence, it is impossible to ex-
plain any of these material beings without giving the explanation 
of the whole species to which they belong. Thus, we cannot offer74 
an explanation of one individual man without explaining humanity. 
We have here in de Raeymaeker's notion of the individual as under-
standable only by reference to the specific complexus of individuals 
to which it belongs something similar to, if not identical with, 
Aristotle's notion of Bros hen equivocity. In de Raeymaeker's case, 
however, it is the "complexus" which constitutes the primary referent, 
the individual being understood only by reference to (pros hen) that 
complexus. 
72 See pp. 68-69. 
73 de Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being, p. 70. 
74 Ibid., p. 253. 
Charles Hart, in discussing those attempts periodically made by 
philosophers to deny the reality of substance, points out that such 
efforts invariably lead to a substantializing of all accidents. 
unconsciously assigns to the accident the 
Thus instead of the one substance giving 
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. . . the intellect 
role of substance. 
unity to the being, 
the being, and thus 
we end up with a multitude of substances in 
with the destruction of the being's unity.75 
. " 
Mutatis mutandis, the same sort of process has dogged the Aristotelian/ 
Thomist tradition throughout its history. Attempts to deny the sub-
stantial reality of the species have necessitated a substantializing 
of the individuals within the species, with a corresponding destruction 
of the essential or substantial integrity of the material realm . 
. Substantial Cause: Aristotle and Thomas 
"We say we know each thing only when we think we recognize its 
first cause," Aristotle tells us. 76 "Whatever is found in anything by 
participation, must be caused in it by that to which it belongs es-
sentially," St. Thomas adds. 77 The species, as primary substance in 
Aristotle, is transcendent by virtue of its unlimited actuality. 
This actuality, the total immanent activity of material being, 
pervades all of space and time and escapes all spatial and temp-
oral limitation: it is pure act, immanent in all of matter and 
limited by no matter. It has nothing to overcome, thus no 
potentiality. 78 
This pure act, causative of all participated being in Aristotle, must be 
identified with the agent intellect "or, in modern terminology, the 
75Hart , Thomistic Metaphysics, p. 189. 
76 " Metaphysics, I, 3, 983a25. 
77 ST I, 44, 1. 
78Keefe, Thomism, p. 17. 
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absolute subject.,,79 Because this cause is both transcendent and im-
plicated in material reality, it serves as the Aristotelian substitute 
for God. 
This total cause, because enclosed in the world, is not God, but 
the essentialist surrogate for God. This surrogate transcends 
the individual, but does not transcend the human species; it is 
the formal cause of the species, immanent in the species, and 
in the human community.SO . 
This surrogate for God is humanity itself, the primary substance by 
reference to which all ot~er material realities are pros hen equivocals. 
For intelligibile in actu is irttellectus in actu by reference to the 
agent intellect immanent in the human community. 
It is precisely this ability of Aristotelian methodology to locate 
an order of essential participation in material substance itself which 
allows for its conversion by Thomas into a methodology which can serve 
the Christian theologian. 
When the essentialist act-potency method of correlation is itself 
correlated, according to its own understanding of correlation, 
to the Christian revelation to form the Thomist method, Christ is 
understood as the existential actuality, the formal existentialSl 
cause, of a humanity otherwise confined to essential immanence. 
The surrogate God of Aristotle becomes Christ, the God-man, present 
within His creation as the formal cause of all its essential perfections. 
To speak of Christ as formal cause is, however, to tell only half 
of the story. For the esse/essence transformation which Thomas effects 
in Aristotelian methodology makes primary substance existential rather 
than essential, and introduces an existential order of participation 
which is distinct but inseparable from that of essential participation. 
79Ibid ., p. S3. 
SOIbid. 
SlIbid., p. 5. 
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As noted in chapter 3, it is the need within Thomist methodology to 
locate for these two orders of participation a subs~antial cause that 
is itself single and yet genuinely composite which requires us to 
identify Christ as both existential (divine) and formal (human) cause 
of creation. Christ's substantial causality, therefore, is both exis-
tential and essential in character . 
Creation in Christ, as was noted earlier,82 forces two transforma-
tions of the traditional Thomist notion of substance: first, that such 
a notion of substance be identified with humanity, not with the concrete 
singular, and secondly, that such a notion of substance allow for sub-
stantial as well as accidental grace. The question was raised as to 
whether or not the Aristotelian notion of substance could play any role 
in Thomism under these circumstances. A re-evaluation of the Aristo-
telian primary substance indicates that, far from being ruled out by 
the Thomist transformation, it is essential to it. For the Aristotelian 
primary substance, properly understood, is the human community and not 
the individual. 
Since, however, this notion of substance serves as a surrogate 
God in an essentialist universe, we might expect it to fare less well 
as a correlative principle of esse in a Christian universe. In order 
to understand why the ~homist primary substance must be understood as 
graced and how the Aristotelian primary substance is transformed by 
its correlation with esse, we shall next examine existential partici-
pation in Thomism. 
82 See pp. 135-136. 
CHAPTER 6 
EXISTENTIAL PARTICIPATION AND THOMAS: SUBSTANTIAL GRACE 
The genuinely existential character of Thomist metaphysics lies 
in the real distinction, whereby the Aristotelian substance (form/matter) 
is transformed into an essential principle (potency) requiring a further 
correlation with esse (act). By means of this new act/potency correla-
tion, the Aristotelian essential substance (form/matter) becomes the 
Thomist existential substance (esse/essence). As Hart points out, 
Thomist metaphysics is "a true metaphysics of being as existing in 
contrast to that of Aristotle, which is a metaphysics of being as sub-
stance with existence completely ignored."l 
Gilson insisted, as we have already seen,2 that Thomism's claim 
to be the one authentic existentialist metaphysics rests upon the fact 
that Thomas alone posited "existence in being, as a constituent element 
of being.,,3 Fabro maintains that this immanence of esse within con-
crete things is precisely that element in Thomism which makes it a 
genuinely participationist metaphysics • 
• Thus the authentic notion of Thomistic participation calls for 
distinguishing ~ as act not only from essence which is its 
potency, but also from existence which is the fact of bein~ 
and hence a "result" rather than a metaphysical principle. 
lCharles A. Hart, "Participation and the Thomistic Five Ways," 
New Scholasticism 26 (July 1952):273. 
2 See p. 155. 
3Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 154. 
4Fabro, "Intensive Hermeneutics," p. 470. 
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What, however, is the significance of esse as a metaphysical prin-
ciple? Is it the principle of all intelligibility in existing things, 
as Esseist Thomists maintain, such that esse is form? Or does it con-
tribute nothing to the intelligibility of things, so that as Geach 
maintains, "Aquinas's doctrine of ~ really adds nothing over and 
above his doctrine of form."S Translated into methodological terms, 
the central question is one of causality. Is esse an extrinsic or an 
intrinsic cause? This is a critical question with regard to how one 
views Thomist substances, for the notion one has of that substance 
will control the notion one has of the causality exercised by esse 
vis a vis that substance. Although both Esseist and Gilsonian Thomists 
have recognized the existential character of Thomist substances, neither 
group has recognized the methodological implications which such a view 
of substance requires in the realm of causality.6 
The difficulties associated with understanding esse and its relation-
ship to essence in existing things arise from the fact that the Aristo-
telian act/potency methodology is not equipped, on its own merits, to 
handle the notion of esse, because that methodology has no way to deal 
with a non-formal act. In Aristotle, form and act are inextricably 
linked, not only to one another, but to intelligibility as well. An 
act is always the act of a form, and as such its causality makes itself 
• 
felt in intelligible effects. The intelligibility of a substance, 
S Geach, Three Philosophers, p. 92. 
6we see here further evidence of the fact that Thomism must be 
treated as a ~ethodology rather than as a metaphysics. It is pri-
marily because Thomists fail to pursue the methodological questions 
that they fail to come to grips with the central problems of Thomism. 
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therefore, is directly and entirely traceable to the formal element 
within that substance. As Farrer points out with regard to the Aris-
totelian substance, "Whatever in the history of a substance belongs 
to it as a substance of such a character, is referable to the influence 
7 
of its form." 
When we move from the Aristotelian substance (form/matter) to the 
Thomist substance (esse/essence), however, the situation changes radi-
cally. We now have a non-formal act (esse) which lies outside of the 
formal act (essence) of a thing, but within the thing itself (substance). 
The necessary relationship which Aristotle understood to obtain between 
form and act has been severed. But what about the relationship between 
act and intelligibility? Has that been severed as well? In short, does 
the intelligibility of a thing in the Thomist universe continue to be 
identified with its formal component (as Aristotle supposed) or does 
that thing now derive its intelligibility from its existential com-
ponent? Esseist and Gilsonian Thomists give diametrically opposed 
answers to this question. 
Thomists such as Carlo and Clarke, by reducing essence to esse, 
identify form with esse. In so doing, they re-establish the Aristo-
telian link between act and form, as well as the relationship of both 
act and form to intelligibility, but they do so at the price of the 
• 
real distinction between esse and essence. Essence itself becomes 
severed from form and intelligibility, and, as such, no longer has any 
positive function to play within Thomism. As a result, the Aristote-
lian act/potency methodology no longer has any role in Thomism either. 
7Austin Farrer, Finite and Infinite, 2nd ed. (Westminster: Dacre 
Press, 1959), p. 248. 
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Gilsonian Thomists (and all other Thomists as well who understand 
the Aristotelian notion of act/potency and the esse/essence distinction 
to be central in Thomas' thought) continue to identify the intelligi-
bility in things with essence. Since all formal causality is thus 
identified with essence, they are left with the problem of accounting 
for the type of causality which esse can be understood to exercise in 
this situation. 
Their task is not an easy one. Since esse is intrinsic to exist-
ing things, it would seem that the causality exercised by esse must 
be of a type compatible with intrinsic causality in general. In an 
Aristotelian methodology, however, all intrinsic causes are either form-
al or material. The notion of a non-formal act having never entered 
his mind, Aristotle made no provision for it. Since esse is clearly 
not a material cause, on the one hand, and is just as clearly not the 
formal principle within a thing, on the other, some third type of 
causality must be assigned to it. Thus, Gilsonian Thomists conclude 
that esse operates as an efficient cause. Here again we see the sharp 
distinction which Gilson draws between the orders of efficient and 
formal causality, a distinction which he understands to be demanded 
by the esse/essence distinction in things. 
A problem immediately presents itself, however . Efficient causes 
• 
are extrinsic causes. As Hart points out, "The efficient cause of a 
being is never part of its intrinsic constitution but is extrinsic to 
it.,,8 This being the case, how can esse as intrinsic to substance 
nevertheless serve as an extrinsic, efficient cause of substance? 
8Hart , Thomistic Metaphysics, p. 95. 
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The answer is not long in coming. Although esse cannot be re-
garded as extrinsic to an existing thing, it can be regarded as ex-
trinsic to the essential principle with which it is correlated. As 
Hart puts it, "existence is given to that nature or essence, that is, 
it is caused in it. Therefore it must be . an extrinsically added per-
fection.,,9 What we have here in Hart is a notion of efficient causali-
ty which corresponds to the light/air analogy employed by Gilson (and 
by Thomas). Esse is like the light which comes to the air as an ex-
trinsic principle exercising efficient causality. As such, esse (like 
the light) cannot be regarded as rooted in that to which it comes as 
an external perfection. The only difference between Hart's position 
and that of Gilson is that Hart understands this extrinsic character 
of esse to be the fundamental principle underlying the doctrine of 
participation in Thomas. 
It is generally stated: A being that does not have its full 
intelligibility in itself (since existence, which is the 
supreme source of intelligibility is not intrinsic and proper 
to it) must have its intelligibility (and therefore .its source 
of existence) outside itself. Such a being is called a "parti-
cipated being," that is, a being possessing a degree of exis-
tence. Therefore, as we have seen, we may state the principle: 
Participated beings must be efficiently caused. lO 
Unfortunately, however, this notion of esse as extrinsic principle 
forces Hart, . as it forced Gilson, to an essentialist notion of sub-
stance. For ·the state:nent that existence is not intrinsic and proper 
to "a being" (Le., a substance or a concrete thing) can only mean that 
we have returned to that "substantial" point of view of which Gilson 
9Ibid., p. 202. 
10Ibid., p. 263. 
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speaks, from which existing things can be treated as Aristotelian sub-
stances (form/matter) to which esse is added. This is tantamount t.o 
treating the essential component in an existing thing as though it 
were the thing itself, a process already noted with regard to the 
light/air analogy, in which air (a substance in its own right) is 
understood to be modified by the light which comes to it ab extrinseco. 
Instead of understanding existing things as constituted by two correla-
tive principles, this type of Thomism is forced to treat those things 
as Aristotelian substances accidentally (extrinsically) modified by esse. 
At the same time, however, this 'thick essence' interpretation of 
Thomism (i.e., that interpretation in which all intelligibilities are 
attributed to essence) cannot altogether ignore the intrinsic character 
of esse with regard to existing things . Therefore, some role must be 
found for it beyond the simple actualizing of essence . For that reason, 
most 'thick essence' Thomists speak of esse as performing two functions 
from within the existing thing. First, it is the energy source (first 
act) which grounds all of a thing's operations (second act). We have 
already seen how Gilson speaks of the "dynamism of esse" in this 
11 
regard. 
Secondly, esse as intrinsic to things is said to establish those 
things as autonomous or independent vis a vis God. Even those parti-
• 
cipationist Thomists who regard esse as that principle whereby all 
created things participate in Ipsum Esse also attribute to created 
things an autonomy by virtue of the fact that, by means of esse, they 
are beings in their own right. 
11 See p. 148. 
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To the extent that a created substance is composed of essence 
and esse, it is as far removed from God, the esse subsistens, 
as it can possibly be, and in this respect the terms "creature" 
and "God" admit of no measure or comparison. But since the 
essence of a creature has also its own participated act of being 
(actus essendi), its actualization is not merely a relation of 
extrinsic dependence; rather, it is based on the act of ~ in 
which it participates and which it preserves within itself and 
is the proper terminus of divine causality.12 
For Fabro, therefore, participated existence and autonomous existence 
(that being which existing things preserve within themselves) are simply 
two sides of the same coin. 
This ability of esse to overcome, as Gilson puts it, the radical 
contingency of finite beings13 lies at the heart of the distinction 
which Thomist metaphysics has repeatedly drawn between the metaphysical 
and the supernatural realms. It is the reason why Western theology 
and philosophy has, as Mersch has pointed out, understood God to communi-
cate being to His creatures in two different ways, first in a manner 
tailored to their natures (natural existence or esse) and secondly 
in a manner which communicates His own way of existing to them (super-
natural existence or grace). This allows Mersch to speak of two crea-
tions of the world. "In creating it the first time, He gave existence 
to things; but the second time, He places His own existence in it.,,14 
What Mersch has in mind here is a distinction between two orders, 
one an ad extra order, . the other an ad intra order. As Mersch describes 
them, these two orders correspond to the exitus/reditus structure so 
often attributed to the Summa Theologiae. They also correspond to the 
l2Fabro, "Intensive Hermeneutics," p. 482. 
l3Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, pp. 178-179. 
l4Emile Mersch, The Theology of the Mystical Body, trans. Cyril 
Vollert (St. Louis/Lond: B. Herder Book Co., 1951), p. 418. 
traditional distinctions made between nature and grace and between 
creation and re-creation. 
In itself, creation is the production of the order ad extra. 
By creation God produces the creature in its own subsistence, 
outside of Himself, and gives existence to a being that is not 
Himself. The Incarnation, on the contrary, is the taking up of 
a creature into the Word ad intra, so that it may subsist not 
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in itself but in Him, and that through His subsistence it may be 
the human nature of God. As regards the distinction between ad 
intra and ad extra, the direction of the two works is diametrically 
opposed. The first has an external terminus, the second has an 
internal terminus; the first causes the order ad extra, the 
second causes, not the order ad intra, which would be an absurd 
conception, but the order of that which is "interiorized," if we 
may use the expression; that is, the order of what, left to 
itself, would undoubtedly be ad extra but which God causes to 
subsist in His Word ad intra, and which in this sense is ad 
intra. IS 
---
Esse and grace, therefore, are the principles of two different types of 
interiority. "When God has communicated Himself to a thing by the be-
ing that is interior to the thing, He can still communicate Himself by 
the being that is interior to Himself. ,,16 Esse is the principle of an 
autonomous interiority whereby, as Fabro puts it, things preserve with-
in themselves their own acts of being. Grace, on the other hand, is 
the principle of that type of interiority which is made available to 
us by virtue of the Incarnation and which makes it possible for us to 
enter into that being which constitutes God's own interior life. 
This notion of two orders of being in created things, one exis-
• tential and the other graced, recommends itself highly to Thomist 
philosophers intent on defining a domain for themselves which lies 
beyond the natural (which is meta-physical, in other words) without 
lying simultaneously 'above' the natural (the super-natural). This 
lSIbid., pp. 372-373. 
l6 Ibid ., p. 460. 
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is a difficult task, even at the linguistic level, since 'metaphysics' 
would seem to be nothing more than a Greek way of referring to what the 
Latin calls the 'supernatural'. Metaphysically, such a domain seemed 
plausible by virtue of esse, a principle which Thomas and all of his 
followers have understood to lie somewhere between the natural (essence) 
and the supernatural (grace). 
Methodologically speaking, however, such a notion of esse would 
appear to be impossible to support, first, because it places the real 
distinction itself in jeopardy, and secondly, because it cannot be made 
coherent within an Aristotelian act/potency methodology. In order to 
see more clearly the methodological problems which arise, we shall 
consider first, the relationship of esse to creation, and secondly, 
the relationship of esse to intelligibility. 
Esse and Creation 
The problem which arises when one treats esse as efficient cause, 
existential cause, actualizer, energizer and autonomizer of existing 
things is that one has still not provided esse with any function which 
would require its presence as a constitutive principle of existing 
things. If what one is seeking is nothing more than a way to account 
for how God could create the universe, the positing of God as efficient 
cause would appear to ~e all that one requires. Descoqs recognized 
this more than fifty years ago, calling the esse/essence distinction 
"une vraie superfetation,,17 precisely because it is not needed to 
account for creation. 
l7p . Descoqs, '~etaphysique--#5: Ie thomisme d'apr~s Ie R. P. 
d'Ales et a propos de l'union hypostatique," Archives de philo sophie 
6 (1929--cahier #4):143. 
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This fact has not gone unnoticed even by such Thomists as Owens 
and Gilson. Owens points out that '~any Christian thinkers, who readily 
admit that all things in the created world receive their being from God, 
and regard it as contingent to their natures, do not hesitate to deny 
any real distinction between those things and their being,,,18 while 
Gilson expressly denies the need for such a distinction to account for 
creation: 
in a created universe, existence must come to essences 
from the outside and, therefore, be superadded to them. Any 
metaphysics or theology that recognizes the notion of creation 
necessarily agrees on this point. All Christian theologies in 
particular expressly teach that no finite being is the cause of 
its own existence, but this does not imply that existence is 
created in the finite substance as a distinct "act of being" 
(esse) added by God to its essence and composing the substance 
with it. 19 
Thus, when a Thomist such as Maritain calls the real distinction "a 
thesis of extreme boldness" because it posits over and beyond esse 
"an act of another order which adds ab~olutely nothing to essence as 
essence, intelligible structure, or quiddity, yet adds everything to 
it in as much as it posits it extra causas or extra nihil,,,20 the 
boldness to which he refers would appear to lie in the positing of a 
superfluous act which adds nothing beyond what God as efficient cause 
can accomplish without it. 
Esse and Intelligibility , 
To treat esse as an act which, because non-formal, has no intelli-
gible impact upon the existing things within which it .is a constitutive 
1 8 Owens , An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, p. 77. 
19G'l 1. son, Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 128. 
20Jacques Maritain, Existence and the Existent, trans. Lewis 
Galantiere and Gerald B. Phelan (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 
Inc., an Image Book, 1956), p. 45. 
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principle presents two immediate problems within the Aristotelian act/ 
potency methodology which Thomas adopted. The first of these arises 
from ' the fact that pure act in God is identical with infinite intelli-
gibility. While it is true that Thomas says, "even though the rest of 
things were to receive a form that is absolutely the same as it is in 
God, yet they do not receive it according to the same mode of being;"Zl 
it is by no means equally clear that the reception of esse in a differ-
ent mode than that enjoyed by God requires us to suppose that such a 
mode deprives it of all causal ability to make an intelligible impact 
upon those things of which it is a constitutive principle. Further-
more, the notion that esse does no more than actualize or existentialize 
things tends to reduce God to Pure Being or Pure Existence devoid of 
intelligibility. As Geach points out, 
... Aquinas holds that God's nature and God's esse are identical. 
On the view that the distinction between nature and esse is to 
be explained in terms of the difference in meaning between the 
questions 'quid est?' and 'an est?' this would commit him to 
saying that in God's case the two questions have the very same 
answer--that to know or state that God exists is the same thing 
as knowing or stating what God is. Z2 
In addition, the notion common among participationist Thomists that 
we can participate in Ipsum Intelligere by virtue of esse without that 
participated existence exercising any intelligible impact upon us only 
reinforces the tendenc1 to think of that Being in which we participate 
as itself severed from intelligere. 
The second problem with such a notion of esse arises from the fact, 
ZlCG I, 3Z. 
Z2Geach, Three Philosophers, p. 89. Geach himself tries to re-
solve the dilemma by attributing 'intensive magnitude' to esse. This 
does not solve the problem, however, since intensive magnitude can be 
handled under the rubric of accidental change. 
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previously alluded to, that in Aristotle act and intelligibility go 
hand. in hand. Furthermore, any act intrinsic to things is understood 
by him to exercise formal causality. Although the esse/essence dis-
tinction forces upon Aristotelian methodology the notion of an act which 
is no longer linked to form, there is no reason at all to suppose that 
this severance of act from form also forces a severance of act from 
intelligibility. In fact, quite the opposite. Not only the Aristotelian 
notion of act as that which exercis~p an intelligible impact upon things, 
but the Thomist notion of Ipsum Esse as Ipsum Intelligere, would seem to 
require us to identify· act and intelligibility. Maritain is quite right 
when he says, 
In the verb exists we have the act of existing, or a super-
intelligible. To say that which exists is to join an intelligible 
to a super-intelligible; it is to have before our eyes an intelli-
gible engaged in and perfected by a super-intelligibility.23 
Here in Maritain we have something which comes surprisingly close 
to Thomas' own notion of participation as the possession of a nature 
higher than one's own or as a share in an act higher than one's own. 
Maritain himself, as we have seen, refuses to suppose that esse has 
any intelligible impact upon essence, but he has come closer than a 
good many 'thick essence' Thomists to recognizing the pure intelligi-
bility which is indissociable from esse, even in the mode in which we 
find it in created things. 
Esseist Thomists are correct in refusing to deny to esse an in-
telligible impact on existing things. Thomism's transformation of 
Aristotle's act/potency methodology by means of the esse/essence 
distinction does signal a corresponding break with the notion that all 
23Maritain, Existence and the Existent, p. 44. 
intelligibility is "formal" intelligibility. As Grene notes in her 
study on Aristotle, 
In Aristotelian terms, in terms of a non-created universe, to 
say that a man 'is' offers no information of scientific import 
beyond the statement what it is to be a man. If there is 
creation, to say that a man exists informs us of something over 
and above his 'what'.24 
But they are wrong in supposing that no intelligible content can any 
longer be assigned to the essential principle in things. For such a 
supposition destroys both the real distinction and the act/potency 
methodology which Thomas employed. 
219 
'Thick essence' Thomists, on the other hand, are right to insist 
upon essence as a positive principle in existing things, but wrong to 
dissociate esse from all notion of formal causality. Helen James John 
is correct when she speaks of "the 'immanence' of the transcendental 
perfections in the finite creatures whose structure is constituted by 
25 the union of essence and participated ~." Essence, however, can-
not on its own bear the burden of explanation for transcendental per-
fections immanent in creatures whose ultimate participation in being 
is a created participation in uncreated esse. 
Hawkins has pointed out that the esse/essence composition does 
not function like other act/potency compositions in Thomism, inasmuch 
as here all determinations fallon the side of potency (essence) 
rather than act (esse). He therefore counsels Thomists to treat the 
esse/essence distinction first "for its own sake and in its own terms 
and only later, when the ordinary meanings of potency and act can be 
appropriately introduced, to consider how far and in what way these 
24Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle, p. 248 . 
2SJohn , "Participation Revisited," p. 164. 
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notions can be applied to it.,,26 It would seem more a4visable, how-
ever, to reexamine the relationship between esse and essence in light 
of the ordinary meanings of act and potency in Aristotle. For, in so 
doing, Thomists would have to reconsider the connection which Aris-
totle makes between act and intelligibility in light of the connection 
which Thomism makes between esse and Ipsum Intelligere. 
Reference was made in chapter 427 to the distinction which Thomas 
drew between abst~action with and without precision to being. Although 
this distinction allows Thomists such as Gilson and Owens to identify 
Aristotelian substance (form/matter) with Thomist substance (esse/ 
essence), the distinction itself may signal a realization on Thomas' 
part .that an abstractive process which prescinds from being, however 
appropriate it might be in an Aristotelian world of essential substances, 
cannot ultimately be made to apply in a Thomist world of existential 
substances. He may well have realized that there is an intelligibility 
associated with esse which makes it impossible for us to prescind fram 
it. 
Certainly he recognized, as we have already noted,28 that whatever 
is associated with esse must lie outside of (praeter) the essential 
principle of a thing. Therefore, whatever is associated with esse can 
never be reduced to essence. Further, there are several indications 
• 
that he understood esse to lie above (supra) the essential principle 
of a thing. He speaks of esse as a good and a perfection,29 as the 
26Hawkins, Being and Becoming, p. 105. 
27 See pp. 163-164. 
28 See p. 160. 
29 ST I, 20, 2. 
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perfection of all perfecti~ns,30 as indeed the most perfect of all 
. 31 th~ngs. Everything noble in a thing belongs to it in proportion to 
. 32 ~ts esse. There are also indications that he understood esse to 
function formally within things. He speaks of esse as the most formal 
of all things33 and as that which is "most interior to anything, and 
which inheres more profoundly than anything else, since it is formal 
in relation to all those [principles] which are in the thing.,,34 
Finally, Thomas speaks at least twice of esse as that principle 
whereby creatures participate in the nature of being {naturam essendi).35 
Elsewhere he notes that every being composed of act and potency part i-
cipates in a higher act than its own, adding that things especially 
become actual by participating in pure act or subsistent esse by 
similarity. 36 Hence, it is impossible to dissociate esse first, from 
perfection, and secondly, from participation in an act which lies not 
only outside of (praeter) essence but also above (supra) essence. In 
fact, it is impossible to dissociate esse from that principle whereby 
we share per participationem in the divine nature which is God's per 
essentiam. 
Since grace is understood to be that principle whereby we are 
raised, in the words of St. Cyril of Alexandria, supra naturam, it 
30 • De Pot., 7, 2 ad 9. 
31 ST I, 4, 1 ad 3. 
32CG I, 28. 
33 ST I, 7, 1. 
34 ST I, 8, l. 
35 ST I, 3, 4; 45, 5 ad 1. 
36 Quodl. XII, 5, 5. 
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becomes increasingly difficult to know how esse can be dissociated, as 
it is in Thomism, from grace. Especially when one considers first, the 
close relationship~ if not identity, which exists between essence and 
nature, and secondly, the fact that, for Thomas and Thomists in general, 
esse perfects essence and grace perfects nature. Clearly Thomism is 
working with a notion of nature which permits it to understand esse 
as a 'natural' principle in things. We must therefore examine just 
what notion of 'nature' is operative here and whether or not such a 
notion is, methodologically speaking, applicable to esse. 
Esse and Nature 
Since Thomism builds on the Aristotelian notion of nature, we must 
consider first what Aristotle understood nature to be. He examines 
the question of nature most thoroughly in Book IV of the Metaphysics 
and Book II of the Physics. In the Metaphysics, he summarizes the 
various uses which philosophy has made of this term, concluding, as 
Marling points out, that 'nature' is used in six different ways: 1) 
the genesis of growing things, 2) that part of a thing from which its 
growth proceeds, 3) the inner principle of movement in a thing, 4) the 
primary matter of which a thing consists, 5) the essence of a thing as 
that term of its process of becoming (this would include both matter 
• 
and form), and 6) the essence of a thing, whether resulting from 
natural or artificial production. 37 In the Physics, he distinguishes 
between nature and art, and considers nature in its two primary mean-
ings, as 1) "a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in 
that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in 
37Marling, The Order of Nature, p. 1. 
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virtue of a concomitant attribute,,,38 and 2) the shape " or form of those 
thing which have such a source of motion. 39 These meanings are, of 
course, very broad and encompass, in the final analysis, everything in 
the material realm (apart from artistic productions). Since Aristotle 
recognized no existential principle in things which is not identical 
with their essences, existence (esse) in such a world can only be 
'natural' . 
Texts on nature abound in Thomas' writings and reveal his debt to 
Aristotle in the use he makes of the word. In one text from the Summa 
Theologiae, for example, Thomas defines nature variously as 1) birth, 
2) principle of begetting, 3) principle of generation, 4) any intrinsic 
principle of motion (both formal and material), , 5) form, 6) matter, 
7) the essence of the species and 8) the quiddity or 'whatness' of a 
thing. 40 Since Thomas assumes esse to be natural, we must presume that 
he understands it to fall under one of the above meanings, but there 
is nothing in the text itself to indicate which one he is associating 
it with. 
In a later article of the same question, however, he gives two in-
dications of how esse might be regarded as falling within the category 
of the 'natural'. There, in answer to the question of whether or not 
the grace of Christ can be understood as 'natural' to Christ, he 
• 
answers, 
According to the Philosopher (Metaph., V, 5), nature designates, 
in one way, nativity; in another, the essence of a thing. Hence 
natural may be taken in two ways:--first, for what is only from 
38physics, II, 1, 192b22-23. 
39Ibid ., 193b4-5. 
40 ST III, 2, 12. 
224 
the essential principles of a thing, as it is natural to fire to 
mount; secondly, we call natural to man what he has had from 
birth, according to Eph. 2.3: We were by nature children of 
wrath; and Wisd. xii. 10: They were a wicked generation, and 
their malice natural. Therefore, the grace of Christ, whether 
of union or habitual, cannot be called natural as if caused by 
the principles of the human nature of Christ, although it may 
be called natural, as if coming to the human nature of Christ 
by the causality of His Divine Nature. But these two kinds of 
grace are said to be natural to Christ, inasmuch as he had them 
from His nativity, since from the beginning of His conception 
the human nature was united to the Divine Person, and His soul 
was filled with the gift of grace. 4l 
Since anything is natural to a man which he has had from birth, and 
since esse is something which a man does have from birth, it is easy to 
see how esse can be regarded as a natural principle in things. 
The second indication comes in the answer he gives to the third 
objection raised at the beginning of the same article, namely, that 
the grace of Christ cannot in any way be regarded as natural, for if 
it were, then it would belong to all men. To this Thomas responds, 
"The grace of union is not natural to Christ according to His human 
nature, as if it were caused by the principles of the human nature, 
and hence it need not belong to all men. ,,42 Here an identification is 
made between that which is natural and that which is common. As Keefe 
notes, "Thomas appears to regard that which is universal in all men as 
43 
'natural'." It would seem, therefore, that Thomas' assumption that 
esse is natura144 arises from the fact that it is common to all things 
• 
and present from birth. 
41 ST III, 2, 12. 
42 ST III, 2, 12 ad 2. 
43Keefe, Thomism, p. 69. 
44The fact that this is an assumption must be stressed. Nowhere in 
his writings does Thomas explicitly analyze the relationship between 
esse and nature. 
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Out of this assumption arises the notion that the created order is 
a natural order, complete in itself, to which the supernatural must 
come as a second and different type of order. As Mersch puts it, "God 
is pure Being; to possess Him truly a man must exist otherwise than 
by his natural existence; he must receive and possess a new way of 
existing. ,,45 The natural order of existence comes into being by virtue 
of God's activity as Creator, first cause and exemplar of all things. 
The graced order of existence comes into being by virtue of "the mystery 
by which God Himself has enetered into the world and into humanity. ,,46 
The distinction between natural and supernatural corresponds to a dis-
tinction between the God of philosophy and the God of revelation. As 
Mersch sees it, we can only determine the supernatural by distinguish-
ing two aspects in God. 
The first of these aspects is God such as He is known in 
philosophy; God as the cause and exemplar of everything; God as 
imitated and expressed in His works; hence God as conceivable to 
some slight degree in function of His works, plus the simultaneous 
denial of any relation on His side with these works, since He is 
the Absolute. Envisaged in this way, God is "known as though 
unknown," He is God such as He appears in the mirror of creation, 
in something that is not He, God in His external effects. As 
such, God is the foundation of the natural order. 
The second aspect is God as He is in Himself, within the God-
head: the inner life of God, not merely the external effects; 47 
Deus prout est in se, not merely Deus prout relucet in creaturis. 
Since the natural order encompasses both the existential and the 
essential principles in things, it follows that material substances, 
however one defines them, are natural as well. As a result, grace can 
enter such an order only by way of the accidental. As Thomas says, 
45 Mersch, Theology of the Mystical Body, p. 621. 
46Ibid ., p. 457. 
47 Ibid., p. 459. 
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"Whatever comes to a subject after the latter is constitutecl in exis-
tence, can come only as an accident, unless it should be drawn into 
communion with the already constituted existence" (he has in mind here 
the human nature of Christ which is drawn into the already-constituted 
48 
existence of the Word). 
It also follows that grace comes as an essential (formal) rather 
than an existential principle. As one writer puts it, 
Any created reality is a participation in being, the ultimate 
perfection of which is realized in the absolute being; but 
grace is more than this for it is a formal sharing in the nature 
of God, the Absolute. God becomes the "form" or determining 
principle of the being and operation of the nature that is 
"graced. "49 
Grace is therefore "a formal participation in the divine nature,,50 
which, because formal, exercises formal causality in elevating the 
person to higher levels of existence and activity. 
These notions of esse as natural and of grace as an accidental, 
formal elevation of natural existence have been accepted by Thomism 
for seven centuries. Yet the methodological problems which they create 
are severe, if not insurmountable. Among these problems, three require 
our attention with regard to esse. The first of these has to do with 
the distinction made between God's creative (natural) activity and His 
Incarnational (graced) activity. The supposition that there is an 
aspect of God that can ' be known naturally or philosophically "in the 
mirror of creation" is itself based on an a priori assumption that 
God's creative activity is noetically available to us apart from His 
48 ST III, 2, 6 ad 2. 
49p . Gregory Stevens, The Life of Grace (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 73. 
50Ibid . 
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explicit revelation of Himself as Creator. 
This would seem to violate the distinction which Thomas himself 
tells us exists between those things which are 'naturally' knowable 
and those things which require revelation. With respect to the latter, 
he insists that "such things as spring from God's will, and beyond the 
creature's due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in 
the Sacred Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. ,,51 
, 
Since the decision to create springs from the Divine Will, and, since 
prior to the actual creation of anything, there are no entities or 
creatures to whom anything can be "due", the fact that the world is 
created would seem to require a revelation. 52 
Methodologically, it is the problem of determining how an analytical 
methodology employing the notions of act and potency to account for the 
conditions of possibility of the reality which confronts us is able to 
discern, solely on the basis of that reality, the will of God. It is 
also the problem of determining how that same methodology is able to 
give an account of the world as a "mirror" of God, in light of the fact 
that 1) creation is ex nihilo (that is, not available to rational in-
quiry apart from God's revelation) and 2) we know ourselves to image 
God only because He has revealed this to us. To suppose that we can 
know either of these tqings apart from His revelation is to suppose 
that creation is necessary and that it must image God. It is, in 
other words, to suppose that the Divine Will can be known because God 
has no other choices to exercise than those which the revelation tells 
51 ST III, 1, 3. 
52The fact that the best pagan minds were unable to arrive at the 
notion of a Creator God would lend support to this. 
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us He has in fact exercised. All of this exemplifies that rationaliza-
tion of creation and of esse to which reference has already several 
times been made. 
Where esse itself is concerned, however, the difficulties in view-
ing creation as naturally or philosophically available to us do not end 
there. For if, as Thomists such as Gilson and Owens tell us, there is 
no need to posit a real distinction between esse and essence in order 
to account for God's creative activity, then we are confronted, in the 
creative act itself, with a divine gratuitousness which the mere posit-
ing of creatures ad extra would not require. Under these circumstances, 
the significance of esse cannot be that of simply actualizing or reali-
fying things. God as efficient cause can do that without the help of 
esse.
53 The significance of esse must lie in the fact that it is 
constitutive of us precisely as that principle which enables us to pos-
sess, per participationem, the divine esse which is God's per essentiam. 
The second problem which confronts us, methodologically speaking, 
is that of grace as accidental. There are two elements to this problem. 
The first is the difficulty of explaining how grace, as supernatural, 
can be correlated to a natural act of existence. As Keefe points out, 
The primal reception of the revelation cannot be conceptual; 
it cannot be infused into an already constituted person, for such 
an infused grace would either inhere in the intellect as a con-
ceptual specification inadequate to an apprehension of the prime 
truth, or it would inhere in the substantial soul, which then, 
being elevated in the order of substance, would by supposition 
be transcendentally correlated to a purely natural act of exis-
tence, of esse. But this is impossible: essence, as a limita-
tion of esse, cannot transcend that which it limits. 54 
530ckham's razor has its uses. 
54Keefe, Thomism, p. 106. 
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The second element, a corollary to the first, stems from the fact 
that it is "impossible to correlate a supernatural accident and a natural 
substance, for substance is the prius of accidents.,,55 Host Thomists 
attempt to circumvent these problems by speaking of grace as a "unique" 
accident, unlike any other accident. In· so doing, they seem to leave 
themselves open to the charge of using the term 'accident' in. a nominal-
ist way. Whether or not this be the case, the methodological problem 
remains. Potency and act are not real apart from their correlation. To 
suppose that grace as accident is somehow exempt from this methodological 
principle is to suppose that accidental grace is a thing in itself, re-
quiring no correlating principle to account for its reality. 
The third problem which confronts us is that of grace as formal. 
On the one hand, it is not surprising that Thomism understands grace 
to be formal. After all, grace is understood to ~xercise a formal im-
pact on those who receive it. Therefore, as we have seen, grace must 
be associated with the essence of a thing, not with its esse. On the 
other hand, however, there is something surprising in the notion that 
the Being of Ipsum Esse, communicated via the substantial principle of 
esse, is unable to exercise the intelligible impact on things which 
that same Being, communicated via the accidental principle of grace, 
is able to exercise on them . Since God is Pure Act, it is difficult to 
understand how His communication of Himself as pure act (esse) is of 
a lower order (the natural order) than is His communication of Himself 
under the modality of formal grace (the supernatural order). Mersch 
attempts to get around this by supposing that grace can be viewed from 
two different directions. 
55Ibid ., p. 67. 
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•.. grace, regarded as an assimilation to God, is a new act 
rather than a new form, for God is act, not form. However, in 
accord with the point of view that regards grace as something in 
man, we may admit that it is a form; but we should add that it 
actuates more than it informs, and that it imparts fuller being 
rather than another kind of being. 56 
Since everything that Mersch says here can be made to apply as much 
to esse as it does to grace, it is not easy to see how these two views 
of grace clarify the situation at all. 
Since esse is a constitutive principle immanent within things, 
it is difficult to avoid the notion that it exercises something akin 
to formal causality. Since it is, furthermore, not only a principle 
which lies outside of (praeter) but also above (supra) its correla-
tive principle, it is difficult to understand how it could be regarded 
as 'natural'. Finally, since its placement within things is not re-
quired to account for creation ad extra, it is very difficult to dis-
sociate it from creation ad intra and therefore from grace. For, by it, 
we are granted a share in the divine Esse which is God. 
Esse and a New Ontology 
The supernatural has been defined as a "participation in the 
divine good, in a good that naturally pertains to God alone.,,57 Since 
esse subsistens, pure act, is the good which naturally, i.e., per 
• 
essentiam, pertains to God alone, it would seem impossible to avoid the 
conclusion that the principle of esse, whereby we participate in Ipsum 
Esse, simultaneously constitutes our participation in that which is 
supernatural to us. Far from constituting us as autonomous, esse places 
56Mersch, The Theology of the Mystical Body, p. 621. 
57schema constitutionis dOgmaticae secundae de fide, c. 3. Cf. 
ST I-II, 110, 1. 
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contingency at the root of our being. 
The fact that Thomism has not recognized this lies, in large part, 
in a methodological misunderstanding at the center of the Thomist enter-
prise. Thomists have, by and large, made the assumption that our imaging 
of God must be a formal imaging. When they found this imaging absent 
from Aristotle, they experienced a strong felt need to supply it. Hence 
the Divine Ideas. But the assumption that our imaging of God must be 
formal is a Platonic assumption, based on the VI ew that material reality 
is substantial only to the degree that it participates in the primary 
substances, the Ideal Forms. If one makes this assumption, then one 
is led to suppose that the relation of the world to God and its de-
pendence on Him are inherent in the formal structures of the world. 
Formally speaking, therefore, the world cannot be understood apart 
from God. Hence, the world can be made autonomous only if it is sup-
plied with some further non-formal element which it can then be under-
stood to prese~e within itself. 
If, however, as we have argued, the Aristotelian project is pre-
cisely that of providing an alternative to the Platonic notion of 
divine exemplarity, then the Aristotelian primary substance is, by 
definition, formally autonomous. Such a notion of substance, converted 
by Thomas into the essential principle in existing things, grounds not 
their contingency or dependence on God but their otherness or distinct-
iveness vis a vis God. The correlation of esse with such a notion of 
essence then provides the means by which creatures are understood to 
be contingent and related to God. Esse, therefore, far from overcoming 
the contingency of the creature, establishes the creature as contingent 
in every respect. The esse/essence distinction is the methodological 
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statement of this contingency. As Keefe notes, 
The act-potency method of this [Aristotelian] ontology, which 
concludes to an understanding of being as immanent essence, 
permits this essentialist understanding of the world to be 
itself in potency to a theological understanding. This was 
the insight of St. Thomas. 58 
If this is the case, Thomism cannot be a metaphysics in search of a 
middle ground between nature and grace. On the contrary, "Thomism is 
a supernaturalism, for it seeks to understand, not the necessity of 
essential nature, but the possibility of a gratuity which is not im-
plicit in essence. ,,59 This gratuity is expressed by the esse/essence 
correlation. 
Mersch has raised the question of how a man who has his own form, 
that form which in fact makes him a man, can nevertheless be understood 
as capable of undergoing a formal change which does not undermine his 
own nature. 
• • • how can a man in any true sense put on a form that will 
divinize him? He already has his form, and that is what makes 
him man. How can he receive another form that will make him 
divine, without ceasing to be human? And how can he introduce 
into his form the modifications that are needed to make it 
divine and that have to be so great as to be almost infinite, 
without stretching it well beyond the necessarily narrow limits 
capable of admitting accidental changes, and without bursting it 
asunderZ60 
He concludes that we must seek a "new ontology" in order to account for 
this. 
Such an ontology already exists in Thomism insofar as it adheres 
to the principles of its own act/potency methodology. For, within such 
a methodology, existential grace does not threaten essential integrity 
by entering into the already constituted limits of a finite nature. 
58Keefe, Thomism, p. 26. 
59Ibid., p. 48. 
60 Mersch, The Theology of the Mystical Body, p. 617. 
Rather, it composes with its correlative essential principle in such 
a way as to exercise a non-formal but intelligible impact upon the 
existential substance which it helps constitute . 
. . . there is in each man an existential gratuity, a grace 
more fundamental than any other, which is his substantial be-
ing, the correlation between his essential, potential being, 
and his gratuitous existence. In this correlation he subsists; 
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it is his substantial actuality, a continuum of existential actua-
tion of essential potentiality, which is the substantial prius of 
all his accidental manifestations of his being. This gratuity 
must be denominated sufficient grace. It is supernatural, in 
the strict sense of non-essential, and is prior in being to all 
other grace. 61 
In such a methodology, no purely natural substances can exist. 
For substance is existential (graced), not essential (natural). Pure 
nature is therefore potential, not actual. Herein lies the signifi-
cance of esse as immanent within created things. For within an act/ 
potency methodology transformed by the esse/essence distinction, no 
essence can exist apart from its correlation with esse. In other words, 
the Aristotelian essential universe is not only uncreated in Aristotle, 
it is uncreatable in Thomism. This uncreatability, however, is systematic, 
not doctrinal. As Keefe notes with regard to Thomist methodology, the 
Aristotelian essence is "uncreated and uncreatable insofar as the system 
is concerned.,,62 That God might have created a universe incapable of 
6lKeefe, Thomism, ~. 64. 
62Keefe, "A Methodological Critique," p. 36. Keefe notes, in the 
same article (p. 32) that "In von Balthasar's ' hands, and in this he is 
seconded by Karl Rahner and Henri de Lubac, grace remains grace only if 
there exists alongside it concrete natural reality: e.g., concrete 
human nature. . . . The nerve of this argument is that the divine free-
dom to create man without calling him to a supernatural destiny must 
be systematically maintained, and that only in this simultaneity of 
natural and supernatural reality, which cannot be made systematically 
coherent, is the divine transcendence given a real theological recog-
nition." The difficulty here of systematic incoherence can be over-
come by recognizing the distinction between theological and systematic 
necessities. 
234 
being submitted to a Thomist act/potency analysis remains a possibility. 
It simply means that God is capable of creating a non-Thomist universe. 
If 'pure nature' is, as Keefe says, "a counterconcept, a possibi-
lity of thought whose reification is always a falsification,,,63 it 
follows that the notion of double gratuity also has no place in a 
Thomist methodology. For, theologically speaking, existential grace, 
as a participation in the life of God, is indissociable from gratia 
Christi. And, methodologically speaking, existential grace is in-
separable from our essential participation in the human species, whose 
formal cause, as we have seen, must be Christ, the God-man, in Whom 
alone existential and formal causality can be understood as distinct 
but inseparable. 
There is then no basis for the notion, time-honored in Catholic 
theology, of a 'double gratuity,' the one of nature, the other 
of grace: the ex nihilo of creation in Christ is precisely the 
ex nihilo of gratia Christi, the Gift of the Spirit which is the 
purpose of the Father's sending of the Son, and which is in-
separable from the Incarnation as it is from the Eucharistic 
worship of the Church. 64 
In order to account for substantial grace within a Thomist act/ 
potency methodology, however, some means must be provided to account 
for 1) a union of the divine and human which is substantial, not 
accidental, 2) pure nature as potential, not existential and 3) esse 
as not only actuating but exercising intelligible impact upon existential 
substance . Happily, the means to do so are already in place in Thomas 
himself, in his account of the Incarnation. 
63 Idem ., Thomism, p. 84. 
64 Idem., "Toward a Renewal of Sacramental Theology," The Thomist 
44 (July 1980) : 368. 
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Esse and the Incarnation 
The esse/essence distinction, used by Thomas to account for the 
createdness of things, is also employed by him to account for the In-
carnation. The correspondence between creation and Incarnation is, 
therefore, already present in Thomism. As Keefe points out, 
Beginning with the contingent existence of the created universe, 
he [Thomas] was led to stating an act-potency correlation un-
known and unnecessary to the Aristotelian essentialism, that of 
existence as the substantial actuation of essence. This new 
application of the Aristotelian act-potency correlation at once 
gave an ontological basis for the dogmatic fact of creation, 
and made it possible and necessary to place an ontological dis-
tinction between human nature and its final, personal actuation, 
without depriving that nature of its essential activity or opera-
tion. Thus, an ontological understanding of the Christological 
dogma was provided: God, the Creator, must be understood as 
unlimited actuality, as Ipsum Esse, and in the Person of the 
Logos, must be understood methodologically or ontologically as 
the existential actuality of the humanity of Jesus the Christ, 
Who is thus the existential, substantial union of God and man in 
one divine Person. 65 
That the union is substantial is very clear in Thomas' writings. 
"Now divine and human nature, though infinitely diverse, are neverthe-
less brought together in the mystery of the Incarnation in one ontologi-
cal subject; and neither of them pertains to this subject in an accidental 
way, but rather substantially.,,66 Furthermore, their union in the Per-
son of the Word requires that, in Christ, there be only one act of exis-
tence. 
. . a human nature is united to the Son of God hypostatically 
or personally, and not accidentally. Consequently, with his 
human nature he does not acquire a new personal existence, but 
simply a new relation of his already existing personal existence 
to the human nature. Accordingly, this person is now said 
65Keefe, Thomism, p. 45. 
66 ST III, 16, 1 ad 1. 
to subsist not only in divine nature but also in human 
nature. 67 
Hence, we are able to say that "The eternal existence of the Son of 
God which is identified with the divine nature becomes the existence 
of the man inasmuch as the human nature is assumed by the Son of God 
into the unity of his person.,,68 
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This substantial communication of His existence by the Person of 
the Logos to the human nature is precisely what Fr. de la Taille under-
stands to be the one new element provided by the Incarnation. 
So then, the communication of the Word's own being is some-
thing created, although the being of the Word is uncreated. 
And there is the new element introduced by the Incarnation; 
new, no less than created; truly positive; no mere amputation; 
new and positive, but also substantial: and this is what we 
now have to note. It is substantial forasmuch as the communica-
tion of the Word's existence to the soul and body is the actuali-
zation (supernatural, of course) of the human nature as a potency 
in regard of being. The actualization of such potency is some-
thing in the substantial order; not anything that could be re-
duced to mere accident. Indeed, it is the most substantial 
actuality of all: although it is no part of the nature thus 
actuated: but it is what we call substantial ex1stence. 69 
This communicated existence as substantial, not accidental, is 
important, to our purposes, in two ways. First, it makes clear that 
this union of divine and human does not present us with the problem of 
accounting for how divinity is able to squeeze itself, so to speak, 
into the finite limits of an already-constituted (i.e., existing) 
• human n~ture. As Mascall notes with regard to modern English theologi-
cal discussions about the Incarnation, 
67 ST III, 17, 2. 
68 ST III, 17, 2 ad 2. 
69M• de la Taille, The Hypostatic Union, trans. Cyril Vollert 
(lolest Baden Springs, Ind: ~olest Baden College, 1952), p. 21. 
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They take as their starting-point human nature as it is known 
to us, and then in effect inquire what must happen to the divine 
Word if he is to be compressed within its limits; they hardly 
ever start by considering the mode of existence of the divine Word 
and then ask what must happen to human nature if it is to be 
united to him. 70 
Rather, the question which confronts us is how the human nature can be 
disposed to receive the divine existence. For the change which takes 
place here, as Thomas points out, is on the side of the human nature, 
not on the side of the Person of the Logos. 7l The change in question 
must be some sort of adaptation of the human nature to the Logos, a 
perfecting of the human nature precisely in and through its union with 
the Logos. 
this perfection must be a transcendent actuation brought 
about by union with the pure Act; it can be nothing else than a 
pure adaptation, a pure assimilation and participation of one of 
the two natures with reference to the other. But only the human 
nature can be thus adapted. 72 
This brings us to the second aspect of this communicated existence 
which is important to our purposes. This perfection or adaptation does 
not come ab extrinseco to an already-constituted human nature. It comes 
to it immanently, from the union itself of divine and human. Therefore, 
the causality which brings about this change in the human nature cannot 
be regarded as in the order of efficient or external causality. 
The perfecting we wish to speak of is not and cannot be in 
the order of effi~ient causality that brings about the union, 
however slight the efficient causality may be; the union would 
in that case lose its transcendence. The perfection does not pre-
dispose to the union, does not prepare for it, does not facilitate 
it. The perfection comes into being through the union, not vice 
70E. L. Mascall, Christ, the Christian and the Church (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1946), p. 15. 
71 ST III, 2, 7. 
72Mersch, The Theology of the Mystical Body, p. 214. 
~ 
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versa; it is the union that explains the perfection, not the per-
fection that accounts for the union. 
We may say that the perfecting causes the assumed human nature 
to be the human nature of God and that it adapts the human nature 
for the union. It does so, however, not in the way of an effi-
cient cause, but in the way of a quasi-formal cause. 73 
Although M. de la Taille refuses to designate this causality as in any 
way "formal," he acknowledges that we must understand a "dispositive" 
causality to be at work here. 74 Hence, we have in the Incarnation a 
situation in which the divine Esse operates substantially and existential-
ly not as an efficient cause but as a "quasi-formal" cause exercising an 
intelligible impact on the human nature which it actuates, adapting and 
perfecting that nature from within the union which it effects between 
itself and that nature. 
We have here also a situation in which human nature is a substantial 
principle, not a substance in its own right. As a result, the intelli-
gibility which it has as an existential substance cannot be attributed 
entirely to those formalities arising from its essential principle. The 
intrinsic dispositive causality of the divine Esse contributes its own 
intelligibility to the existential substance which arises from the union 
of the Person of the Logos with the human nature. Consequently, the 
human nature, as existential, acquires a perfection which is extrinsic 
to it as essential principle (i.e., supernatural), but intrinsic to it 
• 
as existential substance (i.e., substantial grace). Thus, we have in 
the Incarnation two immanent causal principles, one existential, the 
other essential, distinct when considered with regard to the divine 
and human natures, yet inseparable in their union in the Person of the 
73 Ibid., p. 208. 
74de la Taile, The Hypostatic Union, pp. 30-31. 
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Word, both of which are necessary to understand the elevation of Christ's 
human nature to a participation in the divine Esse. As Mersch says 
with regard to that elevation, 
Undoubtedly the transcendental aspect that makes it a divini-
zation and the human aspect that makes it an exaltation of the 
human nature are strictly inseparable; only the strict unity of 
the person with the two natures accounts for its existe~ce. Yet 
the two aspects are distinct, with a distinction derived from 
that of the natures which are united. . . . Accordingly what is 
usually presented in theology as a divinization appears to be 
primarily a realization of the ultimate perfections human nature 
is capable of and, if we may say so, a transcendent "humaniza-
tion.,,7S 
In the Incarnation; we are presented with a concrete instance, be-
cause the union is substantial not accidental, in which the esse which 
perfects the essence is identically the grace which perfects the nature. 
Therefore, the real distinction is not only, methodologically speaking, 
a way of stating the gratuity of creation; it is also a way of stating 
the gratuity of Incarnation. Might we not also expect it to be a way 
of stating the gratuity of our own existence? Mersch tells us that we 
would do well to contemplate the divinization of Christ's humanity, 
for it is "the divinization of all humanity.,,76 If this be the case, 
we might well expect the esse/essence correlation to be a kind of 
methodological shorthand for our own creation in Christ. 
7SMersch, The Theology of the Mystical Body, p. 20S. 
76Ibid ., p. 618. 
